The Prescription

The Prescription—Groundfall

It’s September, and the summer 2026 heat wave is, we hope, over. Now it’s time to get out and climb. As a reminder to both trad and sport climbers, the unthinkable can happen. In the case of this month’s Prescription, a quickdraw came unclipped from a bolt hanger.

Back in 2024, the first time we featured a quickdraw unclipping met with widespread disbelief and skepticism. Similar accidents have happened over the years—in this latest case, in November 2025, a climber clipped the first bolt on a tricky 5.7 and asked her belayer to take while she worked out the moves. She then led on past, slipped, fell, and the draw unclipped, sending her 15 feet to the ground. The climber suffered a torn ACL and MCL and sustained a concussion, but her helmet saved her from more serious injury. Fortunately, she has recovered and is climbing once more.

 In November 2025, the High Wire Crag in Clear Creek Canyon, Colorado, was the scene of a groundfall when a quickdraw unclipped from a bolt hanger. Photo by PeakDreamz.

Ground Fall | Quickdraw Unclipped During Fall

Clear Creek Canyon, High Wire Crag, Colorado

On November 14, 2025*, at 3:30 p.m., a female climber (Climber X, 23) sustained serious injuries after falling 15 feet to the ground. She had been leading Stone Cold Moderate (5.7) at the High Wire Crag in Clear Creek Canyon and had clipped the first bolt with an unextended alpine quickdraw. As she manteled past the bolt, she fell. The draw came unclipped from the bolt hanger and she fell to the ground. The fallen climber’s belayer was Adam Page (23). He wrote to ANAC:

“Another climber led the route and lowered. Climber X got ready to lead the climb. We stick-clipped the first bolt since it was high on the initial overhang. Some entries on Mountain Project describe this section as “bouldery,” “heady,” and harder than the crux of an adjacent 5.9. After tying in, X started up and was having trouble getting past the first bolt and onto the easier slab above the overhang. She hung on the bolt several times before figuring out the mantel moves past the bolt. As her waist passed the bolt, she slipped and fell. As she fell, the carabiner unclipped from the bolt and she fell 15 feet to the ground. She landed on her ankle and then hit her head on the ground. She had forgotten her helmet that day, and I luckily had given her mine to wear.

A friend who was observing called 911. I held X’s head stable until the paramedics arrived about 30 minutes later; it took 2.5 hours to get her into an ambulance. X suffered a concussion, an ankle injury, abrasions, and a torn ACL and MCL that later required knee surgery”


Analysis

We looked at a photo that we took of her climbing before she fell, and the carabiner was clipped correctly into the bolt. As she was climbing, she moved straight up, with her waist only a few inches over the bolt. For this climb, one starts to the right, moves left, and then passes directly over the bolt for the mantel. After the mantel, you stand up on good footholds above that first bolt and then move left to clip the second. 

I think that as she manteled or as she fell, her harness or body contacted the unextended alpine draw, and that moved the hanger end carabiner in such a way as to open the gate and cause it to unclip. The bolt, carabiner, and sling appeared to be in good condition. 

The next day when I retrieved my gear and re-created the accident, I tested how easily the draw could unclip. It was pretty easy to cause it to unclip. The type of draw—alpine or dog bone—didn’t affect whether it would unclip or not. The bolt on Stone Cold Moderate was a glue-in style. When testing on a more common ASCA sheet-metal hanger, the draw would not unclip for me. 

On a route where a single protection point is critical, it’s worth clipping both ends with a locking carabiner. Also, in this accident, her helmet almost certainly prevented a far more serious head injury. Also, pre-clipping a high bolt is good practice.

(Source: Adam Page and the Editors.)

*This unpublished report describes an accident that occurred at the end of 2025. It is important enough to warrant inclusion in the next edition of ANAC.


Video Analysis—Bold Unclipped During Fall

Jason Antin goes out to the accident site to explain what we *think* happened. The biggest takeaway is to orient the carabiner's gate AWAY from your direction of travel.

 
 

Pete Takeda @pete_takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin @jasonantin; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney @sierra_mcgivney; Videographer: Foster Denney @fosterdoodle_; Editor: Sierra McGivney @sierra_mcgivney; Location: Clear Creek Canyon, CO


Get Outside Safely—Rescue Coverage

Whether you’re questing off on the twentieth pitch, or checking a landing zone for a boulder, having the AAC’s rescue benefit is a critical step for safety in climbing–ensuring you can find your flow a little more easily knowing we have your back in the case of a medical emergency.

Join the AAC today at the Partner level or higher, and back up your protection with up to $7,500 in rescue benefit and $5,000 in medical-expense coverage. 


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The Prescription—Fall from Ram's Horn Anchor

View of Mt. Diablo, Walnut Creek, CA. Photo provided by Wikimedia Commons.

It’s August, and in a few weeks our goals will probably shift out of the alpine as cooler temps bring relief to what has felt like a global heatwave. For many of us, milder conditions mean sport climbing. Whether revisiting a project or getting some pitches in, safety should always be at the forefront. 

Fall from Anchor | Rope Detached from Open Anchor

Bay Area, Mount Diablo State Park

Safe as it seems, sport climbing demands lowering—a technique that has replaced rappelling as the leading cause of roped climbing accidents. Lowering is almost always entirely equipment dependent. It also involves critical technical steps high above the ground, and almost every fall from the anchor is a ground fall. This month, we look at an accident featured in the 2025 ANAC in which a climber fell while cleaning a toprope anchor at Mt. Diablo, California. She reported the following: 

This ram’s horn anchor on a 30-foot 5.10 called Two for One in Mount Diablo State Park, California, was involved in a near-fatal accident on October 26, 2024. Photo provided by Sean Burke/Kim Harris.

“I was toproping a 5.10a called Two for One (left variation). I reached the anchor to clean the quickdraws. I secured myself with a PAS. I hadn’t seen this type of hardware before, and it was a type that wasn’t fully enclosed—as in the case of a mussy hook. The adjoining link wasn't big enough for me to thread the rope through, so I put my rope across the hardware, stood up to unclip my PAS, sat on the rope, and fell. I have no memory of the fall. I blacked out and woke up in a hospital operating room. 


”I broke my left ulna, two ribs on my right ribcage, part of a vertebra, my sacrum, and the ball joint on top of the femur. My helmet broke, and there was a small gash on the left side of my head. I also hit my left butt cheek, because the nerve endings have no feeling in that area. I had one surgery to cut off part of the fractured vertebra and to drain a hematoma. I was hospitalized for four days.”


Analysis

My climbing friends and I determined that it was a ram’s horn that I encountered at the anchor. I hadn’t wiggled the rope underneath the (curled) part of the horns that would’ve prevented the rope from slipping out. Either that or, when I unclipped my PAS, the rope came out. I fell 30 feet and rolled a further 10+ feet downhill, along with the rope. It happened quickly, and K (my friend) didn’t see what happened because when I was at the anchor, my body blocked her view. K ran to get cell reception and called 911. Apparently, I was able to answer questions, but today I have no recollection of what I said. (Source: Jenna Chan, Bay Area Climbers Coalition, and the Editors.)


Editor’s note: The ram’s horn is ultimately an open system fixture. While there’s an advantage in having fewer necessary steps to lowering (including untying and retying), ram’s horns suffer from the possibility of unthreading. Two fatalities occurred in Austria—Peilstein (2022) and Martinswand (ca. 2020)—in which the climber’s rope became detached from ram’s horns while rappelling. Confusion can exist on how to use any unfamiliar fixed hardware. This accident illustrates the peril when the anchor hardware’s design attempts to balance convenience and safety. That said, no anchor is foolproof, and no design can negate human error.


Video—Ram’s Horn Accident Analysis

Here’s what we THINK happened in this 2024 accident in Mount Diablo State Park:

A climber was cleaning an anchor that incorporated a set of ram’s horns, something she’d never seen before. Carabiners might have been blocking the fixture because, in her recollection, the links weren’t big enough to thread her rope through. She put the rope ACROSS the hardware, stood up, unclipped her PAS, sat on the rope, and fell.

Lowering hardware is either closed (rings, quicklinks, chains) or open (ram’s horns, mussy hooks, and—if they haven’t been updated—unwelded cold shuts from the 1990s). Ram’s horns are cheap, easy to install, and fast to use—thread the rope through, no need to untie and retie, and then lower. But as enclosed as they look, ram’s horns are open anchors. In rare cases—standing above the anchor or threading the rope incorrectly—the rope can come out of the ram’s horns.

Video—Using a Ram’s Horn

Most climbing involves lowering, so much so that lowering has replaced rappelling as the probable leading cause of roped climbing accidents. 

This month, we cover an accident in which a climber was cleaning a ram’s horn anchor and threaded the rope incorrectly, which unfortunately led to a ground fall. Fortunately, the climber survived the fall. 

It may seem simple, but when using a ram’s horn anchor, thread the rope through EVERY available horn. Always weight your system before lowering, and when using open anchors, be a pro and keep it low. 


Video Credits: Pete Takeda @pete_takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin @jasonantin; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney @sierra_mcgivney; Videographer: Foster Denney @fosterdoodle_; Editor: Sierra McGivney @sierra_mcgivney


Get Outside Safely—Rescue Coverage

Whether you’re questing off on the twentieth pitch, or checking a landing zone for a boulder, having the AAC’s rescue benefit is a critical step for safety in climbing–ensuring you can find your flow a little more easily knowing we have your back in the case of a medical emergency.

Join the AAC today at the Partner level or higher, and back up your protection with up to $7,500 in rescue benefit and $5,000 in medical-expense coverage. 


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The Prescription—Fall From Anchor

It’s July, and we’re in high summer, with long days out in the vertical enjoying the season. Recently, we had a request via Instagram to visually demonstrate the mechanics behind a fatal lowering accident that took place in 2024 and was documented in the 2025 Accidents in North American Climbing.

Details came to us through a third-party report sent via our online report form. The correspondent did not want to be identified, but they provided the location, date, name of fallen climber, name of belayer, cause of accident, and other details. As they summarized: “Inexperienced climber (Claire Amiel) may have been cleaning an anchor which was beyond her skill level (and) tied in with a non-traditional knot [identified as an alpine butterfly], which became confusing when clipping mussy hooks.”

The published report and analysis appear below. The lessons here are to stick with simple tools and techniques, and practice skills—like cleaning and lowering—while still on the ground. If you’re the expert in the group, take extra-good care of your partner/s. They are looking to you for guidance and safety.

Jason Antin demonstrating one misstep from this month’s accident. See the full breakdown in July’s video analysis.

Fall From Anchor | Unfamiliar Knot

Queen Creek, The Pond

On January 30, Claire Amiel (34) fell while cleaning an anchor on a sport route at The Pond area in Queen Creek, Arizona. The fall resulted in her death.

According to a source who wishes to remain anonymous, Amiel was the less experienced of two climbers in her group. The anonymous source wrote ANAC: “Claire fell from the top of a route while cleaning the anchor. It's rumored she was tied into an alpine butterfly knot. After clipping the mussy hooks, she weighted the wrong side of the butterfly knot.”

The alpine butterfly is useful for glacier travel, but is not a standard rock-climbing knot. StromBer | Wikimedia


Video Analysis

Pete Takeda and Jason Antin are back to explain an accident involving cleaning a top-rope anchor with mussy hooks. The catch? The climber was using an alpine butterfly tied to the middle of a full-length rope and clipped into the anchors with the wrong side of the rope. Tragically, the fall was fatal. This climber was less experienced than their partner and trusted that this was best practice in climbing. 

When it comes to cleaning anchors, keep it simple, check your systems, and practice a lot before taking it 100 feet off the ground

Video Credits: Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Accessibility Crag, Clear Creek Canyon, CO


Analysis

For most rock climbing, the choice of an alpine butterfly is unusual. John Godino at Alpinesavvy.com wrote ANAC, “The butterfly is generally not a standard beginner climbing knot. It is almost always used for glacier travel to tie in the middle climber to the middle of a rope. Rock climbers almost always tie into the end of the rope, especially when top-roping in a sport area.”

Had Amiel been using a mid-rope alpine butterfly knot, it would have created two lengths of slack rope extending from both ends of the knot. Though both sides would have appeared nearly identical, only one would have been belayed. Amiel may have top-roped up to the anchor, clipped the unbelayed strand into the mussy hooks, and then fallen to the ground. 

In general, climbers of limited experience or those transitioning from the gym to the outdoors are especially vulnerable when cleaning anchors. The use of unusual or unfamiliar knots, gear, or systems in critical situations like lowering/cleaning is very dangerous. 

Godino adds, “I would love to see ground-level anchor stations near beginner areas or on the approach trail. This would provide beginner climbers a place to practice clipping and cleaning, before they get on the rock.” (Sources: Anonymous, John Godino, and the Editors.)

Editor’s Note: We published this report in 2025. A good point has been made that any knot—like a figure 8 on a bight—might lead to the same result if used as a mid-rope tie-in/clip-in point. The butterfly knot is less a culprit than the location where it was tied.)


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The Prescription—Leader Fall on Rock

It’s May and we’re fully into the spring season. We have the first installment of a two-part series that demonstrates what to do if the leader falls and is knocked unconscious. It is not an uncommon scenario as we see in an accident we reported in the 2025 ANAC. 

This accident took place in November 2024, when a climber was leading the overhanging second pitch of a route in Red Rock Canyon, Nevada. This climber fell and was knocked unconscious and ended up hanging above and out from the wall. As you’ll read, this story has a happy ending because of well-informed and decisive action by the belayer.

Red Rock Canyon lies just outside the Las Vegas metropolitan area. This proximity belies the remote wilderness setting in which rescues are often complex and hazardous. BLM Nevada.

Leader Fall on Rock | Protection Pulled Out

Red Rock Canyon National Conservation Area, Oak Creek Canyon, Black Orpheus Amphitheater

On November 10, I, Eric Chaudhary and a partner (male, 26) were climbing Marijuana (5 pitches, 11c) in the Black Orpheus Amphitheater. He was leading the second pitch (10b). It exits hard left off a hanging belay with one bolt for protection about six feet above and ten feet to the left of the belay. The route then cuts back right to a roof/bulge move where I believe he placed a BD #0.3 Z4 cam. 

He did the move, mantled up, and was getting his stance when his foot slipped and he fell. The piece in the roof ripped, causing him to fall about six feet directly onto the rope which was clipped to the first bolt. His ankle caught and flipped him aggressively. The first thing that struck the wall was his head. He was wearing a helmet. 

He was unconscious and was hanging upside down approximately ten feet to my left and four feet above me. I lowered him to a small ledge that flipped him upright. He was now level with me. I then tied off the rope and broke the belay. I called 911 (spotty reception) and relayed our location. I then yelled to a party of hiker/climbers at the base of the canyon. I informed them we needed helicopter rescue and that I was not sure if EMS had received my location.

I then attended to my partner and basically lassoed him with a coil of rope and pulled him to me at the belay. Around then he started regaining consciousness. I secured him to the anchor, untied him, and set-up a rappel. I rapped to the base of the first pitch with him attached to me. Luckily, we had twin 60m ropes. 

At the actual base of the climb there is one belay bolt, but unfortunately it was too high to utilize. I built a two-piece gear anchor to descend a 150-foot section of low 5th class slab that comprises the approach to the first pitch. As we were rappelling, a SAR member yelled from the base of the canyon. I told him my partner was in and out of consciousness and we needed helicopter rescue. I finished the rap to a large ledge system. Five minutes later a helicopter arrived. They flew out my partner, then returned for a SAR team member and myself. 


Video Analysis

Here's the scenario: Your climbing partner took a leader fall, they are unconscious, and unresponsive.

What do you do?

In this video, Jason Antin shows you ONE way to rescue an unconscious leader while on a multi-pitch climb. We recommend taking a course with an IFMGA/AMGA guide to learn more about rock rescue.

Credits:
Pete Takeda @pete_takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Boulder Canyon, Boulder, CO

In this month’s featured accident, a climber was knocked unconscious while leading a second pitch. His partner swooped into action, effecting a self-rescue, and getting them both safely off the wall.

Jason and Pete are back to share knowledge about what to do if your leader is knocked unconscious.

Video Credits: Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Boulder Canyon, Boulder, CO.


Analysis

I inspected the cam that blew, and it had a gouge in two of the lobes. The next party to climb the route retrieved our bail anchor. I was told that the spot where the piece had blown had no fresh scar. I’m still not sure why it didn't hold and hope to climb the route again to inspect it. (Source: Eric Chaudhary.) 

Editor’s Note: It was fortunate that Chaudhary was very competent and effected an efficient self-rescue. Had he not descended to a helicopter accessible area, the rescue might have taken many hours longer—sunset was 4:30 p.m. Though close to Las Vegas, Red Rock is a remote venue and climbers should consider carrying an emergency satellite communication device. 


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The Prescription—Ground Fall

It’s February, and yours truly is bouldering in sunny Hueco Tanks, Texas. I was reminded a few weeks ago that all climbing is not without risk, when a close friend fractured his ankle bouldering in the park and had to be extracted by SAR. The situation was compounded when a rescuer fell off the low-fifth-class approach and also required extraction.

This accident, like the one featured below, happened despite the fact that everyone was playing by the book. In the accident below, two apparently textbook cam placements failed when the leader applied body weight to the top cam on a lead of a slippery granite crack. More serious injury was prevented because the climbers in question had built a solid belay anchor on the ledge below, and the leader and the belayer were both wearing helmets. Still, this is a case in point that you can do everything right and still end up in the hospital. 


The Metolius TCU is an old version with all cam lobes an equal width. Later, the single middle lobe was widened to provide more opposing surface area. The U-stem Black Diamond Camalot Junior is from the mid-1990s. This version’s cam lobes were fabricated from very hard 7075-T6 aluminum—a material implicated in several incidents in which the cam lobes tracked out of apparently perfect placements. Both models of gear have been improved over the decades and form the backbone of many standard trad climbing racks.

Ground Fall | Multiple Pieces of Protection Pulled

California, San Diego, Mission Gorge

On May 18, 2024, at about 10:40 a.m., my climbing partner and I prepared to climb Gallwas Crack (5.9) at the Main Wall of Mission Gorge in San Diego. Another friend was with us for his first outdoor climbing session. The three of us had already warmed up.

Access involved scrambling eight feet up to a large, flat ledge, then up and over to another ledge at the base of the route. This ledge was big enough to not worry about falling off, but there was a risk of the belayer getting pulled off if the leader fell before placing any gear. We all wore helmets and were very safety focused.

The ledge was 40 feet above the trail. We built a three-piece gear anchor to secure the belayer (me), and our other friend sat untethered on the large ledge below and left. Gallwas Crack looked challenging, with slippery rock, but my climbing partner had led higher-rated climbs at similar areas, so I thought it would be possible, though perhaps at his limit. There appeared to be plentiful gear placements.

He racked up and we did thorough safety checks. He got up a short fourth-class ramp to a secure stance and put in a No. 0.5 Camalot, clipped with an alpine draw. He climbed to where his feet were level with the first cam and placed another, then climbed to where the second cam was at his waist and placed a third cam.

When the third cam was at his waist, he paused to figure out the move, then yelled, “Take! Take! Take!” I pulled in a couple of arm lengths of slack as fast as I could. The rope started becoming taut just before he fell, but it never became completely tight during the fall. I did not get pulled toward the wall as one would expect. The highest (third) piece pulled immediately, and he continued falling. The second piece also pulled as he rotated backward and began falling headfirst. The first piece caught him. I don’t remember being pulled by the rope despite the fact that he fell 30 feet total, past the ledge, and ended hanging upside down, about 30 feet above the trail.

He was not moving. Our other friend yelled, “He’s bleeding out of his right ear.” I can't recall the sequence, but someone yelled to ask if they should call 911. I asked our other friend to attend, since he had emergency medical training. I slowly lowered my partner as he was pulled over to the large ledge. As I was lowering, his body shook for a few seconds. On the flat ledge, he had a pulse and breathing was heavy. I called 911 at 10:56 a.m. and learned that someone else had already called in.

I clipped my climbing partner into the anchor so I could be freed up to help. I held his head, and he’d periodically sit up and moan, then lie back. We tried to keep him down, and he would tell us to stop touching him. A woman with emergency medical training came over and did a good job helping us all stay calm. She confirmed that my climbing partner could respond to his name, by turning his head. A helicopter arrived, lowering a paramedic with a radio and litter, who assessed his condition. The paramedic tried to place a neck brace, but my climbing partner refused it. When we got the brace on, he immediately took it off. Eventually, he was put on a litter and flown to a trauma center. It was less than an hour after he’d started the climb.

One of the pieces that pulled was a No. 3 (orange) Metolius TCU. The plastic trigger-wire guide on a green (No. 0.75) Camalot was tweaked, so this was probably the other pulled piece. I’m not sure which one pulled first. My climbing partner suffered a severe traumatic brain injury, but he made it through emergency surgery and has mostly recovered.


Video Analysis

Accidents in North American Climbing Editor Pete Takeda and IFMGA/AMGA guide Jason Antin are back at North Table Mountain in Golden, CO to analyze this accident.

They break the accident down into things that could be improved and things that were done really well. Watch the video for a visual analysis.


ANALYSIS

What went right: I was anchored, so I couldn’t get pulled off the ledge when my partner fell. He was wearing a helmet, which probably saved his life. It’s good that we had a third person there, because he was able to respond quickly and help save our friend’s life. We've been able to talk about what happened and support each other. (Source: Anonymous.)

*Editor’s Note: A climber posted on Mountain Project that, in Mission Gorge, “two separate near-fatal accidents” involving cams pulling out occurred in 2024—one on May 18 (Gallwas Crack; described here) and the other on May 19 on the adjacent Nutcracker (5.9+). He also wrote, “Be aware that cams do not hold well on this rock in hot conditions.” Perhaps the Mission Gorge’s slick rock combined with recent rain-generated dirt and silt contributed to the gear pulling. The gear itself may have played a role. Not up for conjecture is that several elements combined to produce an unpredictable accident. The fallen leader was 34 years old and had “many years” of trad experience; the cams did not suffer obvious deformation that would have indicated a high load. As the belayer stated, “They just came right out, with seemingly less than body weight. They didn’t slow the fall at all.”


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The Prescription—The Stacked Rappel

Rappelling is one of the most accident-prone facets of climbing, with improper/incomplete setup being an all-too-common cause of misadventure. In the 2025 ANAC, we featured an accident that involved a rappel fatality from a difficult ice/mixed route in the Canadian Rockies. Steep, multi-pitch winter climbing combines a challenging environment with the technical complexities of big-wall climbing. Gloved hands, copious gear, and often-cumbersome clothing can impede the usual streamlined rappel setup and safety checks. As John Godino mentioned in his 2025 ANAC Know the Ropes feature, the stacked rappel can help ameliorate these issues by promoting “More efficient rappels with reduced risk—what’s not to like?”  

Drama Queen climbs a series of ice flows interspersed with steep mixed sections. In this photo of the Stanley Headwall, the route is roughly left of center. In winter, this 300-meter-tall crag is a crucible for hard ice and mixed climbing; in summer, it’s home to a host of difficult single- and multi-pitch rock climbs. Photo by Parks Canada.

Rappel Fatality | Possible Unsecured Knot

British Columbia, Kootenay Park and Banff National Park, Stanley Headwall

At the end of 2024, a very experienced climber named Dave Peabody (48) fell to his death while rappelling from a route on the Stanley Headwall. Alik Berg was Peabody’s partner on that day. Berg wrote to ANAC:

Dave and I had been regular climbing partners for about 12 years, with many seasons of winter, alpine, and rock climbing. On December 26, we headed to the Stanley Headwall to climb Drama Queen (170m, WI6 M7). This was a fairly routine climbing day for us. That morning, we saw teams on the neighboring climbs French Reality and Dawn of the Dead.

We topped out at dusk (around 5 p.m.) and began rappelling by headlamp. We both used an ATC-Guide on our belay loops and a prusik backup on our leg loops. The last pitch (P4) was the steepest, and we climbed on a single rope (blue) with the second rope (red) as a tag line. The pitch was short enough to be rappelled with the blue rope, while we left red fixed at the beginning of the pitch to pull ourselves back into the anchor atop P3. 

This awkward rappel was partly free hanging, and pulling back into the belay required care to not disturb a large, dripping ice dagger. Dave descended first. I soon joined him. He had already begun setting up the next rappel, threading the red rope through the anchor and joining the two ropes with a single flat overhand knot.

The P3 anchor is a pair of modern bolts with Fixe rap rings. There was enough space on the small ice ledge to not be crowded, and we busied ourselves with the routine tasks of rigging the next rappel. I pulled the blue rope, verbally confirming with Dave that the joining knot was in place before making the final tug and pulling up the tail to add a stopper knot. We tied an additional stopper knot in the red rope before tossing it off. We noted a bit of a tangle in the red rope that we’d deal with on the way down.

Dave readied himself to start the rappel. I was distracted with untangling and tossing the remaining rope from the ledge and did not directly observe his connection to the ropes. He started the rappel, moving normally. As Dave descended, my gaze at that moment was on the overhand knot joining the rope ends. I sensed something was off but couldn’t register what it was.

At this point, Dave fell. The interval between sensing something was amiss to when Dave started falling was very short, maybe one to two seconds or fewer. There was enough time to register this thought but not enough to assess, let alone react. I believe he was about five to 10 meters below the anchor when he fell—not when he first stepped off the ledge and weighted the system.

In the immediate aftermath, I became fixated on something being “off” with the knot and that being the likely point of failure. It wasn’t until reaching the ground the next morning that it became clear that the knot was not the cause of the accident.

When Dave fell, I reacted by grabbing the free-running (red) rope and squeezing hard enough to melt my gloves and burn my fingers, but not enough to slow his fall. In the darkness, I could not see him at the base, only the faint glow of his headlamp. It was about 6 p.m.

The team on French Reality had already left the area. The party on Dawn of the Dead had descended, traversed the base of the wall, and were around the corner and out of earshot. About 15 minutes after the accident, their headlamps reappeared as they looped back into view near valley bottom—about one kilometer northwest of my location. I was able to yell down, and they turned around. At 6:45 p.m., they reached the base, and we could communicate properly. It was then that they realized the severity of the situation and activated their inReach. 

Dave and I had both carried a cell phone and an inReach. I had my cell phone but my inReach was at the base, while Dave had been carrying his on the climb. The party below had enough cell reception to make calls with Garmin dispatch and Parks Canada. 

Parks Canada later reported that I was secure on an anchor and wearing warm clothing. The rescue team decided that given the exposure and technical nature of the location, they would wait until sunrise to mount a rescue.

During the night, I acquired sporadic cell reception, and in the morning was able to send a few texts to the rescue team, who suggested delivering ropes to me so I could descend on my own. This was a great idea, as it eliminated the risk of doing a direct extrication from the steep wall. At 9:20 a.m., a bag containing two ropes and a radio was delivered to me by helicopter long-line. At 9:50 a.m., I was at the base of the route, where I met rescue-team members.

(Sources: Alik Berg and Parks Canada.)


Video Analysis—The Stacked Rappel

One way that rappelling accidents might be avoided is by using the stacked or pre-rigged rappel method. In this video analysis, IFMGA/AMGA guide Jason Antin walks us through the benefits of the stacked rappel.  


ANALYSIS

Dave was found with only the blue rope threaded through his device and backup. The device was five to 10 meters from the overhand knot.

The matching, triple-rated 8.7mm ropes showed no signs of damage, and the joining knot and stopper knots were intact. The stopper knots were unfortunately not photographed, so this comes from the rescuers and my own recollections. However, both parties agreed that both stopper knots were present.

It appears that Dave’s accident was caused by an improperly threaded rappel device. The simple solution to that is a basic partner or function check. Alternately, rappelling using the stacked rappel method is a solution. It is common in guiding practice and deserves broader adoption in the climbing community. (See ANAC 2025 KTR, “Crafty Rappel Techniques,” by John Godino.)   

Stacked rappel method. Image by AAC Staff Foster Denney.

Though we’ll never know exactly what happened here, these are the scenarios that I’ve come up with: 

  1. Device and prusik only loaded on blue rope. During the initial shuffle off the ledge and transition onto steeper ground, both of Dave’s hands were gripping the ropes. Once the ropes were fully weighted, Dave transitioned to a looser grip, perhaps one hand, or maybe he released both hands to deal with the tangled red rope.

  2. Same as above, except the red rope snarled the small ice daggers near the end of P3. They supported his body weight on the initial lower-angle terrain while providing similar tactile feedback to a functioning system. Once Dave was on steeper ground, his full weight caused the ice to fail or pulled the rope tangle through the constriction that had held it in place.

  3. ATC-Guide was properly threaded but prusik backup was attached to the blue rope only. When his hands came off braking, the red rope ran free. The stopper knot was not present, and the rope tail ran through the ATC. (Source: Alik Berg.)

This was a deeply impactful and traumatic event. Writing the above notes and going back to that place in detail has been really hard. But it is important to me that we get this right.

(Source: Alik Berg.)


Got a question about accidents or climbing safety?

Send it to [email protected] and hear answers from Accidents in North American Climbing editor, Pete Takeda, and the AAC team on an upcoming March episode of the AAC Podcast.


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The Prescription—Crevasse Fall

This month, we feature an accident that occurred in 2025 on Mt. Baker’s Squak Glacier, on the peak’s southern facet. On May 23, Daton Nestlebush fell into a crevasse while on a snowboard descent. His partner Manny Pacheco, travelling on skis, effected a rapid rescue. Pacheco captured a rare POV video of this successful 1:1 partner crevasse rescue and later posted it on Instagram (@pmannyy). Below, we feature this remarkable video, along with a blow-by-blow analysis by IFMGA guide Jason Antin.  

Mt. Baker’s Squak Glacier is the glacier/snowfield on the left-center of the peak. This classic ski-mountaineering route, known for its excellent corn skiing, is one of Baker’s most popular ski descents. It requires extensive glacier travel and offers thousands of feet of descent. Photo by AAC member and grant recipient Craig Muderlak.

Crevasse Rescue | Fall Into Crevasse 

Mt. Baker, Squak Glacier

On May 23 at 3 a.m., my longtime friend Daton Nestlebush (26) and I, Manny Pacheco (27), set out to ski Mt. Baker via the Squak Glacier route. I’m experienced in ski mountaineering and crevasse rescue, and I hold an AIARE 1 avalanche-training certification. Daton had limited experience in high-alpine terrain—this was his first time on a glacier attempting to summit a Cascade volcano.

Earlier, our team had thinned from four members down to two. I took the risk of glacier travel with an inexperienced partner because of my familiarity with the route. We reached the toe of the Squak Glacier at  5:15 a.m. and put on harnesses. I taught Daton how to bury a picket and fix a rope to it—the minimum self-rescue skill one needs if one falls into a crevasse and is still conscious.

We reached the top by noon (my seventh Mt. Baker summit). We then transitioned into descent mode and made our way down to the Squak Glacier, skiing 500-foot pitches while taking turns watching each other. At 1:15 p.m., at 7,950 feet, I stopped abruptly when I saw large crevasses 100 feet ahead. I radioed Daton, still above me, to traverse to skier’s right and keep a high line. He passed, and we both started a 300-foot descending traverse to bypass hazardous convex terrain.

As I followed, Daton collapsed a thin snow bridge and dropped into a crevasse. He raised his arms into a “T” shape, catching himself between the uphill and downhill crevasse lips. His snowboard tip caught an ice chunk four feet below the surface. Only his arms and head were visible.

My most pressing goal was to anchor Daton. I immediately redirected uphill and crossed another small crevasse. I stationed myself 20 feet uphill, using my pole to probe. I told Daton not to move and that I’d throw him a rope in 60 seconds. “You’re going to be okay,” I reassured him. 

He was holding himself strenuously by his arms above the crevasse, which we later estimated to be 60 feet deep. He said, “Can you make that 45 seconds?”  

Fortunately, the late-spring snow was perfect, and I made a trench and buried a picket in a deadman position, stomped it one foot deep, and backfilled the trench. I clipped the picket and tied another figure eight on a bight 20 feet from the anchor and threw it to Daton. My split-second decision to use the eight was based on urgency. Daton was able to grab the large loop—he later said this was critical to his survival. 

I knew the clock was ticking but stayed methodical. Daton grabbed the figure-eight loop with his right hand. As he let go of the uphill lip to clip, he dropped a couple feet, fully weighting the system. At the same time, I attached myself to the rope as a secondary anchor. This all felt like ten minutes but, in reality, it was probably more like 30 seconds.  

Daton Nestlebush emerging from the crevasse. Minutes prior, Nestlebush’s head was five feet below the surface after he fell ten to twelve feet into the deep pit. Photo by Manny Pacheco.

I wanted Daton to pull himself over the lip, but after his head dropped below the surface, this was no longer possible. I began setting up a haul system by burying my ice axe in a deadman, connecting it to the picket, and creating a master point. I took myself out of the system and reconnected with an extended prusik. The weight transfer lowered Daton another few inches; his head was now five feet under the surface. 

Although this stage was less time-sensitive, I was still concerned about “Harness Hang Syndrome”—suspension trauma in which the victim loses consciousness due to lack of blood circulation. I began to rig a 3:1 haul system. I threw a rope end down to Daton, and he clipped it onto his belay loop. Although I was unable to “prepare the lip” with a pole/axe underneath the loaded rope due to the probability of a secondary crevasse, I figured we could problem-solve for this once his head was above the surface. I placed a Micro Traxion on the master point and a prusik on the load line. I clipped the redirected load line onto my belay loop and told Daton to expect to be raised. After double-checking the system, I bear-crawled uphill until the prusik had to be reset. A 3:1 system with friction meant I was pulling 100 to 120 pounds. I repeated the sequence of bear crawling, resetting the prusik, and repeating.

Daton’s face was now above the surface, but progress halted as the haul rope cut into the lip. I threw him the original end of the rope to clip onto his pack. I also told him to unbuckle one of his snowboard boots and use the original fixed rope as a handline. Being able to use his feet, eliminating the pack weight, and having a handline allowed Daton to escape the crevasse.


VIDEO ANALYSIS

Manny Pacheco’s video gives us a firsthand look at a real-time crevasse rescue. In this month’s Prescription video, IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin reacts to the footage and walks through the rescue step-by-step, highlighting what went well and offering recommendations for similar situations.


ANALYSIS

Regardless of how “chill” or (seemingly) filled, an unlucky pressure point on a glacier can lead to a nightmare scenario. The snow bridge was intact; the hidden crevasse was exposed only after the bridge failed.

Fortunately, Daton was in front and I had a visual. Had he fallen into the crevasse behind me, I might not have immediately noticed. This would have dramatically delayed any rescue.

It was lucky that the less experienced person was the one who fell. Had I fallen and become unconscious, we’d likely have needed the help of other skiers nearby. It was also good that Daton caught his fall at the lip—preventing a 60-foot fall—and was able to hold on for the two minutes it took to fix the line. Had Daton been alone with no witnesses, he likely would have fallen below the surface. Snow/ice dampens any yelling.

The process and system I used were not flawless, but I had to act decisively. In practice scenarios, you have time to prep, but in reality, things happen fast. The key is to stay methodical; slow is smooth, smooth is fast.

I should have stopped Daton before he passed me, as he is much less experienced in this terrain. Had he followed me in a higher traverse line, he likely would have avoided the crevasse fall. Also, if I had looked at our position before reaching the convexity, we could have bypassed the crevasse earlier. I was too caught up having fun and skiing.

I’m now much more cognizant of communicating with my partners during glacier travel, as well as of their experience level. This report should encourage glacier recreators to acquire competence to handle worst-case scenarios. Please take crevasse-rescue courses from professionals and/or partner with knowledgeable friends and mentors. Had I not learned and annually refreshed these skills, the outcome would have been much different.

(Source: Manny Pacheco.)


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The Prescription—Anchor Failure

This month we feature an accident that occurred in 2024 on Yosemite’s Manure Pile Buttress when a climber mistied a knot. You can reference this accident in this years Accidents in North American Climbing (page 46). The knot involved was bulky and involved multiple strands of webbing, brought together to tie a single anchor loop. The average climber only needs to know several simple knots but sometimes, even experts can get it wrong. This climber was lucky and escaped with minor injuries.

Yosemite National Park. In spring of 2024 a serious accident took place on a relatively small and very popular crag called manure Pile Buttress. Photo by Andrew Burr.

Anchor Failure | Slipknot Came Untied

Yosemite National Park, Manure Pile Buttress

On June 24, 2024 during the American Alpine Club’s United in Yosemite Climbing Festival, a climber led the first pitch of After Six (5.7). At the belay tree, the climber set up a lowering anchor using a knot on a quad-length sling with two locking carabiners. The climber weighted the rope and lowered. He cleaned the top piece of gear (a camming device). Below, a second cam proved too tight to remove so he unclipped it. The climber continued to lower. At the third piece from the top, the anchor knot failed. The climber fell 80 feet before the belayer caught his fall, when the climber was about five feet above the ground. The climber was lowered and SAR was called. His injuries included a sprained ankle, lacerations on the face, a broken nose, and rope burns on the hands and fingers. 

In June, a lowering climber fell 80 feet when his anchor “knot” came undone. In this photo taken after the accident, it appears that he had completed a serviceable overhand knot. In actuality, he had tied a slipknot and clipped into the loops. The two pulled loop ends are visible in the photo above. Anonymous


Video Analysis

A slipknot looks deceptively like other knots you'd use in a climbing anchor, but when you actually load it, it's not going to hold much at all. Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin, are back to explain how a slipknot can have serious consequences when used in climbing anchors.

Credits: Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Accessibility Crag, Clear Creek, CO.


ANALYSIS

The climber was fortunate that he had high protection that stopped him from hitting the ground when the anchor failed and lots of slack was introduced into the belay system. The anchor sling was found with an intact overhand knot. The belayer, who wishes to remain anonymous, wrote to ANAC: “We believe it was an attempted overhand knot but it was actually a slipknot.” The still-locked masterpoint carabiners were found clipped to the rope by the fallen climber. 

*Editor’s Note: After analysis, it was determined that the climber had attempted to tie an overhand knot but failed to pull the two end strands completely through the knot. He then clipped the two locking carabiners through the unsecured loops. Since there were so many strands of webbing in the mix, it was hard to tell the difference between a fixed loop and a slip loop. When weighted, the slip loops had sufficient friction and compression to hold, if only momentarily, while the ends gradually crept toward release.

(Sources: Anonymous and ANAC Canada Editor Robert Chisnall.)


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The Prescription—Ground Fall

It’s Rocktober and across the continent climbers are sending their projects. This month we remind you that mishaps in “safe” genres like sport climbing can have serious consequences. This accident occurred in 2019 and was only reported this year. However, in the newly published 2025 ANAC, we feature several similar groundfall accidents.  


As you’ll also see below, we’re also featuring a human factors post-accident analysis that reveals some recurrent themes and behavior patterns. These are introduced in an article written by Dr. Valerie Karr.

Red Rock Canyon National Conservation Area is one of the best rock climbing areas in North America. This area features hundreds of boulder problems, sport routes, and traditional climbs. As such, it also hosts a wide range of climbing accidents. Photo by BLM.

Groundfall | Foot Slipped While Clipping

Nevada, Red Rock Conservation Area

On June 22, 2019, B, a male climber, was leading Where Egos Dare (5.12a) as a cool-down after a long session. The four-bolt route was easy enough for this climber that he could run a quick lap and as a result B “didn't take it seriously and was climbing very arrogantly… without careful consideration of the consequences.” Besides being short and punchy, the route also has several hard clips that put the leader within groundfall range.

B was, “…cooling down after a hard day of projecting. At the third bolt I pulled a bunch of slack to clip and my foot popped.” He had placed his foot carelessly on a bad part of the hold when it slipped. He had an arm full of slack and, “…decked straight on my butt.” He suffered lumbar compression fractures and fractured sacrum. “I was mere inches away from a shelf that, that had I impacted with my lumbar spine, I would've undoubtedly been paralyzed.” Though in serious pain, he, “walked out under my own steam. Likely due to adrenaline.”

Where Egos Dare (5.12a). The four lead bolts are each marked with a yellow “x”. In June 2019, a climber fell while clipping the third bolt and he landed on the ground. Besides highlighting the inherent dangers of sport climbing, this accident is an example of “risk normalization.” Photo by Anthony Lijewski.

ANALYSIS

B fell approximately 15 feet. A pit/trough below Where Egos Dare created a ledge that one could hit in a fall. He had stick clipped the first bolt but, “Had I stick clipped the third, this accident wouldn't have happened. Back then I considered it ‘cheating’ to clip more than the first, which in retrospect is silly.”

He adds, “Sport climbing is flippin’ dangerous! For all the sketchy gear routes I've done in my life it was a 35' tall 12a sport climb that nearly cost me the ability to walk. Unfortunately, I don't think most sport climbers have a clue about this.”

Finally, the fallen climber said, “I’d add that one should climb more carefully. Because this route was well below my redpoint level I didn't take it seriously. Ultimately, I put my foot to the right of the actual foothold and that is what did me in. Luckily, I'm physically 100% now, but it was such a close call that I definitely have residual psychological effects. My wife still has trouble belaying me despite it not being her fault. I think the psychological impacts of such accidents cannot be overstated.”

(Source: Anonymous Climber.)


HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS

This is the actual sloping and insecure foothold from which B’s foot slipped, sending him to the ground. Photo by B.

This groundfall is a classic case of risk normalization in which repeated exposure to hazards without consequence, lowers the perception of danger. Over time, shortcuts—clipping from poor stances, eschewing procedures like a higher stick clip, and a casual approach to moderate climbing—diminish the perceived hazards of consequential terrain. On the day of his accident, B admitted he was climbing “carelessly,” on a warm-down route that was well within his ability. Other distracting factors contributed to an atmosphere of informality and distractions at the base of the crag that compounded a sense of invulnerability. 


B’s narrative also reveals how cultural values within climbing can magnify risk through what he called the “purity ethics.”Beyond simple overconfidence, B acknowledged an internalized idea that stick clipping beyond the first bolt was “cheating.” This belief overrode pragmatic risk assessment. Only after his accident did he reframe those values, prioritizing safety over style with an understanding that it’s “all contrived anyway.”

(Source: Dr. Valerie Karr.)


VIDEO ANALYSIS

Pete Takeda, editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IFMGA Guide Jason Antin discuss how to reduce the likelihood of an accident a couple bolts off the ground.

Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Accessibility Crag and East Colfax, Clear Creek, CO.


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The Prescription—Off Route Rappel

Fall is finally here and conditions for rock climbing are prime. Many of you will be heading out to crags or walls that require rappels. Just remember that while rappel mishaps come in all forms, two common errors are getting off the rappel route and/or getting the rappel rope stuck. To extricate oneself and avoid rescue it’s good to learn the art of ascending a rope. 

In this incident from 2021, one climber found himself off route. With some basic tools and an understanding of the concept of rope ascension, this climber got his team out of trouble.

Devils Tower is an immensely popular summit with a high concentration of routes that follow splitter cracks on solid rock. Photo by NPS.

Off Route Rappel | Improvised Rope Ascent

Devils Tower, South Face

On May 25, Climber 1 (David) and Climber 2 experienced a common rappel mishap on Devils Tower.

David recounts: “I share this as a cautionary tale. After climbing the Bon Homme Variation (5.8) and then the Bailey Direct route to top out, we decided to head down by the Meadows rappels. I saw a cairn and some rap rings and rigged the rap, assuming I was on the Meadows rappe route. Boy was I wrong! After descending about 125 feet (with two 60-meter ropes), I realized I was off route. I saw a tiny ledge with a second rap anchor at 150 feet, but when I got there with no Meadows in sight, I knew I was screwed.

There was a steady 30 mph wind with gusts to about 45. Luckily, we had a set of small radios, so I could talk with my partner. I pulled up an end and tied in and had him start belaying me. Unfortunately, the climbing was well above my grade and the rock was covered with lichen and offered no grip, so I was going nowhere fast.

He started hauling me but didn’t know how to rig something to assist, so I had him tie off his ATC to fix the line. I knew the concepts of self-rescue/ jugging but hadn’t ever practiced. I had to quickly figure it out. I carry a Petzl Micro Traxion as well as a Sterling HollowBlock to use as a prusik. I attached the HollowBlock high and clipped into it with my rappel extension. I put the Micro Traxion low on the rope and rigged a foot stirrup with a cordelette, all while hanging in air 500 feet above the boulder field.

I figured out the method—step up on the Traxion, slide up the prusik, sit back on the prusik, pull slack through the Traxion, repeat over and over. A few times, I got to where I thought I could climb, but it was too complicated to switch from jugging to climbing.

At one point the sling to my prusik got tangled in the Traxion. Somehow I got the Traxion opened (while just hanging on the prusik) and freed the sling. It’s impossible to relay the genuine fear I had during this experience. In the end it all worked out, and in about an hour I was back on top. I learned a lot. “


The Meadows rappel descent on Devils Tower is surprisingly deceptive, especially given its popularity. Over a thousand people use this descent every year. NPS Pamphlet

ANALYSIS

The Meadows rappels are known to lead climbers astray and have been the location of at least one recorded fatality. The descent is unobvious, despite it being used to descend from the most popular routes on Devils Tower. With an almost 90-year rock climbing history, there are many anchors on the Tower–some at five- to ten foot intervals–that make even well-traveled rappels problematic.

As David recounts, “I should have spent more time looking around and been 100 percent sure of the descent route. The top of the Tower is disorienting if you don’t pay attention to the landscape on the ground.” David was smart to carry tools for ascending a fixed rope—a little prior practice would have made his journey back to the anchor a lot easier. Learn and practice safe transitions from rappelling to ascending and the methods to back up such an ascent. Bringing radios was another good choice. David recalls, “It was very windy, and it was impossible to shout. Without the radios I’m pretty sure I would have had to call SAR. Best thirty dollars I ever spent.”

(Sources: David, via Mountain Project, and the Editors.)


Video Analysis

Every year, we receive several reports of people getting stuck while rappelling and having to ascend their ropes. Knowing this one technique would save you a lot of stress and prevent what could be a costly and risky rescue.

IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin walks us through ascending a double rope after rappelling off route. We recommend that climbers take a rock rescue course from a guide to get a full in-depth training on how to ascend a rope.

Credits:
Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, IFMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin, Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney, Location: Accessibility Crag, Clear Creek, CO.


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The Prescription—Free Solo Fall

Besides being prime time in the high country, summer is a high-traffic season for alpine rock and long moderate climbs. This time of year, climbers of all levels venture unroped onto “easy” terrain. Every year, we also see a handful of free solo accidents. These are almost always fatal and usually take place on well-trafficked moderate routes.

A disturbing pattern emerged last year when several fatalities occurred on adjacent formations in the same area. Recently, the Flatirons above Boulder, Colorado, saw three fatalities, two within two days in mid-December.

The Flatirons above Boulder, Colorado, see thousands of ascents every year, many by unroped climbers. Close proximity to the metropolitan Front Range, high visibility to the public, and complacency on technical climbing terrain can contribute to accidents. Photo from Wikimedia | joiseyshowaa

FREE SOLO FALLS

Boulder, Flatirons

On December 16, 2024 the Boulder County Sheriff’s Office received a report that 42-year-old Keith Hayes did not return home that evening. Around 9 p.m., friends of Keith found his body near the top of Second Flatiron after he presumably fell while unroped from Freezeway (5.7). Friends of Hayes report that there was no sign of snow or ice on the route and that there was no sign of broken rock contributing to the fall.

Here we see a group scrambling high above the ground in Big Bend National Park. Loose rock, dirt/gravel underfoot, inattention, and haste can trigger fatal falls. Photo from Wikimedia | Yinan Chen

The day after, December 17, a 27-year-old male was reported missing after not returning home in the evening from a Flatirons climb. The Boulder Emergency Squad found the body of the missing male the next day on the Standard East Face route (5.4) on the Third Flatiron; he was presumed to have fallen unroped. Rocky Mountain Rescue Group recovered the body after an eight-plus-hour operation.

“Scrambling” blurs the line between third-class (easy unroped climbing) and fifth-class technical climbing. While the grade of the actual climbing is often anywhere between 5.0 and 5.6, the terrain is climbed unroped and is usually accompanied by consequential fall potential.


Video Analysis—Free Solo Fall

A search of the Accidents archive reveals 33 accidents in the Flatirons described and analyzed by the editors (including 11 deaths) since the 1950s. Many of these were the result of unroped climbing.

The editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, Pete Takeda, walks us through why free soloing or scrambling accidents are so prevalent in this area.

Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Flatirons, Boulder, Colorado.


ANALYSIS

Freezeway is a steep, alternate finish to gain the summit of the Second Flatiron after completing one of several low-angle east face routes. Keith Hayes was very experienced and had climbed this route without a rope many times before his fall. The Standard East Face of the Third Flatiron is one of the most popular beginner climbs in the U.S. and is frequently climbed unroped.

The accidents shocked the local community, and the timing and proximity of both fatalities gained national attention. These tragedies serve as a reminder of the inherent risks of free solo climbing. Experience and fitness do not guarantee survival, and familiarity can degrade attentiveness. (Source: Friends of Keith Hayes and Bill Kinter.)


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The Prescription—Fall on Rock

This July, we look back at an accident in 2019. A climber took a serious lead fall while clipping the third bolt on a popular sport route in North Carolina called Chicken Bone (5.8). This climber made a fairly common error when his rope crossed behind his leg while climbing. This oversight resulted in serious injury from what should have been a routine fall.    

Easy access and solid quartzite make North Carolina’s Pilot Mountain a popular destination. Photo: bobistraveling

FALL ON ROCK | Rope Behind Leg, No Helmet 

North Carolina, Pilot Mountain State Park, The Parking Lot

According to Mountain Project, Chicken Bone is an “awesome moderate and one of the longest routes at Pilot [Mountain].” The route has also seen several accidents in the last decade, including two serious falls at the third bolt (yellow circle). Ben Alexander

During the afternoon of May 6, Ranger J. Anderson received a call reporting a fallen climber. When Anderson found the patient, Matthew Starkey, he was walking out, holding a shirt on the right side of his head and covered in blood. However, he was conscious and alert. After ensuring the patient’s condition did not worsen, Anderson accompanied him on the hike. Medical assessment revealed a two-to three-inch laceration on the right side of his skull and light rope burns on his leg.

Starkey explained to rescuers that he had been lead climbing outdoors for his first time on the route Chicken Bone (5.8 sport). As he was nearing the third bolt, he lost his grip on a hold and fell. His rope was behind his leg, and this caused him to flip upside down and hit his head on a ledge below. Starkey said he was unsure, but felt like he had “blacked out.” He was not wearing a helmet.

(Source: Incident Report from Pilot Mountain State Park.)


Video Analysis—Rope Behind Leg

Many of us have fallen and had the rope catch behind our leg. Usually, we get nothing more than a bad rope burn. Unfortunately, there can be severe consequences if we get a hard catch, flip upside down, and strike our head.

Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, is back with some advice on how to fall correctly.

Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing; Katie Ferguson, Executive Assistant; Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney. Location: Canal Zone, Clear Creek Canyon, CO.


ANALYSIS

Avoid getting your feet and legs between the rock and the rope. A fall in this position may result in the leg snagging the rope and flipping the climber upside down.

While many sport leaders pass on wearing a helmet, this accident is a good example of its usefulness. Leading easier climbs can increase the risk for injury, as they often tend to be lower angle and/or have ledges that a falling climber could hit. (Source: The Editors.)

Editor’s Note: This was Starkey’s first outdoor climbing lead, and his lack of experience perhaps contributed to the accident.


Chicken Bone has been the scene of multiple accidents, mostly involving inexperienced climbers. Here are two more examples:

Lead climbing carries inherent dangers regardless of the grade and amount of protection. Popular moderates might be more perilous than notoriously dangerous routes, as climbers can be more easily caught unawares on “easy” and well-protected terrain. 


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The Prescription—Rappel Fatalities

This month, we recall a tragic accident from 2023 ANAC. While recalling this accident is disturbing, it’s important to understand that there were 14 published rappel accidents that year, eight of which resulted in fatalities. The trend shows no sign of abating. In the upcoming 2025 ANAC, our data tables record a total of 15 reported rappel incidents that involved 23 climbers and ended with five fatalities. It’s not all bad news. In the 2025 ANAC, we also feature an article with tips for improved rappel safety from John Godino of Alpinesavvy.com. 

The west face of Tahquitz Rock was the scene of a tragic rappel accident in 2023 when two climbers fell to their deaths after an apparently solid rappel sling broke. Photo: Benjamin Crowell—Wikimedia.

Rappel Fatalities | Broken Anchor Sling

Tahquitz Rock, Riverside County, California


On Wednesday, September 28, 2022, Chelsea Walsh (33), a documentary filmmaker, and Gavin Escobar (31), an ex–Dallas Cowboys football player, died in a fall at Tahquitz Rock (Lily Rock). The Riverside Mountain Rescue Unit (RMRU) responded to the accident and later provided an in-depth analysis. They concluded that a degraded rappel sling caused the fatal fall of several hundred feet. This was one of two fatal accidents in 2022 due to a broken rappel-anchor sling.

RMRU reported that, around 8 a.m., Escobar and Walsh told another climbing party that they intended to climb Dave’s Deviation (3 pitches, 5.9). The weather appeared good, with only a few puffy clouds. At 10:30 a.m., a team on a route to the left, Super Pooper (5.10b), saw Escobar and Walsh near the top of their route. The weather was still good.

Fifteen to thirty minutes later, it began to rain. The team on Super Pooper began talking about retreating. By noon, the weather had gotten even worse. A team on Left Ski Track (5.6) had topped out and took shelter under a rock near the top of The Trough, a four-pitch 5.4. According to the RMRU report, by this time, “(the) weather has significantly deteriorated, with thunder and heavy rain and small hail. Members of both climbing parties were surprised at how quickly the storm intensified. Water was running down rock faces and soaked all climbing gear.”

Between noon and 12:15 p.m., the team on Super Pooper began to retreat. They heard a noise from the direction of Walsh and Escobar’s route and saw two falling climbers and a very large rock falling with them. The four climbers near the top of The Trough heard the same. No one heard rockfall before the sight and sounds of the fall. When RMRU arrived, they found Walsh and Escobar at the base of a gully below The Trough. The location of the bodies aligned with the fall line below a tree that was above the finish of Dave’s Deviation. Later investigation and video taken by Walsh confirmed the pair chose the tree—with an in situ rappel sling—as a bail point. The video also showed Escobar initiating the rappel and both climbers clipped into the single webbing loop. Both climbers appeared in good spirits and unhurried in making their rappel arrangements.

Above, we see the broken sling. At the time of the accident, this sun-bleached sling appeared darker/newer because it was wet from the rain storm that caused the climbers to rappel from this spot. Photo: James Eckhardt/RMRU.

The RMRU reported that the pair were found “wearing helmets, harnesses, and climbing shoes. Chelsea had a PAS girth-hitched through her harness with a locked screwgate at the far end, an unlocked screwgate clipped to an ATC, and an unlocked screwgate clipped to a hollow block. Chelsea was not connected to the rope or any anchor material. Gavin had a single-length sling girth-hitched to his harness’ tie-in points with an unlocked carabiner clipped to the sling and the belay loop. Additionally, an ATC was attached to his belay loop with a locked screwgate and both strands of the rope running through the ATC and through the screwgate. There was a four-to-five-foot loop of rope extending from the top of the ATC with two opposite and opposed wire-gate carabiners clipped to the rope. These carabiners were not connected to anything else. The rope had some sheath damage to the area around the ATC and significant sheath damage a few feet below the ATC, but there were no breaks present. Each end of the rope had a single figure 8 tied into it, one loose and one hand tight.”

The RMRU report summarizes, “As the storm moved in, the party reached the pine tree close to the first pitch of Upper Royal’s Arch and, given the conditions, decided to rappel. By the time they reached the pine tree, the webbing [around the tree] was wet, and as such, it would have been more difficult to ascertain the quality of the webbing without closely inspecting the knot and seeing the original color. They likely clipped into the webbing with their personal anchor systems. As the terrain below the pine tree is sloping, with only small areas to stand, it is likely they would have both been weighting the webbing. They then tied stopper knots into their rope, clipped it through the two wire-gates opposite and opposed, and dropped the ends. Gavin was first on rappel and descended a few feet before the webbing broke. As it was a single strand with no redundancy, both climbers fell. There was no evidence of rockfall hitting the tree or surrounding rock, and the webbing could not have been cut by a rock.


Video Analysis—Rappel Anchors

In this video, Jason Antin, IFMGA/AMGA Guide, gives some tips to avoid mistakes at the anchor:

  • Avoid rappelling from a single sling.

  • Avoid rappelling from an anchor made of old webbing.

  • White or gray nylon webbing is a red flag and needs closer inspection.

  • Beware of blotchy or faded webbing. Inspect the knot to try to spot an alternate (original) color inside. Try turning a sling over to look at its “under” side, against a tree or chockstone.

  • Carry a knotted sling or cordelette to back up anchors and a knife to cut away bad webbing and carry it out.

Credits: Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, Jason Antin, IFMGA/AMGA guide; Producer: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Little Twin Owls, Lumpy Ridge, CO.


ANALYSIS

Rappelling from a single sling is not advisable. Nor is rappelling from an anchor comprised of old webbing. That said, most experienced climbers (the editors included) have at one time or another done both. Walsh and Escobar were very experienced and, based on their video, they felt in control of the situation. While the weather played a factor in their decision to retreat, it also indirectly played a role in the team’s decision to use the questionable rappel sling. The rain had made the sling appear in much better condition than it was. The RMRU report states, “The webbing felt old and stiff when dry, but when wetted, it felt significantly better and looked much less faded. It was gray/white…however, upon retrieval and closer inspection, it had originally been fluorescent green and was now fully faded from prolonged sun UV exposure.”

The RMRU report added that, “The unfaded color was visible in the knot, however it was very difficult to see without close inspection.” Any white or gray nylon webbing at an anchor is a red flag: Such webbing is sold, but it’s uncommon, and it suggests closer inspection. The same goes for any blotchiness (from fading) in the webbing. Inspecting the knot for soundness is a good step, for obvious reasons, but possibly spotting an alternate color inside the knot is also good reason to inspect it. Also, try turning a sling over to look at its “under” side, against a tree or chockstone. These days, sewn aramid-fiber slings are the norm. It is expensive to leave behind long looped runners as rappel anchors. To get around this problem, consider carrying a long knotted sling or cordelette that is better suited for backing up suspect anchors; a knife will be handy to cut the sling to length. This solution is inexpensive and reasonably light weight. (Sources: James Eckhardt, RMRU, and the Editors.)

These are images of the failed webbing rappel anchor from Tahquitz Rock. (A) Webbing as it was found on tree, with arrows indicating the two broken ends. (B) Image showing the full length of webbing retrieved with break and (C) close-up image of break. (D) Test 1: webbing broke at 2.54kN. (E) Test 2: webbing broke at knot at 3.56kN. Image also shows the original color (neon green) of the webbing. (F) Test 3: webbing broke at 3.2kN. Photos: RMRU.


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The Prescription—Fatal Rockfall

Every year we publish several accounts of rockfall. What makes a few of these accidents so scary is the fact that several climbers have experienced this kind of accident just standing at the base of a crag.

Above 10,000 feet in elevation, Wizard’s Gate is typical of high altitude climbing areas in which sport climbs are being developed. While such areas may be easily accessible and bolt protected, an alpinist’s sense of mountain awareness is required to safely climb there. Photo: Bob Siegrist

Fatal Rockfall

Colorado, Twin Sisters Peak, Wizard’s Gate

On July 9, 2022, Anna Laila Leikvold (22) was preparing to climb at the Wizard’s Gate crag, south of Estes Park, when she was struck by a rock falling from above on a route called The Arrival (4 pitches, 5.11). Leikvold, who was wearing a helmet, was at the base of the cliff in a party of three when a football-sized rock dislodged by another climber struck her as she was fleeing from the base of the wall.

Bob Siegrist, a developer of this area and first ascensionist of The Arrival, wrote to ANAC, “I think the falling rock came from pitch two, but I did not talk with the climbers who were on the route and caused the rockfall. This speculation is based on talking with other climbers who were at the base and also my inspection of [the] route after the accident. Later, I discovered a spot on pitch two where a stone had broken off, matching the features of the suspect rock that was found at the bottom of the crag below where Anna was struck.”

Climbers called 911 and gathered to help Leikvold. Rescuers arrived with a litter, but she passed away before they reached the ambulance. Her evacuation was compounded by the rugged terrain and the lengthy hike to the road (the approach is a steep 30 to 45 minutes). Siegrist returned two weeks later and removed the bolts from the upper three pitches of the climb to prevent such an accident in the future.

The base of Wizard’s Gate, where people often congregate, was the site of a tragic rockfall fatality. The bolts on the route where the rockfall originated were later removed. Photo: Dougald MacDonald.

ANALYSIS

There are annual instances of rockfall injuries and fatalities suffered by climbers at the base of crags. With the growing popularity of multi-pitch sport routes—often extensions of existing single-pitch climbs—the need grows for caution on the ground and above. According to “Neale D” on Mountainproject.com, “There were over 20 of us climbing at or near Wizard’s Gate [that day], maybe the most some have experienced at this crag. Most importantly, though, probably in an effort to find something open to climb, several parties ventured up multi-pitch routes while others stuck to single-pitching below.”

With a shady aspect and an elevation of 10,000 feet, Wizard’s Gate is a popular high-country escape from Colorado’s summer heat. Kim Schwartz, who was at the Wizard’s Gate on the day of the accident, says, “It’s easy to treat an area like this as a sport crag, but it is an alpine environment with all the attendant hazards.”

For those climbing or rappelling above others, avoid loose rock, look for white chalk Xs marking unstable rocks, and be aware of how the rope might catch on sketchy blocks. Consider not climbing when others are below. For those below, wear a helmet while leading, belaying, or spectating. However, remember that in this case, a helmet did not save the individual’s life. Adapting an alpinist’s sense of mountain awareness can help prevent such accidents. Watch and listen for falling rock, and choose protected areas while belaying or waiting for your turn to climb. This is especially true if there are climbers above, after heavy rain or snow, and during windstorms.

A further lesson extends to route developers or first ascensionists. Pay heed to the numbers and demographics of climbers venturing into alpine and remote areas, many of whom have little experience in the risks inherent in such terrain. Consider the potential for both human-generated or natural rockfall before establishing new routes. This is especially true for multi-pitch routes extending above established climbs.


Video Analysis—Avoiding Rockfall

The base of a crag can be a hazardous place. In this video, Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, gives some tips to avoid causing rockfall while climbing and avoid being hit while at the base of the crag.


Safety Tips for Wizard’s Gate & Similar Areas

The Arrival extended above a very popular single pitch cragging zone at Wizard’s Gate, site of the July 2022 rockfall fatality, on rock that deteriorated in quality above the first pitch. The bolts protecting the upper pitches were removed soon after the accident.

For climbing at Wizard’s Gate and similar areas, Siegrist has a few safety tips:

  1. When arriving at an area like Wizard’s Gate, carefully assess where people are climbing and identify risky situations. Locate your gear and hangout spots in the safest areas available. If the crag is too busy, especially with inexperienced climbers, don’t hesitate to relocate to another area or another crag. Weekend days can be busy, so if you want to climb one of the multi-pitch routes, try to do so on days with few climbers below.

  2. At Wizard’s Gate and similar crags, consider wearing a helmet and have a plan in mind if someone yells, “Rock!” Typically, I advise that you run to the wall, extend your arms over your head, and do not look up. Rockfall at Wizard’s Gate often originates from high up the wall, and stones falling from there often bounce off the wall before landing 10 to 30 feet from the base of the cliff. 

  3. Be aware of local resources if an accident occurs. At Wizard’s Gate, there is now an EMS kit and Stokes litter located about 300 feet below the base of the cliff. It has first responder contacts. I spearheaded the effort after the accident and am the current custodian. 

(Sources: Bob Siegrist, Kim Schwartz, Kelly Cordes, and Mountainproject.com.)


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Prescription—High Altitude Cerebral Edema

Every year we publish several accounts of high altitude pulmonary edema and high altitude cerebral edema. While most of these incidents in North America occur in the Alaska Range, any terrain above 10,000 feet holds altitude hazards. Most cases are resolved by descending immediately upon the appearance of symptoms. But as you’ll read below, in the spring of 2023 on Denali, bad weather delayed a rescue helicopter, and by the time the climber was evacuated, it was too late.

Avalanche on Mt. Hunter in Denali National Park. Avalanche and high altitude illness are two proven environmental hazards in the high mountains. Photo by Dave Weber.

High Altitude Cerebral Edema | Ascending Too Fast

Denali, West Buttress Route

On May 30, 2023, an independent expedition at 14,200-foot camp notified rangers via radio that one member of their team, a 24-year-old Coloradan, had an altered mental status. The patient’s team stated that they had been dropped off by plane at base camp (7,200 feet) on May 27. Immediately upon landing, the team departed for the West Buttress Route, reaching 14,200-foot camp a day and a half later, on the evening of May 28. The team stated that upon reaching camp, all team members were feeling “OK.” 

On the afternoon of May 30, teammates alerted NPS rangers that the Coloradan—after reportedly feeling “groggy” with a slight headache—began exhibiting severe symptoms of high altitude cerebral edema (HACE) and high altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE). A second team member was experiencing moderate symptoms of HAPE.

Weather conditions did not allow helicopter flights on the night of May 30. A team of NPS rangers and volunteer patrol members performed 18 hours of advanced life support on the unresponsive HACE/HAPE patient throughout the night, including treatment in a hyperbaric chamber, medications, supplemental oxygen, and mechanical breathing assistance. On the morning of May 31, the patient was evacuated by helicopter with an Air National Guard Pararescue Specialist from the 212th Rescue Unit serving as the medical attendant. The patient was flown to Talkeetna and transferred to a LifeMed air ambulance for advanced care. Unfortunately, the patient succumbed to the effects of HACE/HAPE in the hospital.

NPS rescue personnel and volunteers treat a HAPE/HACE patient at 14,200-foot camp on Denali. This portable and inflatable hyperbaric chamber is used to simulate emergent descent for severe cases of high altitude illness prior to evacuation or when descent is not possible. Photo by Menno Boermans.

ANALYSIS

As many do, this team made the assumption that living at a relatively high altitude (over 5,000 feet) and maintaining a high level of fitness would prepare them adequately for swift elevation gain. This is a severe example of the inaccuracies of this assumption. Living at altitude and having good fitness are not guaranteed to protect climbers against high altitude illness (HAI). The human body starts losing adaptations to altitude in a matter of days, which is often the amount of time that climbers spend traveling to Alaska to begin an expedition.

The Wilderness Medicine Society (WMS) recommends that, at elevations above 9,000 feet, climbers ascend no more than 1,650 feet (500 meters) to a new sleeping elevation each night. Additionally, for every 3,300 feet (1,000 meters) of elevation gain, the WMS recommends spending an extra day sleeping at a given elevation to further acclimatize.

The mountaineering rangers on Denali see many very fit climbers arriving to attempt a summit each season. Although fitness is an important factor in risk management and safe travel on the mountain, it can also make the recommended conservative ascent profile feel onerous. Unfortunately, a climber’s level of fitness has no correlation with whether or not they become stricken with HAI. Only a reasonable ascent profile and proper acclimatization will prevent climbers from becoming ill.

(Source: Denali Mountaineering Rangers.)

Denali rescue volunteer Dr. Andy Luks assesses a HAPE patient in the NPS medical tent at 14,200-foot camp. Photo by Menno Boermans.


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Prescription—Knee Stuck in Crack

Wild as it may seem, every year we publish at least one report of a climber getting their knee stuck in an offwidth crack. Sound crazy? It happened to Martin Boysen on Trango Tower and more recently Jason Kruk on Boogie Till You Puke. 

Queen Victoria Spire in Sedona, Arizona, was the scene of a stuck knee incident in 2023. Photos by Xander Ashburn | Wikimedia.

The final section of the second pitch of the Regular Route (III, 5.7) on Queen Victoria Spire. This four-inch crack trapped a climber on her first outdoor climb. Photo: Chris Thornley/Climbing Magazine

Knee Stuck in Crack

Sedona, Queen Victoria Spire 

On January 8, Climber 1 (female, 25) got her knee stuck in a wide crack on the Regular Route (3 pitches, 5.7) on Queen Victoria Spire in Sedona. Climber 1 was following four friends on her first outdoor climb when she attempted an “alpine knee” while pulling onto a ledge on the second pitch.

An “alpine knee” is when you place that joint on top of a high hold and use it for progress, instead of a foot. Rather than helping her onto the ledge, Climber 1’s knee slipped into a four-inch-wide crack, where it wedged and became stuck. Others in her party tried pouring water over her knee in an attempt to free it but were unsuccessful. 

At 5:15 p.m., the Coconino County Sheriff’s department was contacted to perform a rescue. By 8 p.m., the SAR team had arrived. It took over an hour to free the climber from the crack, and by then the climber was exhibiting signs of mild hypothermia (they had started climbing at 12:30 p.m.). The climbing party was airlifted off the spire. The stuck climber was not injured and refused treatment.

ANALYSIS

The climbers in this scenario did “everything right,” according to the SAR team. They tried to free their partner, and failing that, they initiated a rescue. Many relatively easy routes have awkward sections or styles of climbing that may seem above the technical grade when first encountered outdoors. Care should be taken when making a move where a slip or fall could result in injury or entrapment. It took about four hours to free this climber, and temperatures at the crag dropped to around 30°F. Consider worst-case scenarios when preparing for a climb, as unexpected events could result in prolonged exposure to the elements.

(Source: Dan Apodaca.) 


Video Analysis

If getting your knee stuck in an offwidth is so common, what do we do if it happens? In the video analysis, ANAC editor Pete Takeda provides some tips on how to prepare for this kind of worst-case scenario when rock climbing.

Credits: Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and Hannah Provost, Content Director; Producer: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney @Sierra_McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney @fosterdoodle_; Editor: Sierra McGivney @Sierra_McGivney; Location: Cob Rock, Boulder Canyon, CO


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The Prescription—Top-Rope Solo

Angel Wings in Sequoia National Park. Valkyrie (V 5.11+) climbs the sunlit buttress to the right of the highest summit in this image. Photo: Brandon Thau

In this month’s Prescription, an expert climber made two crucial errors in her rope ascension/top-rope solo system. She fortunately escaped with relatively minor injuries.

This accident was featured in the 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing.

Top-Rope Solo Fall | Device Jammed By Sling

Sequoia National Park, Angel Wings

Valkyrie takes the spectacular red line shown above. Clark’s accident occurred on the slab at the bottom of the climb. Photo: Brandon Thau

On October 8, 2023 Whitney Clark was ascending a fixed rope at the start of Valkyrie (17 pitches, 5.11+) when her single ascension device was jammed by a sling. She fell 30 feet to the ground.

Clark wrote to ANAC:

“We woke at around 6 a.m. and made our way to the fixed line from the day before. The days were short and we had many pitches to do. My partner, Luka Krajnc, went first, using a Grigri to jug and then transitioning to climbing. About 40 feet up, he clove-hitched the rope to a bolt. I then started jugging with a single Micro Traxion. Thirty feet up, I leaned back on the rope. My body weight wasn’t supported because the sling around my neck [part of the top-rope solo setup] got sucked into the device and caught in the teeth of the Traxion. The rope was sliding against the sling. I hadn’t tied a backup knot.”

Clark attempted to wrap the rope around her leg. But her rope was new, thin, and slippery. She wrote, “I grabbed the rope and slowly started sliding down. Eventually the rope burn was too painful and I let go. I hit the ground, landed on my feet, and fell backward. I struck my lower back and then my head. I was wearing a helmet. Because the ground was angled, some of the force was dissipated, though I landed six inches from a large rock spike.

“I never lost consciousness but was in a bit of shock. Luka rappelled down and did a spinal exam. He got me comfortable, and I sat there for a while. I had pain in my back and my left ankle. I used my inReach to call for a rescue while Luka retrieved our stuff. I started crawling and butt-scooting to where a heli could reach me. I would have loved to have self-rescued, but it’s a 16-mile hike out. It took about 2.5 hours of crawling to make it to a flat place. Four hours later, a helicopter airlifted me to the Visalia Level III trauma center.”

 Whitney Clark’s progress-capture device failed when the as-yet-unused retention sling got stuck in the device as she was ascending. It is common practice to use a sling and an elastic connection to hold the progress-capture device upright as one climbs along a fixed rope. Photo: Luka Krajnc


The Prescription—Video Analysis

Top-rope soloing is becoming increasingly popular. In this video, Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IFMGA/AMGA guide Jason Antin are back to provide an accident analysis and give you some quick tips on how to mitigate risk when top-rope soloing.

Top-rope soloing is an integral part of modern climbing. Currently, only one device (the El Mudo) is designed and commercially available for top-rope (and lead) soloing. There are many ways to configure these systems and we’ve demonstrated one possible solution here.


ANALYSIS

Solo top-roping allows a climber to self-belay when no partner is available, for a team to work on individual sections of a route without the need for a belayer, or for two climbers to move simultaneously, as in this situation. The errors Clark made were using only one device to safeguard her progress and not tying a backup knot.

“I was jugging by pulling on the rope, syncing up the slack, and sitting back,” Clark said. “The route was meandering and the fixed line didn’t allow me to readily climb, so I decided to jug straight up the initial blank slab. The sling around my neck was going to hold the Traxion upright [allowing the rope to feed freely] once I started climbing. I haven’t done any top-rope soloing since the accident. I probably will at some point, but I will definitely use two devices. This was the first time I only used a single progress-capture device.”  (Source: Whitney Clark.)


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The Prescription—Bouldering Fall

Photo by AAC Member Merrick Ales

It’s bouldering season in Hueco Tanks, Texas. While most consider bouldering relatively safe, it is perhaps the most accident- and injury-plagued facet of climbing. This month we bring you an accident that took place in 2024 on a famous John Sherman highball called See Spot Run.  

This accident will be featured in the 2025 Accidents in North American Climbing.


Bouldering Fall | Poor Pad Placement

Hueco Tanks State Park, North Mountain

Hueco Tanks is a world-class climbing area known for its outstanding bouldering. It’s also known for having more than its fair share of spicy highball problems. Photo: Pete Takeda.

On January 22, I (Pete Korpics, 35) was attempting to climb a long-standing project of mine called See Spot Run (V6). I was well aware of the risks involved and that it would require ample padding. 

During previous sessions, I had placed six or more pads in a wide area including the back of the fall zone. Six pads or more is ideal, but I was admittedly negligent on the day of the accident, as I felt I’d complete the route and was excited to do it. I also felt that the pad number and pad placement—five total and not as wide as prior attempts—was adequate, given the presence of two spotters. I felt very strong getting to the crux. After pulling through the crux, I got very pumped, lost momentum, and hesitated. We all know that moment when you feel uncertain about the next move. In those moments we tell ourselves, “Do it anyway.” Sometimes this works, but often it doesn’t. In this case, I fell. 

I fell from roughly 15 feet up, with quite a bit of force. My spotters were hesitant to put their bodies in harm’s way. I had told them that, above the crux, staying clear was the best thing to do. Having two people injured is worse than one. 

Due to the momentum of the fall and the poor pad placement, my left foot hit the rock and right foot hit the pad. I severely sprained my ankle. It was probably not helpful that it has in the past received the same injury.  

Pete Korpics on an early attempt on See Spot Run. He recalls, “I was very familiar with this famous and dangerous route, as I’d been attempting it for several years.” Photo: Pete Takeda.


ANALYSIS 

Bouldering is inherently dangerous, and highball problems particularly so. Besides being a four-star John Sherman classic, See Spot Run is a notorious ankle breaker. It is 25 feet tall and described on Mountainproject.com as “one of the more notorious highball problems at Hueco.”

During the same season that Korpics had his accident, other falls from the route caused multiple ankle sprains.

Keep ‘Em On The Pad!

On highballs, the impact forces of a falling climber can be equally hazardous to the spotter. The general rule for highballs (and all bouldering for that matter) is to ensure that the falling climber lands on the pads and stays on the pads after impact. Spotting might look less like controlling and guiding the fall, and more like giving the falling climber a shove to keep them on the pads. The spotter(s) should also protect the head and neck from striking bare ground, rocks, etc.

Korpics wrote to ANAC: ”Preventable action would have included better pad placement and more pads. We could have used thinner pads to cover gaps between pads. This accident may also have been prevented by assertive spotting, and a strong shove from one of the spotters would have landed me on the pads. That possibility was negated because I had instructed my spotters to stand clear if I fell from above the crux.

“Confidence should not lead to complacency,” he continued. “I’d been climbing a lot and climbing well, including numerous highballs prior to the accident, so I’d let my guard down. I do not blame the spotters, as I had given them specific instructions. I had placed the pads, I chose to climb despite knowing more pads would be better, and the injury was my fault.”

(Sources: Pete Korpics, Mountainproject.com, and the Editors.)


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The Prescription—Fall on Ice | Protection Pulled Out

Ice is a fickle medium that is hard to assess. This month we’re highlighting an accident report from ANAC 2023 involving a leader fall that was compounded by pulled protection. Though the climber was very experienced, this accident underlines that even as more people climb ice than ever before, it takes years of experience to accurately gauge conditions. Also, climate change is increasing the hazards of rockfall, avalanches, ice collapse, and generally warmer ice.


Tim Thompson (circled in yellow) climbing on the Finger of Fate prior to his accident. The gray, bubbly, and unbonded ice in the lower section of the photo reflects the warm temperatures on the day prior. Dustin Lyons

Fall on Ice | Protection Pulled Out

Provo Canyon, Upper Provo Falls

Utah County Sheriff’s Search and Rescue was dispatched at 11:09 a.m. on December 26 to aid an ice climber who had fallen from the first pitch of Finger of Fate (3 pitches, WI4+) in Provo Canyon.

The climber, Tim Thompson (29), was nearing the end of the first pitch when ice sheared from under his left foot. He wrote to ANAC that he was “pushed forward into my ice tools and my relaxed grip caused me to fall.” Thompson’s uppermost screw pulled out of the ice, causing him to fall a total of 50 feet.

Utah County team members arrived and, with the help of the climbers already on scene, evaluated the ice conditions, established an equalized anchor with six screws at the base of the climb, and developed a plan to move the patient horizontally about 100 feet over steep, slippery terrain to a five-by-ten-foot ledge that was out of the rockfall and icefall area. Conditions were deteriorating, the ice was becoming less cohesive as temperatures rose, and rocks were starting to fall.

A Department of Public Safety (DPS) helicopter crew did a reconnaissance of the ledge and determined that it would be a suitable place for a hoist operation. The patient was then short-hauled from the ledge to a nearby parking lot, where an ambulance was waiting. He was airlifted to a hospital and assessed to have two broken vertebrae, a broken elbow, torn ligaments in an elbow, and a badly broken left wrist.

Tim Thompson after falling from the first pitch of Finger of Fate. Rescuers short-hauled him by helicopter to a waiting ambulance. Photo: Dustin Lyons.

ANALYSIS

Warm conditions make ice climbing hazardous. Recalls Thompson: “The weather was warm the day before. Temps overnight were about 28°F for almost 10 or 12 hours and were hovering around 31°F or 32°F while climbing. We felt confident that the ice had had enough time to heal, and that as long as we climbed quickly, we were in no danger.”

Running water, heat retained by the underlying rock, and even indirect solar radiation can prevent ice from refreezing. The warm temperatures also affected the quality of Thompson’s protection. He wrote to ANAC, “When I put in the last ice screw, the ice was really soft. Up until the last quarter of the route, the ice [had been] really healthy and the screw placements were really good. I got several really solid screws lower on the route, and the second-to-last one (the one that caught me) was in really bomber ice.”

Thompson did well to place extra gear that he might have dismissed as unnecessary. Before the final section of the pitch, he says, “I remember pulling onto the ice after a ledge rest and deciding to step back down and place a high screw. I knew that would be a lot of protection, as the last screw was just below my feet. But if I had not placed this screw, I would have hit the deck from almost 100 feet up. Things could have been a lot worse.”

Sources: Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Search and Rescue and Tim Thompson.


The Prescription—Video Series

Warm conditions make ice climbing hazardous. Pete Takeda, editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IMGA/AMGA Guide Jason Antin are back to explain the hazards ice climbers face in warm conditions, such as protection pulling, poor tool placements, and shearing crampons.

Producers: Shane Johnson and Sierra McGivney; Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney

Location: Silver Plume Falls, Silver Plume, CO


A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

Over time an ice climber learns to gauge conditions and most importantly, when to go for it and when to back off. This is a long and experience-based learning curve. The biggest lesson is: If it doesn’t feel right, don’t do it. Whether a novice or an experienced ice climber, don’t factor luck into your decision-making.

Utah guide Derek DeBruin’s flowchart is a handy tool to assess ice climbing decision-making on any given day:

This flowchart can assist in managing hazards by helping determine the stability of the ice, the effectiveness of ice screw protection, and the quality of ice tool placements. Downloadable versions are available here.


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The Prescription—Quickdraw Unclipped

Accessible, low-key, and enjoyable, Pilot Mountain State Park in North Carolina was the scene of a serious accident in March 2023. The mishap was a classic case of climbers doing all the right things yet still having an accident. Idawriter | Wiki Commons

Fall on Rock | Quickdraw Unclipped from Bolt Hanger

North Carolina, Pilot Mountain State Park

My climbing partner (31) and I, Alec Gilmore (29), went sport climbing at Pilot Mountain State Park in March 2023. I have ten years of climbing experience, and my partner has six, and we both take pride in our risk assessment and careful approach. The first route we planned to climb was occupied, so we found a nearby route that neither of us had previously tried. We incorrectly identified the route as a 5.7. The route was actually Goodness Gracious (5.10a). I quickly realized the route was harder, but I had previously led up to 5.11 here, so I went on and clipped three bolts and then hung to work out the crux. It involved throwing a high heel hook and manteling onto an awkward bulge.

This photo, taken immediately after Gilmore fell, shows the alpine quickdraw that came unclipped from a bolt hanger. Alec Gilmore 

I got partially over the bulge and needed to make one more move but couldn't find a good handhold. I ended up falling off. Instead of stopping, I hit the ground after falling 20 feet. Both feet landed on a flat rock step on the main hiking trail. My belayer took up enough slack so that the rope started to catch right as my feet hit. After lying on the ground, overcoming the initial shock and pain, I realized that the alpine quickdraw that I had clipped into the third bolt was still clipped to the rope. Somehow as I was wrestling with the move, it had come unclipped from the hanger. I was wearing a helmet, but fortunately I did not hit my head or back during the fall.

Park staffers were alerted by a nearby climber, and in about 30 to 45 minutes a team of park employees, other climbers, and volunteers arrived and loaded me onto a transport basket. For the next hour and a half, they carried me back up to the summit, where an ambulance was waiting. At one point they rigged a rope and hauled me up a steep hill to shorten the journey. At the hospital, X-rays showed I had fractured both heel bones. One of the fractures was bad enough to require surgery, and I received a plate and four screws.

ANALYSIS

The first mistake we made was not being sure of what route we were climbing. We had recently been trying routes we hadn't previously climbed. The route I fell from was on my to-do list, but the plan was to warm up with an easier route.

The second mistake was the positioning of the carabiner on the bolt hanger. I knew that it was possible for a carabiner to unclip from a bolt hanger if it's pulled up against the wall in a certain way. I try to keep the spine of the carabiner pointed in the direction I'm climbing. When I was clipping the third bolt, I thought I would climb toward the left side of the bulge. The line turned out to go right. Somehow, as I wrestled with the move, the quickdraw came unclipped.

It’s an unsettling thought, but carabiners can, on rare occasions, unclip from bolt hangers. When the bolt is clipped from right to left and the hanger angles down to the right, tension on the quickdraw can raise the carabiner and lever the gate open. Foster Denney 


Editor’s Note:  This is a classic case of fellow climbers doing all the right things yet still having an accident.

Though rare, carabiners can come unclipped from bolt hangers. A few things to consider: The hanger-clipping-end carabiner should be loose in the sling, never held by a rubber keeper. Both carabiners on a quickdraw should be oriented with the gates facing the same direction. As Alec mentions, quickdraws should be clipped so the gates are oriented away from the direction of travel. 

 The direction in which one clips also can be a factor in certain cases. Clipping the opposite direction from the angle of the carabiner hole will minimize the possibility of the carabiner levering against the hanger and unclipping. Almost all plate-style bolt hangers have the clipping section on the left side of the hanger. So, the ideal clipping direction would be from left to right. Other factors (like the ones mentioned above) may be more important in a given situation, but when you have a choice, this is the preferred method.

For even more security, a safer play is to flip the gate so it opens downwards. Better yet, if the clip is critical, e.g. before or after a runout, use a locking carabiner on the hanger end of the quickdraw.

 (Source: Alec Gilmore and the Editors.)


The Prescription—Video Series

Under some circumstances, quickdraws can unclip themselves. Pete Takeda, editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and IFMGA/AMGA guide Jason Antin are back to show you that clipping bolts isn’t always as simple as it seems. Dive in to get the accident analysis informing these takeaways, and some quick tips on how to mitigate risk when clipping bolt hangers.

Credits:
Pete Takeda, Editor of Accidents in North American Climbing, and Jason Antin @jasonantin, IFMGA/AMGA Certified Mountain Guide; Producer: Shane Johnson; Cinematographer or Videographer: Foster Denney; Editor: Sierra McGivney; Location: Accessibility Crag, Clear Creek Canyon, CO; Presenting Sponsor: Rocky Talkie @rockytalkies.


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