Prescription—Knee Stuck in Crack

Wild as it may seem, every year we publish at least one report of a climber getting their knee stuck in an offwidth crack. Sound crazy? It happened to Martin Boysen on Trango Tower and more recently Jason Kruk on Boogie Till You Puke. 

Queen Victoria Spire in Sedona, Arizona, was the scene of a stuck knee incident in 2023. Photos by Xander Ashburn | Wikimedia.

The final section of the second pitch of the Regular Route (III, 5.7) on Queen Victoria Spire. This four-inch crack trapped a climber on her first outdoor climb. Photo: Chris Thornley/Climbing Magazine

Knee Stuck in Crack

Sedona, Queen Victoria Spire 

On January 8, Climber 1 (female, 25) got her knee stuck in a wide crack on the Regular Route (3 pitches, 5.7) on Queen Victoria Spire in Sedona. Climber 1 was following four friends on her first outdoor climb when she attempted an “alpine knee” while pulling onto a ledge on the second pitch.

An “alpine knee” is when you place that joint on top of a high hold and use it for progress, instead of a foot. Rather than helping her onto the ledge, Climber 1’s knee slipped into a four-inch-wide crack, where it wedged and became stuck. Others in her party tried pouring water over her knee in an attempt to free it but were unsuccessful. 

At 5:15 p.m., the Coconino County Sheriff’s department was contacted to perform a rescue. By 8 p.m., the SAR team had arrived. It took over an hour to free the climber from the crack, and by then the climber was exhibiting signs of mild hypothermia (they had started climbing at 12:30 p.m.). The climbing party was airlifted off the spire. The stuck climber was not injured and refused treatment.

ANALYSIS

The climbers in this scenario did “everything right,” according to the SAR team. They tried to free their partner, and failing that, they initiated a rescue. Many relatively easy routes have awkward sections or styles of climbing that may seem above the technical grade when first encountered outdoors. Care should be taken when making a move where a slip or fall could result in injury or entrapment. It took about four hours to free this climber, and temperatures at the crag dropped to around 30°F. Consider worst-case scenarios when preparing for a climb, as unexpected events could result in prolonged exposure to the elements.

(Source: Dan Apodaca.) 

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Video Analysis

If getting your knee stuck in an offwidth is so common, what do we do if it happens? In the video analysis, ANAC editor Pete Takeda provides some tips on how to prepare for this kind of worst-case scenario when rock climbing.

Credits: Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and Hannah Provost, Content Director; Producer: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney @Sierra_McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney @fosterdoodle_; Editor: Sierra McGivney @Sierra_McGivney; Location: Cob Rock, Boulder Canyon, CO

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Similar Accidents—Accidents in North American Climbing

• 2022 | Leg Stuck in Crack
  California, Joshua Tree National Park Left Horse Area

• 2019 | Stranded—Knee Stuck in Wide Crack
  Minnesota, Sandstone, Robinson Park

• 2014 | Stranded—Knee Jammed in Crack
  Wyoming, Vedauwoo, Easy Jam

• 2009 | Stranded—Inability to Remove Anatomical Protection
  California, Yosemite Valley, Bishops Terrace

• 2006 | Stranded—Leg Stuck in Crack
  British Columbia, Purcell Mountains Bugagoo Spire, Kain Route

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The Prescription—Top-Rope Solo

Angel Wings in Sequoia National Park. Valkyrie (V 5.11+) climbs the sunlit buttress to the right of the highest summit in this image. Photo: Brandon Thau

In this month’s Prescription, an expert climber made two crucial errors in her rope ascension/top-rope solo system. She fortunately escaped with relatively minor injuries.

This accident was featured in the 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing.

Top-Rope Solo Fall | Device Jammed By Sling

Sequoia National Park, Angel Wings

Valkyrie takes the spectacular red line shown above. Clark’s accident occurred on the slab at the bottom of the climb. Photo: Brandon Thau

On October 8, 2023 Whitney Clark was ascending a fixed rope at the start of Valkyrie (17 pitches, 5.11+) when her single ascension device was jammed by a sling. She fell 30 feet to the ground.

Clark wrote to ANAC:

“We woke at around 6 a.m. and made our way to the fixed line from the day before. The days were short and we had many pitches to do. My partner, Luka Krajnc, went first, using a Grigri to jug and then transitioning to climbing. About 40 feet up, he clove-hitched the rope to a bolt. I then started jugging with a single Micro Traxion. Thirty feet up, I leaned back on the rope. My body weight wasn’t supported because the sling around my neck [part of the top-rope solo setup] got sucked into the device and caught in the teeth of the Traxion. The rope was sliding against the sling. I hadn’t tied a backup knot.”

Clark attempted to wrap the rope around her leg. But her rope was new, thin, and slippery. She wrote, “I grabbed the rope and slowly started sliding down. Eventually the rope burn was too painful and I let go. I hit the ground, landed on my feet, and fell backward. I struck my lower back and then my head. I was wearing a helmet. Because the ground was angled, some of the force was dissipated, though I landed six inches from a large rock spike.

“I never lost consciousness but was in a bit of shock. Luka rappelled down and did a spinal exam. He got me comfortable, and I sat there for a while. I had pain in my back and my left ankle. I used my inReach to call for a rescue while Luka retrieved our stuff. I started crawling and butt-scooting to where a heli could reach me. I would have loved to have self-rescued, but it’s a 16-mile hike out. It took about 2.5 hours of crawling to make it to a flat place. Four hours later, a helicopter airlifted me to the Visalia Level III trauma center.”

 Whitney Clark’s progress-capture device failed when the as-yet-unused retention sling got stuck in the device as she was ascending. It is common practice to use a sling and an elastic connection to hold the progress-capture device upright as one climbs along a fixed rope. Photo: Luka Krajnc

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The Prescription—Video Analysis

Top-rope soloing is becoming increasingly popular. In this video, Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IFMGA/AMGA guide Jason Antin are back to provide an accident analysis and give you some quick tips on how to mitigate risk when top-rope soloing.

Top-rope soloing is an integral part of modern climbing. Currently, only one device (the El Mudo) is designed and commercially available for top-rope (and lead) soloing. There are many ways to configure these systems and we’ve demonstrated one possible solution here.

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ANALYSIS

Solo top-roping allows a climber to self-belay when no partner is available, for a team to work on individual sections of a route without the need for a belayer, or for two climbers to move simultaneously, as in this situation. The errors Clark made were using only one device to safeguard her progress and not tying a backup knot.

“I was jugging by pulling on the rope, syncing up the slack, and sitting back,” Clark said. “The route was meandering and the fixed line didn’t allow me to readily climb, so I decided to jug straight up the initial blank slab. The sling around my neck was going to hold the Traxion upright [allowing the rope to feed freely] once I started climbing. I haven’t done any top-rope soloing since the accident. I probably will at some point, but I will definitely use two devices. This was the first time I only used a single progress-capture device.”  (Source: Whitney Clark.)

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The Prescription—Bouldering Fall

Photo by AAC Member Merrick Ales

It’s bouldering season in Hueco Tanks, Texas. While most consider bouldering relatively safe, it is perhaps the most accident- and injury-plagued facet of climbing. This month we bring you an accident that took place in 2024 on a famous John Sherman highball called See Spot Run.  

This accident will be featured in the 2025 Accidents in North American Climbing.

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Bouldering Fall | Poor Pad Placement

Hueco Tanks State Park, North Mountain

Hueco Tanks is a world-class climbing area known for its outstanding bouldering. It’s also known for having more than its fair share of spicy highball problems. Photo: Pete Takeda.

On January 22, I (Pete Korpics, 35) was attempting to climb a long-standing project of mine called See Spot Run (V6). I was well aware of the risks involved and that it would require ample padding. 

During previous sessions, I had placed six or more pads in a wide area including the back of the fall zone. Six pads or more is ideal, but I was admittedly negligent on the day of the accident, as I felt I’d complete the route and was excited to do it. I also felt that the pad number and pad placement—five total and not as wide as prior attempts—was adequate, given the presence of two spotters. I felt very strong getting to the crux. After pulling through the crux, I got very pumped, lost momentum, and hesitated. We all know that moment when you feel uncertain about the next move. In those moments we tell ourselves, “Do it anyway.” Sometimes this works, but often it doesn’t. In this case, I fell. 

I fell from roughly 15 feet up, with quite a bit of force. My spotters were hesitant to put their bodies in harm’s way. I had told them that, above the crux, staying clear was the best thing to do. Having two people injured is worse than one. 

Due to the momentum of the fall and the poor pad placement, my left foot hit the rock and right foot hit the pad. I severely sprained my ankle. It was probably not helpful that it has in the past received the same injury.  

Pete Korpics on an early attempt on See Spot Run. He recalls, “I was very familiar with this famous and dangerous route, as I’d been attempting it for several years.” Photo: Pete Takeda.

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ANALYSIS 

Bouldering is inherently dangerous, and highball problems particularly so. Besides being a four-star John Sherman classic, See Spot Run is a notorious ankle breaker. It is 25 feet tall and described on Mountainproject.com as “one of the more notorious highball problems at Hueco.”

During the same season that Korpics had his accident, other falls from the route caused multiple ankle sprains.

Keep ‘Em On The Pad!

On highballs, the impact forces of a falling climber can be equally hazardous to the spotter. The general rule for highballs (and all bouldering for that matter) is to ensure that the falling climber lands on the pads and stays on the pads after impact. Spotting might look less like controlling and guiding the fall, and more like giving the falling climber a shove to keep them on the pads. The spotter(s) should also protect the head and neck from striking bare ground, rocks, etc.

Korpics wrote to ANAC: ”Preventable action would have included better pad placement and more pads. We could have used thinner pads to cover gaps between pads. This accident may also have been prevented by assertive spotting, and a strong shove from one of the spotters would have landed me on the pads. That possibility was negated because I had instructed my spotters to stand clear if I fell from above the crux.

“Confidence should not lead to complacency,” he continued. “I’d been climbing a lot and climbing well, including numerous highballs prior to the accident, so I’d let my guard down. I do not blame the spotters, as I had given them specific instructions. I had placed the pads, I chose to climb despite knowing more pads would be better, and the injury was my fault.”

(Sources: Pete Korpics, Mountainproject.com, and the Editors.)

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The Prescription—Fall on Ice | Protection Pulled Out

Ice is a fickle medium that is hard to assess. This month we’re highlighting an accident report from ANAC 2023 involving a leader fall that was compounded by pulled protection. Though the climber was very experienced, this accident underlines that even as more people climb ice than ever before, it takes years of experience to accurately gauge conditions. Also, climate change is increasing the hazards of rockfall, avalanches, ice collapse, and generally warmer ice.

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Tim Thompson (circled in yellow) climbing on the Finger of Fate prior to his accident. The gray, bubbly, and unbonded ice in the lower section of the photo reflects the warm temperatures on the day prior. Dustin Lyons

Fall on Ice | Protection Pulled Out

Provo Canyon, Upper Provo Falls

Utah County Sheriff’s Search and Rescue was dispatched at 11:09 a.m. on December 26 to aid an ice climber who had fallen from the first pitch of Finger of Fate (3 pitches, WI4+) in Provo Canyon.

The climber, Tim Thompson (29), was nearing the end of the first pitch when ice sheared from under his left foot. He wrote to ANAC that he was “pushed forward into my ice tools and my relaxed grip caused me to fall.” Thompson’s uppermost screw pulled out of the ice, causing him to fall a total of 50 feet.

Utah County team members arrived and, with the help of the climbers already on scene, evaluated the ice conditions, established an equalized anchor with six screws at the base of the climb, and developed a plan to move the patient horizontally about 100 feet over steep, slippery terrain to a five-by-ten-foot ledge that was out of the rockfall and icefall area. Conditions were deteriorating, the ice was becoming less cohesive as temperatures rose, and rocks were starting to fall.

A Department of Public Safety (DPS) helicopter crew did a reconnaissance of the ledge and determined that it would be a suitable place for a hoist operation. The patient was then short-hauled from the ledge to a nearby parking lot, where an ambulance was waiting. He was airlifted to a hospital and assessed to have two broken vertebrae, a broken elbow, torn ligaments in an elbow, and a badly broken left wrist.

Tim Thompson after falling from the first pitch of Finger of Fate. Rescuers short-hauled him by helicopter to a waiting ambulance. Photo: Dustin Lyons.

ANALYSIS

Warm conditions make ice climbing hazardous. Recalls Thompson: “The weather was warm the day before. Temps overnight were about 28°F for almost 10 or 12 hours and were hovering around 31°F or 32°F while climbing. We felt confident that the ice had had enough time to heal, and that as long as we climbed quickly, we were in no danger.”

Running water, heat retained by the underlying rock, and even indirect solar radiation can prevent ice from refreezing. The warm temperatures also affected the quality of Thompson’s protection. He wrote to ANAC, “When I put in the last ice screw, the ice was really soft. Up until the last quarter of the route, the ice [had been] really healthy and the screw placements were really good. I got several really solid screws lower on the route, and the second-to-last one (the one that caught me) was in really bomber ice.”

Thompson did well to place extra gear that he might have dismissed as unnecessary. Before the final section of the pitch, he says, “I remember pulling onto the ice after a ledge rest and deciding to step back down and place a high screw. I knew that would be a lot of protection, as the last screw was just below my feet. But if I had not placed this screw, I would have hit the deck from almost 100 feet up. Things could have been a lot worse.”

Sources: Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Search and Rescue and Tim Thompson.

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The Prescription—Video Series

Warm conditions make ice climbing hazardous. Pete Takeda, editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin are back to explain the hazards ice climbers face in warm conditions, such as protection pulling, poor tool placements, and shearing crampons.

Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney

Location: Silver Plume Falls, Silver Plume, CO

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A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

Over time an ice climber learns to gauge conditions and most importantly, when to go for it and when to back off. This is a long and experience-based learning curve. The biggest lesson is: If it doesn’t feel right, don’t do it. Whether a novice or an experienced ice climber, don’t factor luck into your decision-making.

Utah guide Derek DeBruin’s flowchart is a handy tool to assess ice climbing decision-making on any given day:

This flowchart can assist in managing hazards by helping determine the stability of the ice, the effectiveness of ice screw protection, and the quality of ice tool placements. Downloadable versions are available here.

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The Prescription—Quickdraw Unclipped

Accessible, low-key, and enjoyable, Pilot Mountain State Park in North Carolina was the scene of a serious accident in March 2023. The mishap was a classic case of climbers doing all the right things yet still having an accident. Idawriter | Wiki Commons

Fall on Rock | Quickdraw Unclipped from Bolt Hanger

North Carolina, Pilot Mountain State Park

My climbing partner (31) and I, Alec Gilmore (29), went sport climbing at Pilot Mountain State Park in March 2023. I have ten years of climbing experience, and my partner has six, and we both take pride in our risk assessment and careful approach. The first route we planned to climb was occupied, so we found a nearby route that neither of us had previously tried. We incorrectly identified the route as a 5.7. The route was actually Goodness Gracious (5.10a). I quickly realized the route was harder, but I had previously led up to 5.11 here, so I went on and clipped three bolts and then hung to work out the crux. It involved throwing a high heel hook and manteling onto an awkward bulge.

This photo, taken immediately after Gilmore fell, shows the alpine quickdraw that came unclipped from a bolt hanger. Alec Gilmore 

I got partially over the bulge and needed to make one more move but couldn't find a good handhold. I ended up falling off. Instead of stopping, I hit the ground after falling 20 feet. Both feet landed on a flat rock step on the main hiking trail. My belayer took up enough slack so that the rope started to catch right as my feet hit. After lying on the ground, overcoming the initial shock and pain, I realized that the alpine quickdraw that I had clipped into the third bolt was still clipped to the rope. Somehow as I was wrestling with the move, it had come unclipped from the hanger. I was wearing a helmet, but fortunately I did not hit my head or back during the fall.

Park staffers were alerted by a nearby climber, and in about 30 to 45 minutes a team of park employees, other climbers, and volunteers arrived and loaded me onto a transport basket. For the next hour and a half, they carried me back up to the summit, where an ambulance was waiting. At one point they rigged a rope and hauled me up a steep hill to shorten the journey. At the hospital, X-rays showed I had fractured both heel bones. One of the fractures was bad enough to require surgery, and I received a plate and four screws.

ANALYSIS

The first mistake we made was not being sure of what route we were climbing. We had recently been trying routes we hadn't previously climbed. The route I fell from was on my to-do list, but the plan was to warm up with an easier route.

The second mistake was the positioning of the carabiner on the bolt hanger. I knew that it was possible for a carabiner to unclip from a bolt hanger if it's pulled up against the wall in a certain way. I try to keep the spine of the carabiner pointed in the direction I'm climbing. When I was clipping the third bolt, I thought I would climb toward the left side of the bulge. The line turned out to go right. Somehow, as I wrestled with the move, the quickdraw came unclipped.

It’s an unsettling thought, but carabiners can, on rare occasions, unclip from bolt hangers. When the bolt is clipped from right to left and the hanger angles down to the right, tension on the quickdraw can raise the carabiner and lever the gate open. Foster Denney 

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Editor’s Note:  This is a classic case of fellow climbers doing all the right things yet still having an accident.

Though rare, carabiners can come unclipped from bolt hangers. A few things to consider: The hanger-clipping-end carabiner should be loose in the sling, never held by a rubber keeper. Both carabiners on a quickdraw should be oriented with the gates facing the same direction. As Alec mentions, quickdraws should be clipped so the gates are oriented away from the direction of travel. 

 The direction in which one clips also can be a factor in certain cases. Clipping the opposite direction from the angle of the carabiner hole will minimize the possibility of the carabiner levering against the hanger and unclipping. Almost all plate-style bolt hangers have the clipping section on the left side of the hanger. So, the ideal clipping direction would be from left to right. Other factors (like the ones mentioned above) may be more important in a given situation, but when you have a choice, this is the preferred method.

For even more security, a safer play is to flip the gate so it opens downwards. Better yet, if the clip is critical, e.g. before or after a runout, use a locking carabiner on the hanger end of the quickdraw.

 (Source: Alec Gilmore and the Editors.)

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The Prescription—Video Series

Under some circumstances, quickdraws can unclip themselves. Pete Takeda, editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IFMGA/AMGA guide Jason Antin are back to show you that clipping bolts isn’t always as simple as it seems. Dive in to get the accident analysis informing these takeaways, and some quick tips on how to mitigate risk when clipping bolt hangers.

Credits:
Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and Jason Antin @jasonantin, IFMGA/AMGA Certified Mountain Guide; Producer: Shane Johnson; Cinematographer or Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Accessibility Crag, Clear Creek Canyon, CO; Presenting Sponsor: Rocky Talkie @rockytalkies.

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The Prescription: Cams and Magical Thinking—October 2024

Cams might not be as bomber as you think. We are stoked to kick off our Prescription video series by unpacking some magical thinking around cams. This video series will give you greater detail and visual insight into the accidents analyzed in our monthly Prescription newsletters. Featuring Accidents in North American Climbing Editor Pete Takeda, and IFMGA/AMGA Mountain Guide Jason Antin, these bite-sized lessons will get you thinking about how this accident analysis applies to you and your climbing.

For Rocktober we have two accidents that represent a larger trend we noticed in 2023. This trend involves: 1) Placing an inadequate number of protection pieces and 2) Poorly placed camming protection.

Lead Fall on Rock | Cam Pulled Out

Smith Rock State Park, Morning Glory Wall

The crux section of Lion’s Chair Start (5.10c/d R) at Smith Rock. The larger red circle marks the bolt that Genereux was attempting to clip, prior to falling to the ground. The smaller red circle marks the location of the 0.4 cam that pulled out when he fell. Photo: Garrett Genereux.

Garrett Genereux submitted the following report to ANAC:

At the end of a great day of climbing on May 15, my partner Lance (30) and I, Garrett Genereux (34), decided to do one last route on our way out of the main area. We stopped at Lion’s Chair Start (5.10c/d R). As usual, no one was on it despite the routes on both sides being busy. I had been on the route several times before.

I didn't realize how tired I was until on the route. I was trying to conserve energy by not placing too much pro. I was about one body length above my first two pieces of gear and placed a 0.4 cam. My belayer asked if it was a good placement. I assured him that it was fine and kept moving. As I approached the first bolt, where the crack pinches down, I became very fatigued and started getting scared. I wanted to clip the bolt as fast as I could. I was able to hang the draw at my farthest reach. Then I pulled up rope to make the clip. As I inched the rope closer to the lower carabiner, my left foot greased off and I fell.

There was a ton of rope in the system, and when I heard the 0.4 plink out of the crack, I knew I was going to the ground. My left foot briefly hit and then I landed on my butt. I lost my breath and made some guttural noises trying to get it back. I lay supine. My ankle hurt and my lower back was pretty tight, but I had full sensation and movement below. I even remember feeling like I needed to pee while lying there and took that as a good sign.

The folks nearby were able to clean up the lower pieces and someone with the longest stick clip I've ever seen, snagged the draw off the bolt. Someone let me borrow their camp chair. I was able to slip off my climbing shoes. My left ankle was dark in color and already beginning to swell, but I could bear weight and felt that we didn’t need a crew to carry me out.

My partner carried the gear and I used my stick clip as a walking stick as we hiked to the road. My ankle was just a soft-tissue injury, and my back had compression fractures at T12, L1, and L2. Two months later, I was back climbing and feeling well. Since then I have even gotten back on the same route. I sewed it up with 11 pieces rather than three.

ANALYSIS

Simply put, I did not place enough protection. In the first 15 feet, I only placed three pieces: a nut and a cam protecting the start and then the 0.4 cam that pulled. Also, I could have climbed a bit higher to a better hold and clipped the bolt with the same amount of rope in the system as I had when I fell. I also should have checked in with myself mentally and physically. While it is not the most difficult route, it does take focus and it gets an R rating in the newest guide. (Source: Garrett Genereux.)

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Leader Fall on Rock | Protection Pulled Out

Lander, Sinks Canyon, Sandstone Buttress

Gunky (5.8) is a popular route in Sinks Canyon that protects well with hexes and nuts. Familiarity with passive gear and more cam-placing skills might have helped prevent an accident that occurred in July 2023. The high X marks where Taylor fell, and the low X marks where he landed. Photo: Joe M.

On the morning of July 10, Mac Taylor (25) fell on the first pitch of Gunky (2 pitches, 5.8). He wrote the following account for ANAC:

“Two friends and I hiked to the base of Gunky (5.8) at the Sandstone Buttress. I was new to the area. We hiked with gear on our harnesses while carrying ropes and a bag with water and extra gear. I decided to lead the first pitch, despite being told that there was a scary roof section. Part of the reason I chose to lead it was that I already had most of the gear racked on my harness. On the route, I placed a large nut and a number 1 Camalot. I then clipped a bolt and placed a 0.75 Camalot in a shallow slot deep in the crack that I was climbing. 

“Halfway up the pitch, I rested and placed a number 2 Camalot deep in an offwidth-sized crack. I laybacked the crack and got established below the roof. From there, I struggled to find comfortable holds. I was about 10 feet above my last piece.

“I decided to backtrack. My belayer was pulling in slack while I downclimbed. About five feet above my last piece, I fell. My hands slipped first, and my feet were still on the wall. I flipped upside down and pulled two pieces. The number 2 was a good placement, but it was placed straight in the crack, not oriented in the direction of the fall. It levered out and tweaked the cam lobes. The 0.75 just pulled out. I was caught by the bolt after falling 30 feet. My belayer was yanked up then dropped back to the ground as the last piece pulled. This resulted in bruising on their elbows and lower back. I split my lip, sprained my ankle, and cut up my left forearm, with heavy bruising on the right side of my abdomen from my harness.  

“I had stopped right before hitting a ledge. I was lowered to our belay stance, a very large ledge above a slabby wall. My belayer ran down to the car to grab my first-aid kit while I lay on the ground. In the parking lot was an AMGA guide who was also a Wilderness Emergency Medical Technician (WEMT). Rather than navigate the entire approach, the guide lowered me down the slabby wall. I walked out with the help of my friends, and we went to the emergency room. I was given a stirrup and crutches for my ankle, and I got stitches in my lip. I had no internal injuries.”

ANALYSIS

Taylor wrote, “I think the two biggest factors were my overconfidence and my poor gear placements. I had been warned the route had a scary section, and it was the hardest trad climb I would have done up to that time. I definitely should have let a friend lead this pitch while I took the second, less scary pitch. I also really thought I had placed some good pieces on the climb. I should go back and practice my placements more and get some critical feedback from someone more experienced.” (Source: Mac Taylor.)

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Editor’s Note: Cams vs. Nuts

In the 2024 ANAC, there were 13 accidents caused or aggravated by pulled protection. All of them involved a failed cam placement. Whether placed by a novice or professional climber, none of the pulled protection was a nut, hex, or other passive gear.

In my own climbing career, I’ve been as guilty as anyone when it came to magical thinking around cams. When I got my hands on a set of rigid Friends (the first commercially viable spring-loaded camming devices) they were like fast food—quick and convenient. The subconscious belief was that devices of such expense and complexity must have had hidden powers. In some cases, cams outperformed our expectations. But we were to discover that also like fast food, cams came with hidden health risks. I’d often find myself placing a marginal cam, even when there was an obvious and solid nut placement staring me in the face. On several occasions, a poorly runnered cam fell out below my feet, creating a unexpected runout. Another time while I belayed, my partner fell, snapping the shaft of a poorly placed Friend. After these incidents I embarked on a trad curriculum that saw me using only passive gear for a good part of an entire season.

While not as sexy as a rack of the latest cams, a set of hexes, nuts, and Tricams provides light, simple, and intuitive protection. Though cams are often “easier” to place and frequently cover a wide size range, they are also intricate and fussy gadgets that require advanced skill to properly set and assess. As Taylor notes above, simply not orienting the stem in the direction of loading can cause an otherwise good placement to lever out. It is good to remember that although cams will sometimes hold in flares, soft rock, choss, and in shallow placements, sometimes they don’t. And due to a multitude of unseen factors inherent to their mechanism of action, cams can even fail in perfect looking placements.

—Pete Takeda, ANAC Editor

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The Prescription—September

The following report describes an accident at Seneca Rocks, West Virginia. This is a longer form version of a report than what will be published in the 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing. If you are a Partner Level Member or above, Accidents will arrive in your mailbox any day.

The book is filled with examples of both good and bad luck—unfortunately, mainly the latter. This tragic accident occurred on the third pitch of a popular route at Seneca Rocks when a climber with three years of experience took an intentional leader fall. The rope was not running over an edge, his gear was in perfect working order, and his belayer made no mistakes. He expected a safe, albeit long fall. Instead, the rope was severed and he tragically fell to his death.

The third and final pitch of Simple J Malarkey climbs through the overlaps and triangular roofs seen here rising above and slightly left of the prominent cave. This pitch was the scene of a fatal rope-cutting accident (marked with a yellow X) in August 2023. Krzysztof Gorny

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Fall On Rock | Carabiner Cut Rope

Monongahela National Forest, Seneca Rocks

Arthur Kearns, local guide and owner of The Gendarme Climbing Shop and the Seneca Rocks Climbing School, submitted the following report:

On August 5, a party of two started up Simple J Malarkey (3 pitches, 5.7). The top of the second pitch ends in a corner alcove with overhanging rock above. At the start of the third pitch, the leader, Danny Gerhart (24), placed a 0.75 Camalot just above the belay, before attempting to climb up and left. Gerhart encountered a wasp’s nest and stepped back down to the belay. He then stepped down and to the right on the ramp that ends the second pitch. This was the sequence most used by other climbers.

Gerhart was now about five feet away from the belay. He placed a second 0.75 Camalot before moving up and left to a second alcove, about eight feet above and to the right of the belay. Here, Gerhart placed a number 3 Camalot in a shallow, slightly flaring pocket. (This piece was found with both extended and non-extended alpine draws attached.) At this point, he removed the second 0.75 Camalot to prevent excessive rope drag. 

Gerhart attempted to move up and right from this stance, which is the most used sequence. This crux section requires the leader to move over a roof on a four-foot-high plaque of rock. Though protection is available, the leader cannot see it until they have committed to the crux, and even then, the placement is behind the climber and at waist level. The handholds here could be described as less than inspiring, as water drains onto them from above, adding a polished feel to the rock. Having found no gear, Gerhart stepped back down to the previous stance and discussed options with the belayer. By then, the sun was peeking over the top, making route-finding more difficult. The climbing team discussed options before Gerhart decided to move up and left.

Climbing above the last piece and not finding additional protection, Gerhart called down to the belayer, informing them that he was going to take a deliberate fall (acknowledging it was “going to be a big one”). He then let go and fell around 12 feet before loading the rope. The belayer reported having enough time to take in two to four feet of slack before hearing a very loud “gunshot” as the rope exploded. The belayer never felt the falling climber load the belay, and Gerhart fell approximately 130 feet to the ground. 

While numerous climbing parties immediately responded to give aid, the fallen climber passed at the scene. 

Evidence points to the rope being cut by the rope-end carabiner (a Petzl Spirit) on the extended alpine draw attached to the number 3 Camalot. The carabiner remained attached to the fully extended alpine draw and was situated on a slabby portion of rock just below the Camalot. Fuzzy remains from the rope sheath were found inside the carabiner. No rope sheath material was found on any nearby rock edges or the slabby rock face. Photos from the accident scene show about seven feet of rope extending from the tie-in on Gerhart’s harness. Three to four feet of core was exposed where the rope cut. The individual core bundles were all severed at the same length; this indicates a definitive “cut” versus extended shredding over an edge.

 ANALYSIS

Kearns wrote the following analysis:

How the carabiner cut the rope is difficult to visualize. But here is my attempt to explain it. The rope leaving the belayer moved up through the first piece and past the slightly overhanging rock above. The overhang included a six-to-eight-inch-wide V-slot that likely inhibited the belay strand from moving laterally to the right. At the time of impact, the belay strand of the rope would have been lying on the slabby rock face above before entering the backside of the carabiner, which in turn was clipped to the extended draw on the number 3 Camalot. In the same way the load strand in an ATC Guide locks down on the belay strand, so did the leader’s end of the rope. It wrapped around the carabiner, crushing down on the belay strand and the rock below it, and thus focusing the entire load of the fall onto the small section of rope between Gerhart and the cam.

In this highly unusual accident, the carabiner on the rope-bearing end of an alpine quickdraw appears to have acted like a belay device configured in guide mode. The load-bearing/climber strand (on top) trapped the belay strand (on bottom, under the carabiner) between the carabiner and the rock. The rope was severed. No rock edge was involved in cutting the rope, and no rope sheath material was observed on the rock. Drawing by Foster Denney

In essence, Gerhart took a factor-two fall onto the carabiner. In fact, he may have achieved something greater than a factor-two fall, as the pinched rope effectively reduced the rope in the system to around six feet. I’ll leave it up to someone more qualified to calculate the force load of a climber falling an estimated 9 to 11 feet on around six feet of rope and all that energy being applied at the bend at the carabiner and onto the belay strand. Needless to say, it was enough to instantly sever the rope. 

One tragic fact: It’s quite possible that Gerhart’s extended sling may have perfectly positioned the carabiner at the time the piece was placed, but then tragically the carabiner shifted into the fateful position. Had the carabiner been just two inches to the left or right, it would no longer have been lying on rock but hanging in free space. Would extending the sling on the first piece Gerhart placed have changed the location of the carabiner in question at the time of impact? This is unknown, as the first piece was ultimately removed by the belayer before they rappelled to the ground, so we were not able to replicate exactly how the rope was running. 

Apart from the fact that Gerhart was slightly off route, this was, in my opinion, a freak accident. Two inches of movement in the carabiner could have made the difference between life and death.

(Source: Arthur Kearns, guide, Seneca Rocks Climbing School.)

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Editor’s Note from Pete Takeda:

After hearing of this incident, I emailed Kearns—a very experienced local guide. Kearns climbed Simple J Malarkey the day after the accident with a fellow guide. Kearns came to the conclusion above, based on the pair’s observations, discussions with the belayer, and their intimate knowledge of the area and the route.

I also extensively interviewed and eventually went climbing with the belayer. I was assured that the rope was in good condition and had not been exposed to any compromising chemicals.

On @hownot2, Ryan Jenks posted his assessment and wrote, "After testing… it (the rope) seems normal and broke at an acceptable force."

The belayer also sent the intact section of rope to Ryan Jenks of HowNot2 for break testing. Jenks posted his assessment on Instagram. He felt that, “It’s unclear what happened. Be as safe as you can climbing but there are inherent risks. We lost one of the good ones..”

Finally, the belayer wrote to ANAC: “I think about the HowNot2 video where Ryan tested the rope (9.4mm) and how he showed an example of a (different) #3 Camalot that took a lot (an unknown amount) of force and was mangled. The number 3 Danny fell on looked in perfect condition after the accident. I don’t know how much force it would take to deform it (BD website says number 3’s have a 12kN strength), but Ryan implied in the video that if the rope broke due to force alone (in the video it broke at 10.86/11.33 kN) the cam should have deformed. I just think the rope MUST have cut or at least abraded somewhere right around the carabiner. Also, in that video the broken ends looked different than they did from the accident. In the video the core wasn’t sticking out or hiding way back in the sheath. After the accident my end of the rope had a few inches of empty sheath extending beyond the core.”

Note from Rob Chisnall, the ANAC Canada Editor:

Rob Chisnall is a climbing safety consultant and member of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences. He testifies in civil cases involving climbing accidents and also in criminal cases involving homicide, suicide, auto-erotic fatality, and other misadventures involving knots and ligatures. 

Chisnall reviewed Kearn’s report and wrote to ANAC that “the explanation is sound.” He further noted that:

1. Ropes have been getting thinner, and lightweight carabiners no longer bear a round cross section. Stress-strain analyses have allowed manufacturers to eliminate unnecessary metal from carabiners, giving many carabiners a T or H cross section (sharper edges).  

2. Sport ropes are now typically less than 10 mm in diameter, the one in question being 9.4 mm. So, whatever pinch point was created, the same force would have been applied to a much smaller surface area compared to decades ago. The carabiner might have momentarily resembled something akin to a blunt cutting edge. And maybe the rock surface at the pinch/cutting point was overtly convex, thus concentrating the force even more.

3. I've observed people having problems when lowering off slabs, then onto vertical walls or past overhangs. In this case, the angle between the parts of the rope exiting the carabiner might have been reduced to zero, creating a pinch point.

4. Judging from the description of the damaged rope, it appears the sheath cut first and shifted position, exposing the core strands, which then cut cleanly in one place—they probably instantaneously flattened out.

5. Ropes [that] cut via lateral movement over a sharp edge do not go “BANG.” The belayer clearly recalled a very loud “gunshot” noise as the rope exploded. In less dramatic breakages, a rope pulled straight to failure usually makes a snapping sound, like an elastic band.

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The Prescription—August

A Parks Canada rescue helicopter responds to an accident on Mt. Louis on August 20, 2023 (Mt. Edith in the background). Mt. Louis is an iconic limestone tower and home to several popular multi-pitch rock climbs. Though some are moderate in grade, they all offer a Canadian Rockies–style adventure. Photo: Parks Canada

The following report describes an accident in the Canadian Rockies that will be published in the upcoming 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing. While reviewing last year’s accidents, a particularly improbable incident stood out. Almost exactly a year ago, a climber fell, unroped, from the fourth-pitch belay anchor of a 15-pitch climb. After tumbling 35 meters, he came to rest on a ledge three pitches above the ground, having suffered only minor injuries. One might attribute this incident to a form of benign intervention, a guidance bordering on the divine. Or it might have been simple good luck. Read on.

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Fall From Anchor | Tether Clipped Incorrectly

Alberta, Banff National Park, Mt. Louis

At 5 a.m. on August 20, 2023, Alistair Hall (34) and I, Adam Laycock (33) started our approach to attempt the Gmoser Route of Mt. Louis. While this 15-pitch 5.9 has bolted anchors, it is also an old-school trad route that would push our limits for climbing on gear. Alistair was confident in his ability to lead the crux pitch. Although it was our first time on this mountain, we were both locals and familiar with the chossy nature of the Canadian Rockies. We did plenty of research and felt confident in the route and conditions that day.

Our ascent was slower than we had anticipated. By the time we reached the top of pitch six, it was midafternoon, and with ten pitches remaining, we decided to back off the climb. The belay stations were bolted, so we chose to descend the same way we had ascended. Rappelling pitches six and five was uneventful.

After I finished rappelling pitch five, I secured myself to the anchor with my personal anchor system (PAS). My PAS was a 120mm nylon sling, girth-hitched through my belay loop, with two knots for length adjustment. The belay stance was narrow, prompting me to shorten my PAS by moving my locking carabiner to a knotted loop closer to my belay loop. I then clipped my carabiner into one of the rappel rings, locked it, weighted my PAS to test it, and took myself off rappel. I spent a few minutes preparing the rope for the next rappel, threading it through the rappel rings, coiling it, and adding a knot for safety.

Then I fell. I was not connected to the wall or rope, and there were four pitches of high-angle terrain beneath me. I tumbled for 35 meters, the full length of the 5.6 fourth pitch. I ultimately came to a halt on a sloping ledge. I was conscious. I screamed, crying out for help from Alistair, who was above me, and the hikers below. Under my legs was one of our half-ropes, in which I tied a figure-8 on a bight and clipped it to my belay loop. I yelled to Alistair that I was alive and secure, but injured, and there was no need to descend to me.

My left ankle was visibly disfigured and unable to support any weight. Clearly unable to self-rescue, I used my inReach device to send an SOS message. Within half an hour of my fall, a Parks Canada rescue helicopter located us on the rock face and began the rescue.

A Parks Canada rescuer attends to Laycock after his 35-meter fall. Laycock recalls, “My pants were shredded from the fall. The ledge was narrow and down-sloping and I imagine if I had been unconscious I could have slid further. When I landed, I was stable enough to secure myself, but it was a precarious position.”  Photo: Parks Canada 

ANALYSIS

Laycock’s accident was eerily similar to another recent incident, suffered by a climber in Arizona. Both fallen climbers had tied overhand knots in a 120cm length loop of 20mm sewn webbing to create adjustment pockets for a home-made PAS. This is a common practice. In both cases, it appears that the tether was not clipped correctly with the carabiner, but instead the knot caught in the bottom, non-gated end of the tether carabiner.

In the August 2023 accident and another in 2021, a tether carabiner of the same model had a bottom basket that was flat enough and shaped in such way as to allow a knot to temporarily hold weight, if only for a few minutes. In this recreation, note that the the jammed knot is pulled up and above the clipping point—almost visually identical to a correctly clipped daisy loop. Photo: Pete Takeda

Detaching and reattaching a carabiner from a daisy pocket or lanyard introduces an opportunity for error. After suffering his potentially fatal fall, Laycock wrote ANAC: “To shorten my PAS at an anchor, I won’t unclip the first (longest) loop anymore. I'll clip an additional locking carabiner in the shorter loop, then clip it to the first locker (Editor’s Note: This is inherently easier to visually evaluate). Previously, and in the case of my accident, I would completely unclip from one loop and reclip the closer knotted loop.” Graphic: Foster Denney

A contributing factor to the accident was that Laycock’s daisy knot was unusually bulky from being unevenly tied. This increased the possibility of the knot sticking in the bottom of the carabiner. He wrote, “Despite weighting my PAS to test it, the poorly dressed overhand knot briefly supported my weight.” He added, “Before the knot slipped through the carabiner, I failed to thoroughly check my anchorage to account for human error.”

It is worth noting that the critical section of webbing was hard to assess. The two strands that created the clipping pocket were of the same color and were flush with each other. Additionally, the rappel station was on a ledge, hampering a full weight test. In the end, sheer luck might have saved Laycock’s life.

He wrote, “During my fall, I tangled myself in the rope below, which was still being used by Alistair to rappel pitch five. This might have slowed my fall enough for me to stop on the ledge. We had two 70m half-ropes that hung 30 or 35 meters below the pitch-four anchor. When I hit the ledge, I was sitting on the tail of the rope, and I was still five to seven meters above the pitch three anchor.

“Also, my helmet, though it ended up broken, allowed me to remain conscious. Considering what could have happened, my injuries were minor: a fractured left fibula requiring surgery, and numerous abrasions.” (Sources: Adam Laycock, ANAC 2022, and the Editors.)

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From the ANAC Report Archive:

Here are two incidents from past ANACs indicating ways climbers can be disconnected from anchors. Tragically, both of these ended with fatal injuries.

PAS Disconnected on Half Dome’s Snake Dike (ANAC 2016)

Knotted Sling Comes Undone on Grand Teton (ANAC 2017)

In all of the cases discussed here, a closer look and more vigorous weight-testing of the anchor connection might have prevented a disastrous accident. A common thread: the technical error occurred while the daisy/tether system was unweighted. The fall occurred only as or after bodyweight was applied to the system.

Note that while climbers place much emphasis on anchors themselves, there are numerous and equally consequential errors to be made while attaching and detaching oneself from the anchor. It is critical yet often ignored step, to triple check your connection.

From the ANAC Essentials Archive:

For more detail on making a clear weight transitions from one piece of cord, rope, or webbing to another, see outdoor educator, and climbing author Molly Loomis’ 2017 Essentials: Clear Weight Transitions.

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Get Accidents in North American Climbing Mailed to You!

Published annually since 1948, Accidents in North American Climbing documents the year’s most significant and teachable climbing accidents. Each incident is analyzed by experts to show what went wrong in order to help climber avoid similar problems in the future.

When you sign up for AAC membership, you get this publication delivered to you annually in late summer.

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The Prescription—July 2024

Summer has officially arrived and climbers are turning their attentions to northerly latitudes, higher elevations, and lofty peaks. This month we feature two accidents that took place last summer on Teewinot (12,330 feet) in Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming. While these accidents differ in immediate cause and final outcome, they share a common origin: the use of hiking-specific applications for selection, preparation, and route-finding, versus the use of climbing-specific resources.

Last year, Grand Teton National Park was the eighth most-visited U.S. national park. The year 2023 also saw a disturbing trend in which technical climbs were listed on popular hiking-specific apps. This contributed to several rescues and one fatality. Photo: Acroterion | Wikimedia

Stranded | Inexperience With Snow Climbing

Grand Teton National Park, Teewinot Mountain

On July 14 at 3:45 p.m., National Park Service personnel received a cell phone call from two young climbers stuck on Teewinot (12,330 feet). The male climbers, aged 19 and 20 years, reported that they were on a snowfield north of the Idol and Worshiper rock formations. They were carrying ice axes but did not know how to use them. They also reported that the snow was soft and they were unable to descend any further. The incident commander coached them on proper descent practices. The climbers then reported over the phone that, despite this assistance, they still needed a rescue.

Two NPS climbing rangers were deployed, and rescuers got to the stranded climbers at 6 p.m. The distressed climbers were lowered on rope systems until they reached the bottom of the snowfield and a dry trail at 7:30 p.m. After resting and rewarming for 45 minutes, the climbers requested that they be allowed to descend at their own slower pace to the parking lot.

The East Face of Teewinot (yellow line) was the scene of several rescues and one fatal fall in 2023. A late start, the large team size, and reliance on a popular hiking app contributed to this tragedy. Photo: Acroterion | Wikimedia

ANALYSIS

There have been multiple similar instances of climbers in the Tetons being unprepared for their objectives, both during 2023 and in previous years. The summer climbing season in the range often starts with snow-covered peaks and ends with almost exclusively rock climbing terrain. During transition periods, climbers need to be prepared for the current conditions and not the ideal conditions.

In recent seasons, rangers have noticed an increase in technical climbing routes being listed on hiking-specific applications and websites. Many 4th- and 5th-class rock climbs with high risk and fall potential are listed incorrectly as hikes. Climbers are reminded to gather their route information from fellow climbers and climbing-specific resources.

(Source: Grand Teton National Park Search and Rescue Report.)  

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An NPS rescuer and climber being short-hauled from an accident on Teewinot (background) in August 2023. Photo: Dave Weber

Fatal Fall | Climbing Unroped

Grand Teton National Park, Teewinot Mountain

On August 10, a team of nine climbers were attempting to climb Teewinot via the East Face (low 5th class). Upon nearing the summit, a 47-year-old female climber in the group fell about 150 feet to her death. The team decided to send one climber down to get help, while the rest stayed in place and called for help via cell phone. NPS personnel were contacted at 7:30 p.m.

After a helicopter reconnaissance, given the late hour and waning daylight, the decision was made to send a ground team to assist the stranded climbers. Four climbing rangers were deployed at 10:30 p.m., and they arrived on scene at 2:15 a.m. and spent the rest of the night with the climbers. During the morning of August 11, three helicopter shuttles brought the rescuers and climbers back to the valley. A short-haul operation then retrieved the deceased climber.  

ANALYSIS

Several factors contributed to this unfortunate accident.

1. Late Start. The team started their ascent in the afternoon, well after most climbers would recommend. An NPS volunteer who was descending the peak at 2 p.m. informed the team on the lateness of their ascent and that other climbers were already descending from the summit. The volunteer also pointed out the lack of necessary equipment to safely continue. Despite this, the team continued up.

2. Large Team. Having nine climbers in the group likely contributed to this accident. Larger teams almost always move slower than smaller teams, as rest breaks and decision-making can be prolonged.

3. Use of Hiking Apps. This team relied on information taken from a popular hiking application (as previously discussed in this Prescription). This climb in particular is listed on several platforms as a hike. Interviews with survivors revealed they were under the impression that the East Face of Teewinot was a traditional hike. It is a fifth-class climb.

   (Source: Grand Teton National Park Search and Rescue Report.) 

Fig 1: Screenshot of the AllTrails.com Teewinot page taken on July 7, 2024.

EDITOR’S NOTE:

While preparing these reports for the soon-to-be-released 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing, I found several popular hiking apps featured the East Face of Teewinot. The most disturbing representation was on AllTrails.com. On the page for Teewinot, the climb was referred to as a “trail” not once, but three times (See Fig 1.). The strongest warning given was to “proceed cautiously” on a “highly challenging” route that “should only be attempted by experienced adventurers.” In contrast, the Teewinot trail reviews posted by members revealed a different reality. A few are listed below:

• Alissa Cooke wrote on September 23, 2022:
  **THIS IS NOT A REAL TRAIL AND REQUIRES CLASS FIVE MOUNTAINEERING*** 
  I did not hike this trail, but friends of mine attempted it two days ago and required search and rescue to come get them. They spent 24 hours on the mountain and at least 12 of which were in severe storms. As per the ranger who coordinated the search and rescue, there are no real “trails” to go up this peak (or the Grand Teton) even though it’s listed on AllTrails.

• Caroline Berlin wrote on September 6, 2022:
  We came across 4 separate parties that were way off trail, one of which created potentially deadly rockfall at the choke point of the mountain. They neglected to yell rock as they sent down 30-pound boulders onto parties coming up below them.

• Tadami S wrote on February 9, 2022:
  This trail is for experienced climbers. Be sure to bring your own helmet and rope. My friend slipped and fell on this mountain and died in September 2021. 

• Tim Reddy wrote on August 18, 2023:
  This is not a hike. This is a technical (~5.4) rock climb. Most parties should plan to rope up on the ascent and on the descent. If you do not know how to place protection, set anchors, belay, and rappel, then you should hire a professional guide who does. Many people have died or been seriously injured climbing unroped on this route. 

I went further and downloaded the AllTrails.com iPhone app. It appears that the description on the app has been updated. The webpage description remains the same. On the iPhone app, Teewinot was appropriately described as a route requiring “technical mountaineering skills and equipment…” This was accompanied by a statement that the route is “the most dangerous in the Teton range…” I don’t know when the content update was made, but I infer that it changed after the 2023 accidents and was probably introduced by the same description still seen on the AllTrails.com webpage (Fig 1.).

My email queries to AllTrails.com have remained unanswered. On the app, the updated route description reads like a ChatGPT-derived synthesis of crowd-sourced user comments. What it lacks in human nuance, it compensates with a tinny stridency. Unfortunately for the two parties above, the corrections come a bit too late. The take-away: Use these non-climbing specific apps with discretion and understand the experience level and tools that are required. Seek out route information/conditions from fellow climbers and climbing-specific resources.

An earnest, honest, and accurate comment regarding Teewinot was posted on Mountainproject by Max Morgan:

Fourth class and easy snow, my @$$. Classic old school Teton sandbaggery, resulting in close calls and several deaths. Statistically, this has been the most deadly climb in the Tetons. At least four people have died on it over the course of the last few years. I've climbed it at least a dozen times. When snow free… [it] entails difficult route-finding and several trails that vary widely in difficulty and exposure. The easiest route up I've ever encountered has at least a couple of 5th-class slab moves. I'd call it 5.5. Maybe there's an easier route, but if I haven't found it in12 tries, you probably won't either.

As always, thanks again to all our volunteers, regional correspondents, and editors who make our efforts a reality. In particular I’d like to thank ANAC Senior Editor Dave Weber. Besides reporting from far-flung national parks, Dave is a climbing ranger in the Grand Tetons and flight paramedic/hoist rescuer for Intermountain Life Flight. He provided extensive reporting and images for both this Prescription newsletter and the upcoming 2024 Accidents.

In addition, I give deep thanks to those who take the time to submit accident reports. I can’t say this enough. If you spend enough time climbing, you will experience or witness an accident. While accidents are inevitable, reporting one is your choice.

Finally, if you have an AAC Partner membership or above, you’ll soon receive a copy of Accidents and the 2024 American Alpine Journal. Be safe out there.

—Pete Takeda, Editor

The Prescription—June

It’s June and we’ve been busy wrapping up edits on the 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing. If you have an AAC Partner membership or above, you’ll receive the best kind of mail soon–a copy of Accidents, the 2024 American Alpine Journal, and other neat things in a few months. I give thanks to all our volunteers, regional correspondents, and editors, who made this year’s book a reality. I also give deep thanks to those who took the time to submit accident reports. Whether one has personally experienced an accident or is reporting an incident, it is never an easy thing to do.

In closing out the year’s edits I’m reminded of a few things. As with any elective passion, climbing gives us what prudence itself can’t provide—our humanness. While climbing promises a glimpse of the unimaginable and the ineffable, it can also visit us with mishap or tragedy. Gravity constantly teaches us that no matter what gear we use, how much we practice, and how many precautions we take, climbing is dangerous. Stay safe out there.  

This month we feature an accident that will appear in the 2024 ANAC. It took place last September and reminds us that not all climbing misadventures occur while actually climbing.

—Pete Takeda, Editor

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(L to R) Mt. Darwin and Mt. Mendel seen from the north near Lamarck Col. These are two of nine 13,000+ foot high peaks that comprise the massive Evolution Traverse (VI, 5.9). The col was the scene of an unusual accident in which a climber was pinned by a large boulder while descending. Photo: Will Keightley | Wikimedia

Pinned Under Boulder

Inyo National Forest, Lamarck Col

Around 12:40 p.m. on September 28, Larsen Tormey (28) was pinned under a large boulder while hiking out after an attempt on the Evolution Traverse (VI, 5.9). His climbing partner, Jacob Ireland (35), was able to free him after several hours, prior to the arrival of SAR.

Ireland wrote to ANAC:

The accident took place five miles from the trailhead. Lars was hiking ahead of me. I was at the top of Lamarck Col when I heard someone yelling. I figured this was Lars, but I couldn’t spot him. As I headed toward the sound the cries grew louder, and I knew that an accident had occurred. When I was directly above his voice, I could hear clearly, “I’m stuck! There’s a rock on me! Please help!”

Larsen Tormey, three hours after being pinned by a large boulder near Lamarck Col. This photo was taken shortly before his partner, in a display of tenacity and prolonged heroics, managed to pull the boulder off. Photo by Jacob Ireland.

I hit the SOS button on my Garmin inReach and started down the broken 4th-class terrain. When I made it to Lars, he explained that, because he carried no traction devices nor ice axe, he had been downclimbing through a small tunnel or cave in the rock to avoid a steep section of hard-packed snow. A boulder the size of a city trash can he had been using as a hold came free. The rock was angled and sharp and plugged the slot so his leg was pinned just below his groin.

The boulder was in the way, so I couldn’t see his injuries and had to rely on what he told me. From what I could tell, one leg was pinned near his groin. It’s hard to recall, but the rock was maybe three feet by three feet and one foot wide.

There was no blood, but Lars believed he was bleeding internally and could not feel his leg. He was lying partly on the ice and was cold and shaking. I did my best to drape a puffy over him. I tried to move the boulder, but this only made him scream. The back of the rock was the obvious place to try moving it, but I quickly realized it wasn’t going to move by hand. I told Lars I was going to try the climbing rope and gear we had brought.

He pleaded with me to just try by hand again, and I did my best to assure him that the rope would be better. I frantically unpacked my gear. I jammed a cam into a crack above us, wrapped the rope around the front of the boulder, and set up a hauling system with my harness and two Micro Traxions.

The next hour was a blur. We tried multiple configurations of the rope and hauling methods. Nothing worked beyond a small amount of movement. One method from the side caused Lars to cry out, “Stop! You’re making it worse!” Between all my attempts, poor Lars begged me to keep trying. Every now and then we made eye contact, and I could see his horror and pain. I’d exhausted myself and started needing longer breaks between tries. My hand was bleeding, so I wrapped it with climbing tape. I had to cut the rope multiple times to quickly fix jams when I’d reset a system. Everything was failing.

I realized my phone had been getting messages. I had cell service and called 911 and relayed information. Lars was screaming at me to keep trying. He didn’t believe help was going to come fast enough. Part of me believed him, so I did my best to talk on the phone and work on the boulder at the same time. Someone from the Inyo SAR team called back and I sent them photos and exact coordinates. They assured me they were on the way.

It had been almost three hours since the boulder fell on Lars, and I was beginning to lose hope. Every failed attempt was devastating. I felt weak and my hips were raw and bruised from the harness. Then, in one adrenaline-fueled attempt, I clipped my harness directly to the rope around the boulder via a sling and pulled to the side. The boulder started to move. My foot gained a bit of new leverage and the boulder moved more. Lars began yelling that he was able to move. “Keep going!” I found a hold in the back of the wall and pulled as hard as I could, screaming from the adrenaline and pain in my waist.

Lars slipped down and behind the boulder to a larger ledge below. He was free and I was ecstatic. I used the rope to swing down to him. He was shaking, cold, and couldn’t feel his leg. I got him flat and bundled up with both sleeping bags and an air mattress under his body. He was in and out of consciousness, but his breathing remained stable. I checked his wound, and to my astonishment it didn’t look worse than a large bruise. Of course, I had no idea what was happening internally.

An hour and a half later, a helicopter appeared and I felt massive relief. The U.S. Army had been flying training missions in the area, and the SAR team was able to use their Chinook helicopter to reach us. They landed at the bottom of the snowfield. An hour later Lars was in the chopper heading for Fresno. He suffered abrasions, major impact trauma, nerve damage, and internal bleeding. He still has trouble making large upward steps, but he is out hiking, biking, and getting back to normal.

Members of the Inyo County Search and Rescue Team package Lars Tormey for helicopter extraction. Photo: Jacob Ireland

ANALYSIS 

I think the main factors in this accident were:

1. Lack of gear for snow travel: We should have had Microspikes or crampons and an ice axe. With those items, we would have directly descended the snow in Lamarck Col and avoided the loose rock.

2. Getting separated: With our technical objective behind us, we became complacent. Had we stuck together, we might have chosen a different way or at least been able to help each other sooner. Lars spent almost an hour under the boulder before I found him. Had he been unconscious, I might have passed by and not realized he was missing until hours later.

3. More knowledge of hauling systems and pulleys: I tried a number of techniques with the climbing gear on hand. A few of these systems moved the boulder, but not enough to free Lars. If I had more knowledge, I could have rigged something to free him faster.

(Source: Jacob Ireland.)

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The Prescription—March 2024

This month we have an unreported accident from a few years ago. This incident occurred at Mt. Woodson near San Diego. A climber atop one of beautiful granite boulders that sprinkle the area was lowering his partner when the unthinkable occurred.

Thibault Philippine leads the mega classic Robbins Crack (5.10a) at Mt. Woodson. This boulder was the scene of a serious lowering accident in 2021. Visible in this image is the sloping summit and the barely discernible anchor bolts, six feet below and to the right of the top. Note: Philippine was not in any way involved in this accident. Photo: Philipp Arndt

Ground Fall | No Belay Anchor

San Diego County, Mt. Woodson

On February 24, 2021, Dawson Riley (21) and his friend (19) were enjoying a day out at Mt. Woodson. Riley, an experienced climber, had taken this friend climbing a few times before. Riley first led the 35-foot route Robbins Crack (5.10a) and attached a quad anchor sling to the bolts atop the large boulder. His friend then followed, with Riley belaying from above on a Grigri. Riley then adjusted the position of the anchor so that they could lower each other and climb Lie Detector (5.12a/b), another crack route (the analog to Robbins Crack) that shares the same bolt anchor. After each climber took a turn on Lie Detector, they sat together on top of the boulder.

Shortly after, Riley removed his quad anchor from the bolts. Unanchored and with the Grigri clipped directly to his harness, Riley began lowering his friend down the Robbins Crack side of the boulder. The rope began feeding rapidly through the Grigri. Riley released the brake handle to block the rope and started to slide off the boulder. Riley fanned out his body in an attempt to increase friction but was quickly launched off the boulder. He fell approximately 25 feet and landed on his right side. His partner, still tied to the end of the rope, had fallen approximately ten feet and was uninjured.

On impact, Riley suffered a seizure and remained unconscious. Others nearby heard his partner yelling for help. They called 911, and nearby CAL FIRE first responders arrived. They placed Riley on a stretcher and onto the flat bed of their truck, then transported him to a nearby airport. There, they met a Mercy Air medical helicopter, who flew him to the Palomar Health trauma center.

Riley sustained multiple injuries including a concussion, an open fracture of both bones in the right forearm, a lung contusion, and three pelvic fractures. He was not wearing a helmet. He required multiple surgeries but has fully recovered and continues to climb.

Dawson Riley sitting atop the Robbins Boulder last week. He has fully recovered from the 2021 accident. As you can see, this time Riley is safely attached to the anchor bolts. Photo: Alex Sanson

Analysis

The Robbins Boulder requires lowering or rappelling to descend. The large and deceptively angled summit can give climbers a false sense of security. Dawson recalled having removed his quad anchor from the bolts while he and his friend sat and relaxed after climbing Lie Detector. The quad anchor gear remained attached to his harness, while his friend remained tied into the rope.

Complacency plays a role in many accidents, and this incident might be no exception. In this case, Riley’s familiarity with the climb (he’d been on top of the Robbins Boulder many times) and the large, comfortable summit belied the hazard. In any perilous position, it is critical to establish and maintain a safe anchor, perform safety checks with your partner, and assess/test the system before detaching from the anchor. It is also wise to redirect the rope through the anchor while lowering another climber from a braking device that is directly attached to the harness. This technique creates extra friction and allows more control of the lowering speed and the force on the belayer.

A safer alternative might have been a rappel from the bolts. As Riley recalls, “Looking back, the only way I had descended the route [previously] was by rappelling. On that day, my brain wanted to lower my partner because I noticed he was still tied in and the rope was running through my Grigri. But muscle memory was getting me ready to rappel, so I removed the quad then began lowering without registering that I was unanchored.” 

(Source: Dawson Riley.)

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Learn More About Safe Lowering Techniques

John Godino at Alpine Savvy has created climbing and navigation content for years. Below are some good tips on lowering at alpinesavvy.com.

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The Prescription—October

We are approaching the prime season for El Potrero Chico in northern Mexico. This month’s incident took place earlier this year on one of the most sought-after routes in this sport climbing paradise. The classic Time Wave Zero is perhaps the second-longest sport route in North America.

Belay Failure From Above

El Potrero Chico, Nuevo León, Mexico

Time Wave Zero, which climbs the buttress and headwall on the left side of this formation, is over 2,000 feet long and has a fully bolted crux that can be easily aided. These two factors make it a relatively popular route. Photo: Tony Bubb

“On March 14, 2023, my friend (the belayer) and I (Liu Yuezhang, 26) headed to Time Wave Zero (2,000’, III 5.12a or 5.11 A0) in El Potrero Chico (EPC) to check out the approach and prepare for a full attempt a few days later. Our plan was to try the moves of the first two pitches before returning to the ground. While following the second pitch (95’, 5.11b, nine bolts), I experienced a belay failure from above, hitting my right lower back, head, and both elbows as I fell. I was rescued by the EPC rescue team and local climbers. Miraculously, I was not seriously injured.

We had reached the crag around noon. It was drizzling, so there were not many climbers heading out. We were glad to meet two female climbers at an area close to Time Wave. They eventually performed the rescue. I led the first pitch (100’, 5.7, four bolts) and belayed my friend up. We switched leads and my friend led the second pitch, set up the belay, and notified me to follow.

My partner was belaying in guide mode off the bolted anchor (see Fig. 1). He double-checked the system by pulling on the climber’s side of the rope. I climbed to the eighth bolt. Earlier, I had noted that the crux was between the eighth and ninth bolt, so I decided to check out the moves. I said, "Take." I was on the rope around five to ten seconds when I suddenly began to free-fall. I remember the sky moving further and further away, so I must have been falling face up, with my back downward. I thought I was going die.

The belayer remembers releasing both hands at one point, after which the climber’s side of rope began to run rapidly through the ATC. In a panic, he attempted to hold the climber’s side, rather than the belayer’s side of the rope. His right hand got seriously burned. Eventually, the rope (9.5mm, 70m, almost new) stuck inside the belay device (Black Diamond ATC Guide, with Black Diamond RockLock screwgate carabiner) and I was stopped in a slabby area, around ten feet below the pitch 1 anchor. The falling distance was around 60–85 feet.

From my injuries, I inferred that I hit my lower right back on a bulge first, then struck the back side of my head and both elbows before sliding down the slab. My neck and tongue were also slightly impaired by the impact. Due to amnesia, I could not recall some details of the fall. I was wearing a helmet, backpack, and long-sleeve jacket. I noticed climbers approaching on the ground to provide help. Then, in what seemed to be the next second, they were above, readying to lower me. According to the belayer, I repeatedly asked “Where am I?” and said “Record the accident scene.”

The belayer spent around ten minutes trying to feed slack efficiently after I was connected to the rescuer, but I also did not recall this. My consciousness came back to normal while being lowered, but I still experienced some long-term memory loss. The rescue team performed a rapid response, and I was carried on a stretcher to an ambulance. This took around 30 minutes. I was sent to the emergency room in Monterrey and luckily was not seriously injured. I would like to express my utmost gratitude to the EPC rescue team and local climbers for the speedy rescue, especially Juliet. She was one of the female climbers we met earlier, who re-led the first pitch and lowered me down.”

—Liu Yuezhang

ANALYSIS

Yuezhang wrote:

“There were a few mistakes made. One error was when the belayer released both hands while belaying from above. This should be strictly prohibited even with an [assisted-braking] system. Also, the fall could have been caught if he had pulled the correct (belayer’s) side of the rope.

“Besides the above two obvious errors, we next tried to analyze the cause of the autoblock system failure. The ATC setting from the accident is shown in Fig. 1” (below).

Fig. 1 This is a screenshot of the actual anchor and belay configuration immediately following the accident. Photo: Courtesy of Liu Yuezhang

Yuezhang added:

“From the photo, we can confirm that the ATC was set correctly (left strand is the belayer side and right strand is the climber side). The climber’s side was initially on top, and eventually got stuck beside the belayer’s side due to the falling impact. After some experiments, we found that the autoblock system might fail if (i) there was a horizontal component force pulling outward, since the belay station was above a bulge, and (ii) the wire of the ATC was stuck by something on the cliff. A repeat experiment is shown in Fig 2 (below). Again, this scenario is very unusual and can be avoided by always having a hand on the belayer’s side.”

Fig. 2 This shows how the ATC orientation can potentially allow the rope to run through the device in guide-mode. Photo: Liu Yuezhang

Yuezhang concludes:

“I was the more experienced climber in the team (one year of trad, multiple years of ice and sport climbing) and received training in multi-pitch climbing from an IFMGA guide. The belayer was the stronger, but less experienced, sport/gym climber. He had no experience of multi-pitch climbing before the trip. To compensate the experience difference, we held two educational sessions in a gym and completed two multi-pitch routes together. At EPC, we climbed several multi-pitch routes while safely switching leads. I emphasized the importance of keeping a hand on the belay side of the rope, even while in autoblock mode. Due to the limited experience with the ATC Guide, the belayer failed to react properly. Also, always wear a helmet. Mine saved me from more severe injuries.”(Source: Liu Yuezhang)

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Editor’s Note:

It is possible that when Yuezhang called “take,” the belayer may have grabbed the bight carabiner (or the ATC retaining wire) to disengage the rope/carabiner/device in order to more easily take up slack through the device. While this is not recommended by the manufacturer, it is not an uncommon technique. Yuezhang recalls, “If my memory serves me, the belayer told me he first pulled the slack when I called ‘take.’” Thus, it is plausible that the belayer, finding it difficult to pull in slack, disengaged the rope. When the bight carabiner or retaining wire is pulled upward, it also orients the rope perpendicular to the top of the ATC (as shown in Fig. 2 above). In this case, the ATC might have been pulled horizontally. If the belayer did just that, while Yuezhang momentarily shifted his weight on and off the rope, the rope could have begun to slip rapidly through the ATC (see Fig. 3 below).

We know that the belayer, now panicking, mistakenly grabbed the follower’s side of the rope in a vain attempt to arrest the fall. His grip may have prevented the device from loading, that is, until excruciating rope burns forced him to release the rope. At this point, the rope locked in the now loaded ATC. The newness of the rope also probably played a role in the accident. Note that in the video below and in Fig. 1, the climber side of the rope is loaded adjacent to the brake side, not on top, as per the intended design. This is probably due to force of the fall and the slickness/diameter of the fresh rope. Extra caution must be taken with any braking or belay device when using a thin and slick rope.

Fig. 3 If the bight carabiner or retaining wire of the device is caught or held upward, and the climber’s side rope is loaded while perpendicular to the top of the ATC, the device can fail to catch. Video: Liu Yuezhang

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The Prescription—September

We are entering the prime season for climbing on the East Coast, so this month we’re featuring an incident that took place on Moss Cliff in upstate New York. Don Mellor, climbing guide and author of American Rock and Climbing in the Adirondacks, calls Moss Cliff “among the most appealing rock walls in the Northeast." Such an attractive crag has its inevitable share of mishaps. The following report appears in the 2023 edition of Accidents in North American Climbing, which is being mailed to AAC members this month, and has been expanded here with more information from the ranger involved in the rescue.

Guidebook author Don Mellor calls Moss Cliff “…the most Adirondack of all Adirondack crags.” Hard Times (5.9+) is drawn in red. The stranded climbers were stuck at the pitch-two belay. Photo by Jim Lawyer.

STRANDED | Stuck Rappel Ropes

Adirondacks, Moss Cliff

At 6:30 p.m. on October 16, 2022, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) rangers received a call from two climbers who were stranded on Moss Cliff in Wilmington Notch within Adirondack State Park. Moss Cliff is a 400-plus-foot face with a 30-minute approach that involves fording a small river.

The two climbers had topped out on a four-pitch trad climb called Hard Times (5.9+) and had completed their first double-rope rappel from the bolted rappel station at the top of the final pitch. When the climbers went to pull their ropes after the first rappel, the rope would not budge. After repeated attempts to pull the ropes down, the climbers considered themselves to be stranded and used a cell phone to contact rangers.

DEC ranger Robbi Mecus was able to talk to the subjects via cell phone and instruct them. She determined that the subjects still had both ends of the rope, and that it would be possible for one of them to use prusiks to climb the ropes back to the anchor. However, the climbers did not have prusik loops and were unfamiliar with techniques for ascending a rope. Mecus was able to coach the climbers by phone on how to use their sewn slings as prusiks. She then instructed them to create two prusik loops: one short one attached to the harness and one long one as a foot loop. She also instructed them to tie in to the ropes directly every few feet as a backup should the prusik attached at the waist fail. The climbers completed one round of practice with Mecus on the phone, and then one of them prusiked to the top of the climb to free the rope from the crack in which it had been stuck.  

Mecus instructed the subjects to pull the knot joining their two ropes down past the obstruction and place a nut in the crack to prevent another stuck rope. They were able to retrieve their ropes and finish their descent. She stayed on the phone with the subjects while she herself approached the cliff to ensure the subjects were following her directions. The subjects had left their headlamps in their packs at the base of the cliff, not expecting to be caught in the dark. This oversight exacerbated the situation. Mecus then assisted the subjects across the west branch of the Ausable River and back to the trailhead.

ANALYSIS

More people are learning to climb in the gym or on sport routes. Thus, they can become stronger climbers much faster than in the past, without learning the foundational skills associated with outdoor traditional climbing. These climbers were very capable, successfully climbing a four-pitch 5.9+ trad route, but were not familiar with the relatively basic rope ascension techniques they needed to ascend and free the rope.  

Investing in self-rescue skills is an important part of transitioning from gym to crag. These can be learned through mentorship (informally or with a guide), through self-rescue courses, or even by reading a book or watching YouTube videos on self-rescue. A few minutes invested in learning and practicing how to ascend a rope with prusiks would have prevented the need for the rangers to be called. The climbers were right to have brought a cell phone and used it to call for help. Had they been unable to receive help by phone, the climbers’ situation would have turned significantly more dire, as they would have been stuck several hundred feet up the face for the night or longer.

As this incident demonstrates, you never know when you may be unexpectedly delayed. The climbers in this incident did not have headlamps and were unprepared to be out after dark. As a general precaution, always bring a headlamp when multi-pitch climbing. Stashing a small headlamp in the bottom of a chalk bag is a great way to ensure you always have one with you.  

(Sources: New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Forest Rangers and the Editors.)

FaceTime and SARTopo

Mecus used FaceTime to communicate with the climbers and visually demonstrate techniques, as she has on other rescues. She recalls one such incident: “A hiking party with an injured individual (dislocated finger) was asking for a ranger to hike out to them. I was able to look at the injury (via FaceTime) and with a good interview determined it was dislocated. I instructed them how to reduce the dislocation, sling and swath the arm, and walk themselves out. Pretty simple.”

Mecus uses other technologies to help people get themselves out of trouble in the mountains and woods—technologies that help conserve precious ranger resources. She says, “With better cell phone coverage comes the ability to send a lost person a link to a SARTopo application. This allows us to see them on a map as they move.” SARTopo, a version of CalTopo, is a widely used, collaborative online and offline mapping tool; the program name SARTopo is being phased out in favor of CalTopo.

For background on SARTopo (CalTopo), click here.

SARTopo is a web-based version of CalTopo with SAR-specific enhancements, including a variety of map layers and overlays. 

For a consumer overview of SARTopo (CalTopo) and a how-to tutorial, click here.

DEC ranger Robbi Mecus says, “Improved cell coverage obviously has impacts on our ability to talk to stranded or injured climbers.”

While cell service has improved in recent years deep in the Adirondacks, you can’t count on a phone in remote areas and should still carry an inReach or other satellite-based communication device. Nonetheless, Mecus says, “Within the past seven or eight years, certain spots on Wallface, our tallest and most remote wilderness cliff, can hit a cell tower. Wallface is six miles from the nearest trailhead and 800 feet tall. A few years ago, we had a seriously injured climber hanging on pitch two of an eight-pitch 5.8 after taking a 60-foot fall. Their friend on the ground was able to find cell service and call dispatch. We were able to insert myself and a volunteer climber via helicopter at the base, climb up to the party, package and lower the subject to the ground, and perform a helicopter hoist extraction. The climber was in the hospital within five hours of his accident. Without the improved cell coverage, he would’ve been hanging suspended on the cliff all night. I'm not sure he could've survived his injuries.”

Read the ANAC report from the Wallace incident here.

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The Prescription—August 2023

We are about to enter the prime big-wall season for Yosemite Valley, so this month we’re featuring a big-wall mishap. Last year, a solo aid climber suffered a serious leader fall on a classic Yosemite wall. He used a bit of know-how and perseverance to help effect his own rescue. This report will appear in the upcoming 2023 edition of Accidents in North American Climbing.

Fall on Rock

Yosemite National Park, Washington Column

On June 28, at 10:59 a.m., Yosemite Dispatch received a report of a 42-year-old male who had taken an approximately 50-foot fall on The Prow (V 5.8 C2) on Washington Column. The climber’s plan had been a multi-day, aid-solo ascent. On the second pitch, the climber fell, ripped rock protection, and struck a ledge. He recalled, “I felt the sensation of falling—it was so sudden and so fast. Then I remember hitting a ledge hard, bouncing, sliding. I remember hitting two more small ledges on the way down.”

Washington Column. The Prow is a classic aid route and excellent primer for El Cap. It climbs the smooth, golden plaque of rock on the right side of the formation. Photo: xRez Studio

The climber was finally caught by his rope. He had sustained closed injuries to his head, knee, and ankle. He also had one open injury to his thigh that he tied off with an improvised tourniquet. He wrote, “I could not breathe in all the way. Possible lung injury—it felt like fractured ribs. Can’t do anything about that, other than controlled breathing. Next, I looked around and saw the deep laceration on my inner left thigh. This one I was worried about! I had flesh hanging out that I put back in, and I stopped the bleeding with my bandana. Then I checked my limbs. The hands, feet, neck, and back seemed okay.”

He began to ascend his rope in order to reach his cell phone to call for help. He recalled, “I had to get my phone from my haulbag, which was above me about 50 feet. I thought, if I were to get rescued it would be easier for YOSAR to get me from the ground and not on the side of the wall. I did not have my jumars with me because I was leading. So, I used two prusiks, one that I had and the second one that doubled as my belt for my chalk bag. I untangled myself from the ropes, backed myself up with a Grigri, and began the painful journey up to my phone. I finally arrived at the belay station [and the phone], quickly set up for a rappel, fixed both the lead and haul line, and got down to the beginning of the climbing, which starts at the top of a 4th-class section.”  

The YOSAR hasty team located him at the top of the 4th class and provided necessary care. Soon a technical rescue team of four arrived and rigged to lower the injured climber down to the bottom of the cliff. From an open, grassy area between the South Face and Astroman routes, the climber was short-hauled by helicopter and transferred to a hospital.

Editor’s Note: In 2016, another climber fell from a similar section of aid on the nearby South Face route, when a cam pulled from a flared piton scar. That climber also ripped several pieces before coming to a stop. Take extra care placing cams in pin scars. Offset nuts, offset cams, and Totem cams often have superior holding power in these flared/grooved placements. Read the 2016 report.

The first few pitches of The Prow follow classic yet tricky piton-scarred cracks and corners. Extra care must be taken when placing gear in such flared placements. Photo by Ryan Meyers.

Analysis

“A piece for you and a piece for Mom,” as they say. Climbing above ledges is a heads-up moment—the threat of falling and getting traumatically injured is very real. As climbers, what can we do to make climbing above ledges safer? Backing up pieces is one option. Also, be aware of how much slack is in your system.

Other takeaways:

Bring a medical kit. A light medical kit while climbing could be a life saver. Ideally, it is never used, but it’s always wise to be prepared for an accident. A little tape, some pain meds, and gauze go a long way.

Practice and be familiar with self-rescue techniques. During this rescue, the injured climber did an excellent job of helping himself. Even after sustaining several injures, he was able to improvise gear, ascend his line, and rappel down the cliff. His self-rescue skills made the whole operation much faster and more efficient. Study self-rescue skills and practice with friends, or consider taking a self-rescue course.

Climb with a partner. While some enjoy the extra challenge of climbing alone, there’s no denying that aid soloing introduces more risk and complexity to a climb. Consider climbing with a partner for a safer climb, or at least acknowledge the added risk of climbing alone. Is it worth it?

The climber offered some final thanks and advice for others: “I cannot thank YOSAR, all the medical professionals, and all my friends and family who helped me and are helping through this event. I feel that even though being super prepared is a must, life just happens! I encourage all climbers to learn basic self-rescue skills.”

(Source: Yosemite National Park Climbing Rangers.)

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With three spotters and five crash pads, Emily Diamond can safely launch into the crux of Heartbreak Hotel (V2). Photo by Pete Takeda.

From the Editor: On the Small(er) Rocks

I’m a week into a bouldering trip to Squamish. It’s peak season in terms of number of climbers, but it’s a little early for good conditions, that brief period in which cool temperatures converge with low humidity.

Bouldering is my first love. As a teenager, I started climbing in an abandoned quarry. Over the years I would learn that the spirit of climbing is in its movement and all I would need learn of any style of ascent could be traced back to those boulders. We wore painter’s pants and carbon rubber (non-sticky) high-tops called EB’s—pretty much the only performance rock shoe of the time. This was in the pre-pad days and spotting was unheard of. While bouldering, I managed to suffer my first serious accident—fracturing my leg at the age of 16.

Today, while topping out a classic highball, I have a half-dozen pads below, along with a handful of attentive spotters. That said, I am reminded that climbing on the small(er) stones, though generally regarded as safe, arguably holds a higher injury potential than any other facet of climbing. My reasoning is:

1. Move for move, bouldering is the most difficult game in climbing.

2. Bouldering is quite popular and exposes the largest number of climbers to the largest number of falls.

3. Every bouldering fall is a ground fall. 

4. Crowds can create a false sense of security.

5. The uninhibited and maximal physical effort demanded by bouldering can draw attention from critical peripheral matters, like pad placement, spotting, and falling.

Boulderers hit the ground more than in any other genre. While these accidents do not incur fatalities (at least that I am aware of), nor prompt spectacular rescues, they do have a huge impact on our community.

I encourage anyone experiencing or witnessing a bouldering accident to report them here.

While we annually publish a few bouldering accidents—the vast majority of them result in lower-leg and/or wrist/arm injuries, and the vast majority self-rescue—obtaining data is important. It is prudent to reinforce best practices. Read more on bouldering safely here.

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Prescription—July

Mt. Assiniboine is nicknamed the "Matterhorn of the Rockies." Both peaks share an imposing geometry—and plenty of loose limestone. On August 12, 2022, a climber fell to his death (yellow line) from the popular and “moderate” North Ridge route after slipping from a slick handhold. Photo courtesy of Parks Canada

Fatal Slip on Rock | Climbing Unroped

British Columbia, Assiniboine Provincial Park

On August 12, 2022, a party of two climbers left the Hind Hut to ascend the North Ridge of Mt. Assiniboine (AD 5.5). By late morning, they had reached one of the steeper upper steps at about 3,500 meters (11,482 feet). The pair had soloed everything up to this point and arrived several minutes apart. The first climber to arrive (Climber 1) assessed the next step and determined they would likely use a rope due to the steep angle and sloping nature of some of the holds. When Climber 2 arrived, the pair took a break and considered their options. Meanwhile, a separate party downclimbed the step. This party was unroped.

After watching the other party downclimb, Climber 2 decided he would try soloing the step and started up the pitch while Climber 1 packed the rope. As Climber 2 started up, Climber 1 watched him grab a sloping hold, slip, and fall down the north face. He fell out of sight. Climber 1 tried to gain a better vantage point by carefully climbing to the top of the rock step but was not able to see his partner. He then triggered an SOS on his satellite communication device. At the top of the step, he met a guided group on their way down. The guide radioed for assistance and helped Climber 1 down to a flat ledge. After communicating with the rescue team, it was determined that the guided group would remain with Climber 1 and wait for a rescue.

A team arrived by helicopter approximately one hour later and located Climber 1 and the guided group. Two other guided parties were located near the summit, and the deceased, fallen climber was located at approximately 3,300 meters (10,826’). After surveying the scene, it was determined that all the parties would be removed prior to accessing the fallen climber, in order to minimize rockfall hazard to the rescuers below. All climbers were flown or slung down to the Hind Hut, and the fallen climber was then accessed and slung down to the hut as well.

The uninjured climber who lost his partner to a fatal fall waits for rescue below the steep upper step on the North Ridge of Mt Assiniboine. Photo courtesy of Parks Canada

Analysis

The North Ridge of Mt. Assiniboine is often soloed due to its low technical difficulty. However, it requires a great deal of care and experience to climb safely. The route is very exposed, and a route-finding mistake can quickly elevate the technical grade. Loose, sloping, or slippery rock is common. While the route was dry on this day, snow, ice, or verglas are common in the upper sections.

While we cannot know with certainty why Climber 2 decided to solo the steep step, prior to the ascent he had expressed interest in climbing the route unroped. His decision may have been influenced by watching the other unroped party. Fatigue and limited technical rock climbing experience may have also played a part. Whatever influenced his decision, this incident highlights the risks involved in soloing exposed terrain. Easy terrain can prove fatal.

Communications during this incident were very good, in large part due to the guided parties (who had radios) and a satellite communication device. The rescue team was able to coordinate the pickup of the three groups, thereby eliminating the potential for human-generated rockfall during the recovery. It is not always possible to remove other climbing parties from an accident scene. If you find yourself in a situation where a rescue is occurring nearby or below you, it is very important to remain stationary or move with extreme care to prevent rockfall hazard. (Source: Parks Canada.)

This accident is eerily similar to another we reported in 2017.

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Resources for Loss

Climbing is inherently dangerous, but that does not make loss easier. If you are struggling after the loss of a loved one, check out our Climbing Grief Fund Directory. Whatever you are facing, we believe you are worthy of hope, effective therapy, and access to the best mental health resources.

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Updates on Auto Belays

In January 2023, we reported an auto belay accident that sadly occurs with some frequency. This accident had a happy ending and contained a powerful lesson.

Last month, the Climbing Wall Association (CWA) released updated Auto Belay Guidance in hope of reducing auto belay incidents and improve the culture of responsibility in the sport of climbing. The CWA is a trade association dedicated to protecting, connecting, and educating the indoor climbing industry.

Along with its updated guidance, the CWA released a commissioned study conducted by Prof. Jon Heshka of Thompson Rivers University, titled “Understanding Climber Behaviour in Climbing Gyms.” The study sheds light on climbers’ behavior and attitudes toward auto belay usage and climbing gyms in general.

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The Prescription — June 2023

This report will soon be published in ANAC, 2023. It is a dramatic story of a climber who narrowly avoided death. It is also a cautionary tale of a hazard that can strike even well-seasoned experts.

Rappel Anchor Failure

Wind River Range, Cirque of the Towers, Wolf's Head

The Cirque of the Towers is a popular alpine rock destination. It is home to two of the hallowed Fifty Classic Climbs of North America. One of those routes climbs the big rock tower on the right—Pingora. The other, the East Ridge of Wolfs Head, climbs the sunlit ridge of the formation to the left. 

Photo by Kylir Horton—Wikimedia Commons

On July 6, 2022, Alex Satonik (35) and Peter Haley (29) climbed the classic East Ridge of Wolf's Head (10 pitches, 5.6). The climb was uneventful. Satonik wrote to the ANAC that, “We arrived at the summit around 11 a.m. We had a brief rest and then started the standard descent route.

“The first two rappels were easy to find, and the cordage looked good on both. After some scrambling across the west face we found the next two sets of rappel anchors, again deeming the cordage to be in reasonable condition. After more sideways scrambling we arrived at the fifth rappel. I inspected the visible sections of the cordage on the anchor, two lengths of 5mm to 6mm cordalette. I yanked hard on the anchor. The cord held the pull and handled well. It did not show indications of severe sun damage. However, it was wedged into a crack and I could not see the back side of the material.

“I threaded the rope. After checking my ATC, I loaded the rope and sat back. Almost immediately, I was accelerating downward at 9.8m/s. Roughly halfway down, my feet impacted a small ledge, causing me to somersault. I landed on a ledge at the bottom of the rappel, mostly on my back and left side. I had fallen about 50 feet. 

“I immediately knew I was badly injured. I heard my partner calling out. I had an older Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) that didn't have two-way communication capability. My partner activated the beacon. He also called 911 via normal cell phone. SAR responded that their helicopter was already out on a rescue, but would refuel and be at our location in an hour. During the wait, I untangled myself from the rope and did a self-assessment. I had broken both legs, with an open fracture on the right. I had some painful spots on my back, and my right arm was weak. I had also broken my helmet into three pieces and had multiple facial lacerations.

“I did my best to communicate my injuries to my partner, who relayed them to the 911 dispatcher. Roughly an hour after calling in, we heard the helicopter. They located us quickly and landed down by a lake to rig a longline for a pick off. At this time a second party showed up at the failed rap station, where my partner was. The helicopter came and a rescuer dropped onto my ledge. The rescuer attempted to splint my legs with some foam supports and got a three-point seat harness under me. We clipped into the long line, and the helicopter lifted us off the mountain.  

“It was a short flight down to the flat landing area near the lake where the SAR team transferred me into a soft litter and loaded me in the back of the helicopter. Five minutes later, I was at the Pinedale clinic. A day and a half later I woke up in a hospital in Idaho Falls. All told, I had broken my tibia and fibula in both legs, my right arm, right thumb, two vertebrae, the orbital bone over my left eye, and the bridge of my nose. I ended up staying in the hospital just short of a month. The doctors were confident that I would be able to walk on my own by winter, although my ankle strength and mobility will be permanently affected.”

ANALYSIS

Satonik suffered simple bad luck when the rappel anchor failed. There are many rappel stations scattered in various locations on the Wolf’s Head descent. These and other soft rappel stations in the high country suffer from UV degradation and in this case, abrasion and cutting due to the expansion and contraction of anchor blocks. Climber Thomas Gilmore used the same descent two months later. He wrote ANAC, “The team that had the anchor failure, may or may not have been on the ‘standard’ anchor. But, as you can see from the image below, one of the ‘standard’ anchors, the regular stations are garbage too.” 

These old slings comprise either the third or fourth rappel anchor on Wolf’s Head. In a “pinch point,” anchor such as this (similar to Satonik’s failed anchor), the area of contact between large rocks provides security for a thread or sling. Over time, these anchors can become hazardous. Gilmore wrote ANAC, 'This was taken after that accident. Unfortunately, I forgot to grab a picture of the anchor that blew. The rappel route really needs some love.’"

Photo by Thomas Gilmore.

Satonik wrote the ANAC that, “I remember there were double aluminum rings on two pieces of 5mm or 6mm cord, one green and one orange. My suspicion is that on the backside of the block, the cord must have been damaged, likely from being run over an edge. But since the loop was wedged firmly into a crack, I couldn't slide it around to investigate the hidden material. But it is also on me that I choose to use that anchor as is. Based on the damage to my helmet and other facial trauma, I would have died had the helmet not been on my head.”

*Editor’s Note: It is prudent to bring and use extra cordelette to back up anchors. Bring a knife to cut and clean old weathered webbing. In 2022, there were three reported rappel accidents caused by aging slings/cords, causing three deaths. Satonik was fortunate to avoid being the fourth fatality. He wrote to ANAC that, “While falling, I definitely bounced off at least two ledges. That took out some of the kinetic energy out of the impact, compared to 50 feet of uninterrupted acceleration.”

In the image above and in Satonik’s description, aluminum rappel rings are seen or mentioned. These rings vary in manufacture and can range from very strong (25 Kn) to very weak (1.5 Kn). Beware rappel rings with visible wear, especially in the old rolled variety. These are recognized by a seam, running along the entire circumference of the ring. Best practice is to use a locking carabiner or a quicklink in place of the ring. At the minimum, back up the ring with a carabiner clipped through all the available slings. Please do not pilfer fixed carabiners. (Source: Alex Satonik.)

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The Prescription — April 2023

This month we have an unusual rappel accident. While this story has a happy ending, we cannot be absolutely certain of the accident’s cause. However, one theory seems to check all the boxes. For more details, read on.

Rappel Failure | Rope Became Unclipped from Anchor

Utah, Provo, Rock Canyon

The Kitchen in Rock Canyon with rappel/belay anchor circled in red. This was where the accident happened last September. Photo by John Ross.

On September 3, 2022, Kyra Harames (female, 24) was climbing with a group of friends at The Kitchen in Rock Canyon. After setting up a top-rope, she fell to the ground while rappelling from the two-bolt anchor.

Harames reported to ANAC, “I remember everything leading up to my actual fall, and the rest of the details my friends filled in. At about 8 a.m., I successfully led Panic City (5.11a). After I set up that route with a top-rope, a couple of my friends started climbing it. I then hiked to the top to set up another route called Left Corner (5.9). I clipped in my daisy chain as a safety with a locking carabiner. I set up the top-rope using two wiregate quickdraws on the same bolt. I put both strands of rope through my belay device to rappel and used a locking carabiner. I checked the rappel and put my weight on the belay device/rope before taking off my safety. Everything seemed good, so I proceeded to rappel. The last thing I remember is lowering myself a couple of feet, and that is when I fell.

“The rope came out of the quickdraws, and I fell about 35 feet. My friends said when I hit the ground, they could hear the air leave my lungs. I briefly landed on my feet at an angle, and then landed on my back. One of my friends called 911. Shortly after that, I lost consciousness. A nearby climber came over and couldn't find a pulse. My close friend Alivia did CPR and less than a minute later, I regained consciousness. The ambulance came really quick. A friend ran down to make sure the gate was open for the ambulance and it was able to drive up all the way to me.

“I have a very vague memory of being in the ambulance. I didn't know what had happened, but I had a dream that I was climbing. My first solid post-fall memory was when I woke up in the trauma room. I had no idea what had happened. The nurses filled me in. I got stitches in my foot and elbow, as well as staples in my head. I had a compression fracture on my T11 [vertebra], a mild concussion, bruised ribs, and a fractured talus bone in my ankle. I stayed for a day and a half for monitoring and pain control. The reason I went into cardiac arrest after my fall is believed to be caused by a phenomenon called commotio cordis. This is when an impact to the chest occurs during a short vulnerable window in the cardiac electrical cycle. 

“A week later, I received surgery to repair my talus and they put two screws in my ankle. I took a leave of absence from medical school to recover from my concussion and other injuries. 

“Currently, I have made a full recovery physically and mentally. I have caught up on medical school and have started to climb again. So far, I have only top-roped in indoor gyms, but hope to go back to climbing outside. I am thankful for my friends and family for helping me through my recovery and everything I learned from my experience. It truly was a miracle.” 

ANALYSIS

Two strands of rope were running through Harames’ belay device, which was attached to her harness with a locking carabiner. The entire rope was on the ground after the fall occurred. The quickdraws were still attached to the anchor. 

Harames writes, “Looking back on it, my friends and I have tried to figure out why the rope came out of the quickdraws. It is possible that they were facing the same way, which may have contributed to the rope unclipping itself as I rappelled. I believe this could've been prevented using locking carabiners.” 

In principle, Harames did the right thing by using two draws at a bolt belay. However, she made a fundamental error in using only one of the available bolts. Sport belay stations almost always have a minimum of two bolts. Always incorporate both in any anchor system.

Why did Harames not do so? One clue might lie in the positioning of the belay bolts and the style of hanger used. The bolts here are on either side of a small arete, positioned in such a way as to allow top-roping on both Left Corner and Mark’s Corner (5.7) to the right. Harames later wrote, “I don't remember why I clipped the rope to only one bolt, I might not have seen the other bolt around the corner a little bit.” 

The waist level belay bolts for Left Corner and Mark’s Corner have horizontal hangers with welded steel rings. Photo by John Ross.

Setting up a top-rope with the rope through at least one locking carabiner is always a good idea. (Many climbers always carry an “anchor draw” constructed with locking carabiners for exactly this purpose.) If you don’t have a locker, it’s important to oppose the gates on the carabiners through which the rope is running. 

It is extremely unlikely that simply leaning back on two anchor quickdraws would cause them to come unclipped. If this were so, any link in the belay chain using a rope clipped to a carabiner—a quickdraw on a run-out sport route for instance—would be suspect. Nonetheless, the best practice is to oppose the carabiners, because there are scenarios where for the rope could unclip—see the photos for an example.

Another factor that comes into play is the height of the anchor. When one stands atop Left Corner, the anchor bolts are at waist level. This height might have contributed to this very unlikely accident. As one pulls up the slack on an ATC-style rappel device, it is possible that the tightening loop of rope can wrap around the carabiner gates—see the video. This is made more possible if the quickdraws lie parallel to the rock surface and incorporate both stiff sling material and pronounced bent gates on the lower, rope-bearing carabiner (typical in most modern high-performance draws).

Patrick Begley wrote on mountainproject.com that if two draws on bolted anchors were oriented in parallel rather than gates opposite, “complete detachment of the rope is certainly possible, especially if the climber was firmly gripping the draws in preparation to weight the rappel.” Begley is an aerospace engineer, an AMGA Single Pitch Instructor, and Apprentice Rock Guide. Photo by Patrick Begley.

While unlikely, this scenario is possible when stiff, captive lower carabiner quickdraws are both clipped to a single point. Begley wrote, “It was quite difficult to replicate.” Photo by Patrick Begley.

Video Analysis

If a picture is worth 1,000 words, then a video is worth 10,000. Here, Begley demonstrates this unusual scenario. Video by Patrick Begley.

TAKEAWAYS

1. Always incorporate two or more bolts into any anchor system.

2. Weight test the rappel anchor. Put your weight on the belay/rappel device and rope before you unclip your PAS or other backup. Though Harames did this, it’s possible she did it while holding the draws in the manner depicted in Begley’s photos.

3. Consider using locking carabiners and a cordelette or long sling. AlpineSavvy climbing guide John Godino’s website has some good resources on cordelettes and clipping the horizontal-style ring hanger as found on Left Corner.

4. Oppose the carabiners, especially if you’re not using lockers.

(Sources: Kyra Harames, John Ross, Patrick Begley.)

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The Prescription — March 2023

This month we have a dramatic story that speaks to the strengths of our outdoor community. When Will Toor, the executive director of the Colorado Energy Office, and his wife, Mariella Colvin, a philosophy teacher at the University of Colorado, took a tumble, fellow climbers and hikers came to their aid.

We also cover a remarkable free solo incident below.

Fall on Snow | Climbing Unroped

Colorado, Rocky Mountain National Park, Flattop Mountain

A National Guard helicopter swoops in to evacuate Will Toor. He recalled, “It was raining and windy. This was super-skilled flying, and the helicopter took some real risks to save me.” Photo by Markian Feduschak.

On July 10, 2022, Will Toor (60) and his wife, Mariella Colvin (59), fell down the East Couloir (II, AI2 or 65°snow) on the north face of Flattop Mountain. At the top, a cornice collapsed, causing Toor to fall. The dislodged debris struck Colvin and they both tumbled 900 feet. Colvin left her immobilized husband to try to get help, bushwhacking nearly two miles despite having suffered broken ribs, a broken sternum, a broken wrist, and three fractured vertebrae. While she was gone, two climbers on an adjacent peak came over to assist Toor and summoned a National Park Service rescue. Toor was helicoptered out with a broken femur. Colvin was evacuated the next day.

Toor recalls: “Mariella and I arrived at the couloirs around 11:30 a.m. and spent some time examining conditions. We planned to climb the 1,200-foot-long East Couloir. The cornices at the top had not fully melted out, but there was a portion in the middle with a reasonable looking exit—maybe 80 feet of very steep snow, before turning almost vertical for ten feet. 

Mariella Colvin climbing in couloir prior to the accident. Photo by Will Toor.

“It was a warm day, and because of the timed entry permit, we did not get an early start. But the couloir had been in shade down low, and the snow was good for kicking steps. I was maybe ten feet ahead of Mariella most of the time. We wore helmets and crampons. We had packs with some warm clothing. We did not bring a rope or pickets (to keep our packs lighter). We did not have satellite devices, only cellphones.

“We traversed the lower sections of the couloir but largely went straight up as it steepened. Just below the top, we stopped on a ledge and got out our second tools. We talked about traversing left to a lower-angle exit, but I felt more comfortable facing straight in, with a tool in each hand (for three points of contact), versus traversing. We started up again, and I was still able to kick very secure steps and get secure axe placements. Right around 1:30 p.m. I made the final move to the flat snow on top.”

At this point, the snow collapsed. Toor’s memory of the moment is hazy: “I remember starting to fall and being totally confused how it was happening. I was done with the climb! Our theory is, the old cornice fracture line, a few feet back from the edge, collapsed.”

Colvin recalls, “I was knocked over backwards. I lost both ice axes. I slid until I found myself rolling, which eventually turned into somersaulting, sliding, and tumbling. I was aware enough to see some rocks in the snow as I hit the lower-angled section and did my best to miss them. I dragged my crampons to come to a stop near the bottom and amazingly didn’t break my ankles.”

Meanwhile, Toor recalls “hearing Mariella scream and trying to self-arrest. I remember tumbling out of control and having a fleeting sense that this was the end. Mariella also remembers feeling we were probably going to die.”

 “I was aware of Will sliding behind me,” Colvin recounts. “When we finally stopped, I could skootch sideways to him. Will thought his femur was broken. I knew my upper body had significant trauma, but my legs were fine. Will kept asking, ‘Where are we, what happened?,’ which made me worry about a concussion. I tested my mental state by asking myself easy arithmetic questions and did okay. I yelled for help but got no response. I realized I would have to get help, so I gave Will my warm clothes and food and set off with nothing but a windbreaker.”

Markian Feduschak, right, and Riley Gaines. Both work at the Walking Mountains Science Center in Colorado, as president and community science and hiking coordinator, respectively. Photo by Riley Gaines.

Toor recounts, “At 3:30 p.m., two climbers (Markian Feduschak and Riley Gaines) arrived. They had been climbing on Notchtop and had heard our calls. Seeing them walk toward me was one of the best sights of my life. They immediately took off their own puffies and put them on me. They were able to text with the Park Service on a Garmin InReach. They were calm and competent.

“Unfortunately, I was still cold because I was lying on the snow. Then, another party of three climbers appeared. They used my crampons to dig a trench, then lined it with packs, and dragged me into a sitting position. We got contact back from the Park Service confirming Mariella was with folks tending to her, which helped me relax. At that point, I hadn’t realized that she had serious injuries beyond a broken wrist.”

Colvin, unaware that aid had arrived for Toor, had “headed straight down over snow and rock slabs, avoiding cliffs and talus fields. I did stumble across one of the most beautiful places I’ve ever seen—with a waterfall, green meadow, wildflowers, and butterflies. I debated lying down to nap right there, but knew I had to keep going. I found that focusing on identifying wildflowers kept my mind in the here and now.

Colvin and Toor in the hospital. Toor says, “The whole experience really makes me see the good in people.” Photo by Will Toor.

“Finally, I reached Odessa Lake. This was a good place to yell for help, as my voice would carry across the water. I heard helicopters circling, and I felt sure they were going to Will and was really relieved. That gave me permission to lie down and rest, but within a few minutes I saw a man and his son. He sent his son in search of help and helped me on the rough trail around the lake to a campsite.

“A couple camping there had two tents. She set me up in a sleeping bag and air mattress. Someone else had a Garmin device and contacted the Park Service.”  

Meanwhile, still at the bottom of the East Couloir, Toor, Feduschak, and Gaines awaited more help. Toor recounts, “Around 6:30 p.m. we saw three yellow raincoats—the Park Service hasty team. They had warm blankets and painkillers. The adrenaline was wearing off, and the pain was setting in, so this was very welcome. Eventually, a big National Guard helicopter appeared. Just before 8 p.m. they dropped a litter and an attendant.”

Meanwhile, because of bad weather and impending darkness, Colvin had to stay at the hikers’ campsite overnight. “Two medics hiked in and spent the night with me, monitoring vital signs and administering painkillers,” she said. “They initially thought I would be able to walk out, but it became clear I would need an evacuation. So, the next morning two teams of rescuers transported me to a clearing to be picked up by a helicopter.”

Analysis

Toor and Colvin are very experienced, having climbed since the 1980s in the Tetons, Colorado, and the Canadian Rockies. One can argue in favor of the use of ropes and intermediate protection on snow climbs, but given the pair’s competence, such precaution might have only slowed them down, exposing them to even softer snow conditions.

The team’s late start due to the national park’s timed entry played an important role. Toor wrote that as they started up the couloir, “We were a bit concerned about the temperature.” While RMNP’s timed-entry system can be a challenge, it also reinforces best practices by encouraging an early arrival at the trailhead. A 5 a.m. start might well have prevented this accident.

Alpine climbing is full of unforeseen hazards. In line with Toor and Colvin’s cornice fracture theory, Park officials also suspect the cornice hadn’t melted out completely, contributing to its collapse.

Toor says, “SO MANY people put themselves out to save us, in little ways and in big ways, with skill, enormous effort, discomfort (the climbers with me had to jog to stay warm because I had their warm clothes, and that couple gave up their tent and sleeping bag for Mariella), and real risk (the helicopter team). I just can’t thank everyone enough. I am buying a Garmin InReach for us and one for my son Nicky.

(Sources: Will Toor, Mariella Colvin, Rocky Mountain National Park.)

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Free Solo Rescue on El Cajon Mountain

Is this picture familiar? El Cajon Mountain, the site of a December free solo accident, was the location of a February rescue of a free soloist. Both incidents took place on Leonids (3 pitches, 5.9). The route is to the left of the prominent black roof and dihedral. Photo by Michael Sandler.

In December, we reported a tragic free solo accident in Southern California. It was the third free solo accident in Souther California during 2022.

Last month, a rescue of a stranded free soloist took place on the same crag. Incredibly, the latest incident, involving yet another unroped climber, unfolded on the exact same route!

Climbers, being passionate and opinionated, thrive on conjecture, estimations, and in some cases—judgment. Here, at Accidents in North American Climbing, we avoid emotional opinions. We report events and provide analysis of the facts. Our job is to educate by describing accidents and asking what went wrong. Because of that, we seldom do in-depth reporting of free solo accidents, as that style is a personal choice and there is usually scant helpful analysis to be made after the fact.

So, read on and make your own assessment here on the Mountain Project forum.

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The Prescription — October 2022

The following report will appear in the upcoming edition of Accidents in North American Climbing. The 2022 books are being prepared for shipment and will start going into the mail next week.

Stranded | Exposure and Weather

Yosemite National Park, Half Dome

Nick and Kate being hoisted to the summit of Half Dome after the storm in mid-October of 2021. Big Sandy and Thank God ledges are clearly outlined below by the plastering of fresh snow. Photo: Jack Cramer

In the evening of October 17, two climbers, Kate (28) and Nick (26), started up the Regular Northwest Face of Half Dome (23 pitches, 5.9 C2) after completing The Nose on El Capitan (31 pitches, 5.9 C2) earlier in the same day. Nick and Kate were both experienced climbers attempting a sub-24-hour link-up of the two walls. They failed to summit Half Dome when they were caught in a winter storm, five pitches from the top. 

After finishing The Nose, Kate and Nick ate lunch and started up the approach to Half Dome. The weather forecasted a 90 percent chance of precipitation around 1:30 a.m. Despite that, neither talked about rescheduling.

Kate and Nick started climbing the Northwest Face around 6 p.m. They made good progress, but around midnight they were engulfed in a winter-like storm. At this point, Nick and Kate were simul-climbing through 5.9 and 5.10 terrain, with snow and ice accumulating on ledges and in cracks. Around 12:30 a.m., they arrived at Big Sandy Ledge, atop pitch 18.

Nick and Kate are visible on a snow-covered Big Sandy Ledge in lower right. The icy Zig-Zag pitches are directly above this ledge. Photo: Jack Cramer

Nick began leading the first pitch of the “Zig-Zags” (pitch 19) with increasing difficulty. He was scraping ice out of the cracks and, at one point, slipped off a large foot ledge and fell back onto his daisy chain. Their gear was freezing solid, and Kate’s hands were losing their ability to function.  

Nick still wanted to try and summit, but Kate did not think safely continuing was possible. At this point, they had not sustained any injuries, but the pitches ahead included Thank God Ledge and multiple slab pitches, none of which is inconsequential, especially if covered with ice and snow. They called 911 at 1:50 a.m. and were told to call back at 6 a.m. In a few hours the snow stopped falling, the wind died down, and the temperature dropped. At first light, the conditions on the route were even icier. At 6 a.m., they called search and rescue back and confirmed they needed assistance.

Shortly afterward, Yosemite Search and Rescue (YOSAR) gathered for a technical rescue on Half Dome. The plan was to fly rescuers, ropes, and all necessary equipment to the summit with a helicopter and lower one member of YOSAR to Nick and Kate and then haul them up to the summit. Due to the cold conditions, the helicopter got delayed because the rotors needed to de-ice.

Nick and Kate huddling for warmth on snow-covered Big Sandy Ledge. Photo: Jack Cramer

Later that morning, conditions allowed the helicopter to fly. A rescuer was lowered to Nick and Kate, carrying jackets and warm beverages. Once the rescuer attached to Kate and Nick, two teams on top raised the climbers to the summit. Miraculously, neither Kate nor Nick sustained any cold-related injuries.

ANALYSIS

Heed the forecast. Severe storms can roll through Yosemite any month of the year, but early spring and late fall often catch climbers unaware. In this case, the team saw a forecast for the Valley floor (4,000 feet elevation) with precipitation starting at 1:30 a.m., and they were surprised when the storm started two hours earlier. The conditions on Half Dome (8,846 feet) were unsurprisingly much more intense and severe. 

Nick and Kate on the summit of Half Dome. Photographer Jack Cramer reported that the pair recovered and successfully completed The Nose/Half Dome link-up in spring 2022. Photo: Jack Cramer

Don’t allow the goal to blind your judgment. The link-up of Half Dome and El Capitan in under 24 hours is an admirable goal for any Valley climber. After a season of training and a plan set in motion, it can be tough to decide to bail, especially given that the climbers had completed El Capitan and were “on track” for a sub-24-hour time. They ignored a known weather risk to complete their goal. 

Communicate openly with your partner. Many accidents and rescues can be avoided with better communication. Any reservations or concerns should be immediately communicated. Especially with disappointment on the line, it can be challenging to start the conversation. Partners, particularly new partners, should regularly check in and practice their communication like other climbing skills. Sure, one partner might be disappointed at first, but if it means not having to spend the night in a winter storm or worse, it might be worth it.

Although they discussed the weather, there was no conversation about a worst-case scenario. The climbers didn’t discuss the possibility of not making it to the top nor what the upper pitches would be like in a storm. The final pitch of the Regular Northwest Face is slab climbing with limited opportunities to aid. There should always be a conversation about how to retreat if there is no real possibility of going up.

Pack the proper layers. If you know there is a chance of precipitation, you should pack suitable layers. Kate and Nick both had warm gloves (Kate was not initially wearing them), base layers, and hardshell jackets. However, neither had hardshell pants, and they felt like that was a major mistake. Both Kate and Nick have experience with ice/mixed climbing in winter conditions and thought they could have possibly self-rescued the following morning with the appropriate layers.

A National Park Service rescue helicopter departs the sunny Valley floor on the way to the snowy and frozen summit of Half Dome. Photo: Jack Cramer

Know when to call for a rescue (and have the ability to communicate). It’s tough to know when the right time is. Ultimately, Kate decided they should call for help when she felt like she could not safely use her hands. The need for a rescue became more apparent when they were rappelling back down to Big Sandy after attempting the Zig-Zags. The ropes were extremely icy, making the rappel dangerous. They rappelled with Grigris and used slings as “third-hand” backup prusiks, and did not feel it was safe to try and retreat further. There were legitimate concerns that if they attempted to continue upward, Kate and/or Nick could have gotten injured; this would have made the situation much worse and the rescue more complex.

They only carried one cell phone with them, and fortunately they were able to make a phone call to 911. To communicate with YOSAR, they kept the phone off when not in use and kept the phone next to their bodies to keep it warm and preserve the battery. (Source: Yosemite National Park Climbing Rangers.)

This report is adapted from a story at Yosemite Climbing Information, published by Yosemite rangers. 

SEASONAL HAZARDS: THE EDITOR’S STORY

The shoulder-season months of March/April and October/November can be perilous in Yosemite. After a long winter spent indoors, clear and sunny weather in early spring can lure climbers onto the walls. In fall, peak fitness honed over summer, combined with seemingly endless weeks of perfect weather, can tempt climbers to squeeze in one last end-of-the-season send.  

As the old saying goes, “Good judgment comes from bad experience.” Take it from Pete Takeda, editor of ANAC:

“I spent seven years living in Yosemite. Over that period, I climbed many big walls and suffered more than a few bad-weather epics. One instance stands out. 

“I was coming off a long winter and was itching to get on a wall. So in early April, my partner and I launched up an El Cap route called Lost World, foolishly ignoring a storm forecast. There was no internet back then, but the San Francisco Chronicle, delivered to the Valley on a daily basis, had a generally solid forecast printed in plain black and white on the front page. After two days of climbing, a storm clobbered us above the point of no return, and we spent the next three days soaked to the bone. My shelter was a thin sleeping bag and a leaky bivy sack. On day one of the storm, we foolishly declined an NPS rescue.

On day two I became concerned about hypothermia and asked my partner, ‘Are we going to make it?’ He was a veteran survivor of epics on walls and big mountains. His reply was frightening. ‘How the f*** should I know?’ 

“Day three dawned with sleet, but by noon the sun had peeked out. We jumped into action, climbing for our lives, and barely summited during a few hours of good weather. I’d lost ten pounds and acquired a case of trench foot. Had we had another day of bad weather I might not be sharing this tale.”

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FROM THE ACCIDENTS VAULT: HALF DOME STORIES

These three rescues involved legendary climbers caught in storms on Half Dome:

In 1968, Warren Harding and Galen Rowell got caught in a storm on a new route.

On 27 October Warren Harding (44) and Galen Rowell (28) began an ascent on the unclimbed South Face of Half Dome. It was late in the year, but the weather looked good for the future and they both had equipment in the experimental stages, namely a single suspension bivouac hammock and shelter which would feasibly protect them from the weather in case a storm did break….

In 1986, Steve Bosque, Mike Corbett, and John Middendorf were trapped by an epic storm on the South Face.

(The trio) had been climbing the South Face route on Half Dome since March 4… McDevitt (a Search and Rescue team member) reported by radio that he had attempted to contact the climbers with a loudspeaker and that they had yelled that they needed to be rescued… McDevitt reported blizzard conditions in Little Yosemite Valley with heavy snowfall and strong winds…. 

Scenes from the 1986 South Face epic. Photos: John Middendorf Collection. Read Middendorf’s harrowing personal account here.

In 1975, budding young Stonemasters Dave Diegelman and Bill Price were rescued from the Regular North Face.

Dave Diegelman (17) and Bill Brice (17) had been climbing for the full day of August 19, 1975, on Half Dome’s Regular North (sic) Face, VI 5.8, A3. It started to rain moderately hard at 3 p.m. The climbers continued on for one more hour to reach the bivouac ledge (13th pitch). The rain continued all night and was accompanied by freezing temperatures…. 

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American Alpine Club Podcast · EDUCATE: Trends in Climbing Accidents, with Pete Takeda

EDUCATE: Trends in Climbing Accidents, with Pete Takeda

In this episode, we sat down with Pete to talk about the process of selecting the stories and analysis for the "Accidents" publication each year, trends in climbing accidents that Pete has noticed through his work—including many that the climbing world has been ignoring for far too long—and the bravery of submitting a report in a world that loves to critique.

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American Alpine Club Podcast · EDUCATE: Inside the Life of Search and Rescue Teams

EDUCATE: Inside the Life of Search and Rescue Teams

In this episode of the podcast, we talk to Grant Kleeves, a volunteer with Ouray Mountain Rescue, one of the winning SAR teams for last year’s Rocky Talkie SAR Award. We talk to Grant about some of the operational and logistical challenges that SAR teams face, and he walks us through the decision making process for a particular rescue Ouray Mountain Rescue did in 2021. You might note that we don’t describe what caused the accident, or analyze the accident either. And this is on purpose. Most of the time, SAR teams get a call for services without much context, and they must make decisions based on what they know. The story that Grant shares with us reflects that tricky reality.

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The Prescription Newsletter is published monthly by the American Alpine Club.

The Prescription — September 2022

The following reports will appear in the upcoming 2022 edition of Accidents in North American Climbing.

LEADER FALL | Single Piece Pulled Out 

Eldorado Canyon State Park, Wind Tower

Tiffany Hauck just moments before slipping and falling 30 feet, directly past the belay. Photo: Mike Sutton

My partner Mike (46) and I, Tiffany Hauck (50), convened on the morning of June 13, 2021. Our sights were set on Wind Ridge (4 pitches, 5.7). We had climbed on the route a month earlier but ended up missing a good portion of the ridge. We wanted to bag the full climb.

We made good progress and were soon at the top of the second pitch, nested in a cave-like hollow. Mike had led the previous pitch and opted to wrap the rope around a single largish boulder as the only anchor in the belay. I’d led the next pitch previously and knew that once I maneuvered past the chin-up, it was gravy.

I tightened my helmet and stepped onto a nearby boulder, so I could stretch and reach a large flake, which overhangs about eight feet above the belay. I heaved myself up into a narrow hollow. I put a cam in the same crack I’d previously used and then yanked in four directions. Satisfied the cam was stable and wouldn’t walk, I clipped in, stood up, assessed my position, and made a step onto a tiny foothold—and I slipped.

My right side slammed onto a large boulder at the edge of the belay ledge and I bounced—how far out, I don’t know, as I lost sense of direction. [As Hauck fell, the sole cam she had placed as protection pulled out.] My ears filled with the sound of pro slamming into the rock and striking my helmet. I was yanked back toward the rock, then bounced briefly again before I came to a stop. [Hauck and her partner estimated the fall was around 30 feet, ending well below the belay ledge.]

Looking up at the narrow hollow crux, where two different falls in 2021 led to serious accidents. Photo: Tiffany Hauck

It took time, but I righted myself and looked up to see Mike leaning over the boulder I’d hit on the way down. The first thing I noticed was a large splatter of blood on the rock between us, but Mike quickly explained that it was his blood—he had been pulled violently across the rock when I fell. I painfully climbed back to the belay ledge, and eventually we scrambled over to the descent trail. With the help of Mike and a climber named Hillary, who had come up the route behind us, I was able to walk out under my own power.

A visit to the emergency room revealed no concussion and no broken bones. I had minor scrapes and bruises on my shins, and contusions on my hip and buttocks. That evening, my left shin swelled to twice its normal size. The contusion would take weeks to heal.

Analysis

It is hard to say for sure the cause of the cam failing. I don’t know if it’s because I put in the wrong sized cam or if I put it in a bad location. But the most likely cause is that I placed too small of a cam, or that I placed it in a flaring crack. (Source: Tiffany Hauck.)

The second-pitch belay anchor on Wind Ridge is best built with this large block, in this case using part of the lead rope to tie it off. The long sling in the foreground is clipped to a cam placed in a shallow pocket. Photo: Pete Takeda

Editor’s Note: On Wind Ridge, a fall at this point is often a ledge fall. The cracks available at this crux are flared and piton-scarred, making cam placements tricky. Often, cams placed straight into piton scars appear secure. However, when the cam is rotated downward under load, it can disengage. Also, the interior lobes, hidden from view, might not be securely engaged because of grooves inside the crack. One can easily choose to skip this pitch by traversing along the big ledge.

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A TRAGIC ACCIDENT TWO MONTHS LATER

Wind Ridge climbs directly to the circled belay ledge atop pitch two. This was the site of both accidents reported here. At this point, climbers can either escape left or continue through an overhang. In the August 2021 incident, the two climbers fell all the way to the point marked X. Photo: Tommy Copeland 

The exact spot of Hauck’s fall was the site of an eerily similar accident two months later. On August 26, two climbers suffered a belay anchor failure and fell over 100 feet. Climber 1 was in his 20s and survived with severe injuries. Climber 2 was in his 30s. He sustained fatal injuries.  

In a Climbing magazine accident report, Climber 1 recalled using a cordelette to girth-hitch a horn in the alcove for a belay. Climber 1 began leading the third pitch and moved out of the narrow hollow (where Hauck had fallen), at which point he gave his belayer a warning and fell. 

The two climbers tumbled end over end until they stopped on a ledge with a tree above the first pitch of a route called Tagger.

Later, SAR found no evidence of an anchor at the belay ledge. Perhaps the pair were unanchored. Perhaps their gear came unclipped or broke, as can happen in severe incidents. What is certain is their anchor, assuming they had one, was insufficient.

Danger Zones

Eldorado Canyon is notorious for its heady climbing style and demanding terrain. Adventure often extends well beyond the grade of the climbing and into the realm of rock quality, gear placements, and building belay anchors. See “DANGER ZONES: ELDORADO CANYON” for more information on where and why accidents happen in Colorado's trad mecca. 

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SAME ACCIDENT, ONLY DIFFERENT

On pitch two of the South Face of Washington Column, the leader fell 35 feet after a piece failed in a pin-scarred crack. Several of his lower pieces pulled as he fell. Photo: NPS

Piton scars infest many popular routes across North America. Back in the day, climbers hammered these tapered, nail-like spikes—often called “pins”—into cracks, using them as we now use nuts and cams. Over the years, repeated placement and removal of pitons marred these cracks with flared and irregular scars. Today, these disfigured cracks often offer passage on many moderate and popular classics. Thus, novices are often confronted with tricky protection placements.

California, Yosemite Valley
On October 7, 2016, two climbers started up the South Face of Washington Column. This popular route is a first big wall for many. On pitch two, the leader started climbing up a pin-scarred corner rated C1. Approximately 35 feet up, the piece he was standing on pulled out. The team believe that the falling leader pulled out an additional three pieces of gear during his fall, before landing on the belay ledge on his right side. When he tried to move, the injured leader experienced excruciating pain on his side and was having trouble breathing. They called 911 and YOSAR responded with an ultimately successful rescue. As with Hauck’s accident on Wind Ridge (above), the culprit was an inadequately placed cam in a piton scar. Read more on this in ANAC 2017.

See the National Park Service Accident Report for more images and details.

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 The Prescription newsletter is published monthly by the American Alpine Club.