The following report describes an accident at Seneca Rocks, West Virginia. This is a longer form version of a report than what will be published in the 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing. If you are a Partner Level Member or above, Accidents will arrive in your mailbox any day.

The book is filled with examples of both good and bad luck—unfortunately, mainly the latter. This tragic accident occurred on the third pitch of a popular route at Seneca Rocks when a climber with three years of experience took an intentional leader fall. The rope was not running over an edge, his gear was in perfect working order, and his belayer made no mistakes. He expected a safe, albeit long fall. Instead, the rope was severed and he tragically fell to his death.

Fall On Rock | Carabiner Cut Rope

Monongahela National Forest, Seneca Rocks

Arthur Kearns, local guide and owner of The Gendarme Climbing Shop and the Seneca Rocks Climbing School, submitted the following report:

On August 5, a party of two started up Simple J Malarkey (3 pitches, 5.7). The top of the second pitch ends in a corner alcove with overhanging rock above. At the start of the third pitch, the leader, Danny Gerhart (24), placed a 0.75 Camalot just above the belay, before attempting to climb up and left. Gerhart encountered a wasp’s nest and stepped back down to the belay. He then stepped down and to the right on the ramp that ends the second pitch. This was the sequence most used by other climbers.

Gerhart was now about five feet away from the belay. He placed a second 0.75 Camalot before moving up and left to a second alcove, about eight feet above and to the right of the belay. Here, Gerhart placed a number 3 Camalot in a shallow, slightly flaring pocket. (This piece was found with both extended and non-extended alpine draws attached.) At this point, he removed the second 0.75 Camalot to prevent excessive rope drag. 

Gerhart attempted to move up and right from this stance, which is the most used sequence. This crux section requires the leader to move over a roof on a four-foot-high plaque of rock. Though protection is available, the leader cannot see it until they have committed to the crux, and even then, the placement is behind the climber and at waist level. The handholds here could be described as less than inspiring, as water drains onto them from above, adding a polished feel to the rock. Having found no gear, Gerhart stepped back down to the previous stance and discussed options with the belayer. By then, the sun was peeking over the top, making route-finding more difficult. The climbing team discussed options before Gerhart decided to move up and left.

Climbing above the last piece and not finding additional protection, Gerhart called down to the belayer, informing them that he was going to take a deliberate fall (acknowledging it was “going to be a big one”). He then let go and fell around 12 feet before loading the rope. The belayer reported having enough time to take in two to four feet of slack before hearing a very loud “gunshot” as the rope exploded. The belayer never felt the falling climber load the belay, and Gerhart fell approximately 130 feet to the ground. 

While numerous climbing parties immediately responded to give aid, the fallen climber passed at the scene. 

Evidence points to the rope being cut by the rope-end carabiner (a Petzl Spirit) on the extended alpine draw attached to the number 3 Camalot. The carabiner remained attached to the fully extended alpine draw and was situated on a slabby portion of rock just below the Camalot. Fuzzy remains from the rope sheath were found inside the carabiner. No rope sheath material was found on any nearby rock edges or the slabby rock face. Photos from the accident scene show about seven feet of rope extending from the tie-in on Gerhart’s harness. Three to four feet of core was exposed where the rope cut. The individual core bundles were all severed at the same length; this indicates a definitive “cut” versus extended shredding over an edge.

 ANALYSIS

Kearns wrote the following analysis:

How the carabiner cut the rope is difficult to visualize. But here is my attempt to explain it. The rope leaving the belayer moved up through the first piece and past the slightly overhanging rock above. The overhang included a six-to-eight-inch-wide V-slot that likely inhibited the belay strand from moving laterally to the right. At the time of impact, the belay strand of the rope would have been lying on the slabby rock face above before entering the backside of the carabiner, which in turn was clipped to the extended draw on the number 3 Camalot. In the same way the load strand in an ATC Guide locks down on the belay strand, so did the leader’s end of the rope. It wrapped around the carabiner, crushing down on the belay strand and the rock below it, and thus focusing the entire load of the fall onto the small section of rope between Gerhart and the cam.

In essence, Gerhart took a factor-two fall onto the carabiner. In fact, he may have achieved something greater than a factor-two fall, as the pinched rope effectively reduced the rope in the system to around six feet. I’ll leave it up to someone more qualified to calculate the force load of a climber falling an estimated 9 to 11 feet on around six feet of rope and all that energy being applied at the bend at the carabiner and onto the belay strand. Needless to say, it was enough to instantly sever the rope. 

One tragic fact: It’s quite possible that Gerhart’s extended sling may have perfectly positioned the carabiner at the time the piece was placed, but then tragically the carabiner shifted into the fateful position. Had the carabiner been just two inches to the left or right, it would no longer have been lying on rock but hanging in free space. Would extending the sling on the first piece Gerhart placed have changed the location of the carabiner in question at the time of impact? This is unknown, as the first piece was ultimately removed by the belayer before they rappelled to the ground, so we were not able to replicate exactly how the rope was running. 

Apart from the fact that Gerhart was slightly off route, this was, in my opinion, a freak accident. Two inches of movement in the carabiner could have made the difference between life and death.

(Source: Arthur Kearns, guide, Seneca Rocks Climbing School.)

Editor’s Note from Pete Takeda:

After hearing of this incident, I emailed Kearns—a very experienced local guide. Kearns climbed Simple J Malarkey the day after the accident with a fellow guide. Kearns came to the conclusion above, based on the pair’s observations, discussions with the belayer, and their intimate knowledge of the area and the route.

I also extensively interviewed and eventually went climbing with the belayer. I was assured that the rope was in good condition and had not been exposed to any compromising chemicals.

The belayer also sent the intact section of rope to Ryan Jenks of HowNot2 for break testing. Jenks posted his assessment on Instagram. He felt that, “It’s unclear what happened. Be as safe as you can climbing but there are inherent risks. We lost one of the good ones..”

Finally, the belayer wrote to ANAC: “I think about the HowNot2 video where Ryan tested the rope (9.4mm) and how he showed an example of a (different) #3 Camalot that took a lot (an unknown amount) of force and was mangled. The number 3 Danny fell on looked in perfect condition after the accident. I don’t know how much force it would take to deform it (BD website says number 3’s have a 12kN strength), but Ryan implied in the video that if the rope broke due to force alone (in the video it broke at 10.86/11.33 kN) the cam should have deformed. I just think the rope MUST have cut or at least abraded somewhere right around the carabiner. Also, in that video the broken ends looked different than they did from the accident. In the video the core wasn’t sticking out or hiding way back in the sheath. After the accident my end of the rope had a few inches of empty sheath extending beyond the core.”

Note from Rob Chisnall, the ANAC Canada Editor:

Rob Chisnall is a climbing safety consultant and member of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences. He testifies in civil cases involving climbing accidents and also in criminal cases involving homicide, suicide, auto-erotic fatality, and other misadventures involving knots and ligatures. 

Chisnall reviewed Kearn’s report and wrote to ANAC that “the explanation is sound.” He further noted that:

1. Ropes have been getting thinner, and lightweight carabiners no longer bear a round cross section. Stress-strain analyses have allowed manufacturers to eliminate unnecessary metal from carabiners, giving many carabiners a T or H cross section (sharper edges).  

2. Sport ropes are now typically less than 10 mm in diameter, the one in question being 9.4 mm. So, whatever pinch point was created, the same force would have been applied to a much smaller surface area compared to decades ago. The carabiner might have momentarily resembled something akin to a blunt cutting edge. And maybe the rock surface at the pinch/cutting point was overtly convex, thus concentrating the force even more.

3. I've observed people having problems when lowering off slabs, then onto vertical walls or past overhangs. In this case, the angle between the parts of the rope exiting the carabiner might have been reduced to zero, creating a pinch point.

4. Judging from the description of the damaged rope, it appears the sheath cut first and shifted position, exposing the core strands, which then cut cleanly in one place—they probably instantaneously flattened out.

5. Ropes [that] cut via lateral movement over a sharp edge do not go “BANG.” The belayer clearly recalled a very loud “gunshot” noise as the rope exploded. In less dramatic breakages, a rope pulled straight to failure usually makes a snapping sound, like an elastic band.

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