The Denali climbing season is imminent. The peak’s high latitude, extreme altitude, and arctic climate present hazards that challenge even the most experienced climbers.

Our April “Prescription” is a Denali National Park accident summary, accompanied by an altitude illness report from the peak’s most popular route. While mishaps involving crevasses, avalanches, and falls plague climbers every year, altitude illness is the most preventable cause of incidents on Denali.

This following summary and report will be published in the upcoming 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing. The book will also include a special feature titled Acclimatization and High Altitude Illness, written by Dr. Peter Hackett and ANAC Senior Editor, Dave Weber.

Denali National Park Accident Summary

Denali mountaineering rangers treated a total of 33 patients during the 2023 climbing season in the Alaska Range. The following list provides a breakdown of the diagnoses* from this past rescue season:

• Traumatic Injury – 11 cases (includes one facial laceration, three shoulder injuries, one traumatic brain injury, one case of fractured ribs, one neck injury, and four patients with various musculoskeletal injuries)

• Frostbite - 11 cases

• Medical - Six cases (includes two hypothermia, one diverticulitis, one spontaneous pneumothorax, one possible case of anxiety, and one case of anaphylaxis)

• High Altitude Cerebral Edema – Three cases

• High Altitude Pulmonary Edema – Three cases

*Some patients had multiple diagnoses resulting in a higher number of diagnoses than the total number of patients.

Twenty-one patients required helicopter evacuation from Denali National Park. Three patients were evacuated by NPS Rangers on the ground and nine patients self-evacuated after receiving treatment.

There were three mountaineering-related deaths in the Alaska Range during the 2023 climbing season, with an additional post-evacuation fatality. One occurred when a solo skier was caught in an avalanche. Two fatalities occurred due to a fall from the Moose’s Tooth in the Ruth Gorge. On Denali’s West Buttress, one climber suffering from severe altitude illness was treated and evacuated, but subsequently died in hospital (see below).

While some accidents are difficult to predict and prevent, many of these medical illnesses and traumatic injuries are preventable with prudent decision-making and a reasonable ascent profile during climbing expeditions. Additional information regarding the prevention, recognition, and treatment of common mountain medicine maladies can be found online in the Denali mountaineering handbook: https://www.nps.gov/dena/planyourvisit/part2medicalissues.htm

(Source: Denali Mountaineering Rangers.)

Alaska | High Altitude Cerebral Edema

Denali, West Buttress

On May 31, an independent expedition camped at 14,200-foot camp notified rangers via radio that one team member, a twenty-four-year-old Coloradan, had an altered mental status. The team stated that they had been dropped off by fixed wing aircraft at Base Camp (7,200 feet) on May 27. Immediately upon landing, they embarked on the West Buttress route, reaching 14,200-foot camp a day and a half later on the evening of May 28. The team stated that upon reaching camp, all members were feeling “ok.” On the afternoon of May 30, teammates alerted NPS rangers that the Coloradan—after reportedly feeling “groggy” with a slight headache—began exhibiting severe symptoms of high-altitude cerebral edema (HACE) and pulmonary edema (HAPE). A second team member was experiencing moderate symptoms of HAPE.

Weather conditions were not flyable on the night of May 30. A team of NPS rangers and volunteer patrol members performed 18 hours of advanced life support on the unresponsive HACE/HAPE patient throughout the night. Treatment included a hyperbaric chamber, medications, supplemental oxygen, and mechanical breathing assistance.

On the morning of May 31, the patient was evacuated by helicopter. An Air National Guard Pararescue Specialist from the 212th Rescue Unit served as the medical attendant. The patient was flown to Talkeetna and was then transferred to a LifeMed air ambulance for advanced care. Unfortunately, the patient succumbed to the effects of HACE/HAPE in the hospital.

ANALYSIS

As many do, this team made the assumption that living at a relatively high altitude (5,000 feet) and maintaining a high level of fitness would prepare them adequately for rapid elevation gain. This incident is an extreme example of the inaccuracy of this assumption. Even those who live at elevations far higher than 5000 feet may not be adequately acclimatized for a climb up Denali. The human body begins losing its altitude adaptions in a matter of days, an interval that many climbers spend while traveling to Alaska and Base Camp.

The Wilderness Medicine Society recommends that while ascending above an altitude of 9,000 feet, climbers should limit their daily elevation gain to no more than 500 meters (~1,650 feet) between sleeping locations. They also recommend spending an extra night at the same elevation for every 3,300 feet of elevation gained.

Every season, many extremely fit climbers attempt Denali. While physical conditioning is an important factor in risk management and success, the overestimation of fitness as a determinant factor gets many of these same climbers into trouble.

Unfortunately, an individual’s degree of fitness does not determine whether or not they will suffer altitude illness. Only a conservative ascent profile and proper acclimatization will prevent this.

(Source: Denali Mountaineering Rangers.)

THIN AIR ON DENALI: THE EDITOR’S STORY

I climbed the West Buttress in 2003 as an intended acclimatization for another route. Looking back, I fit the profile of the individual involved in the above accident—I lived in Colorado at above 5,000 feet, I was fit, and I trained consistently prior to the trip. While I knew that the West Buttress was technically moderate, I also knew that the relative atmospheric pressure of the 6,190 meter (20,310 feet) summit was the equivalent of over 7,000 meters in the Himalayas.

We made fairly rapid progress and my fitness served me well on the way up to14,200-foot camp. When we arrived, I felt “off.” Having spent considerable time in the Himalayas climbing above 6,000 meters, experience told me that I could use a few restful days and nights to acclimatize. My partner however, was feeling spry and was eager to carry on to the next higher camp at 17,200 feet. He wanted an advantageous position for a summit bid.

Sometimes you get lucky—the ongoing debate on whether to immediately go higher or stay put, ended when a storm rolled in. By the time the weather cleared, we were rested and acclimatized enough to skip 17,200-foot camp and successfully dash to the summit and back. The forced delay had paid off, as did the solid path beaten into the fresh snow by the dozens of summiteers, whose ranks had swollen during the days of bad weather. Had we pushed higher sooner, I may have gotten altitude illness. This would have negated a summit attempt and/or endangered myself and my partner. This episode was a reminder that mountains do not care how hard you trained, nor how tight your schedule is.

—Pete Takeda

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This month we have an unreported accident from a few years ago. This incident occurred at Mt. Woodson near San Diego. A climber atop one of beautiful granite boulders that sprinkle the area was lowering his partner when the unthinkable occurred.

Ground Fall | No Belay Anchor

San Diego County, Mt. Woodson

On February 24, 2021, Dawson Riley (21) and his friend (19) were enjoying a day out at Mt. Woodson. Riley, an experienced climber, had taken this friend climbing a few times before. Riley first led the 35-foot route Robbins Crack (5.10a) and attached a quad anchor sling to the bolts atop the large boulder. His friend then followed, with Riley belaying from above on a Grigri. Riley then adjusted the position of the anchor so that they could lower each other and climb Lie Detector (5.12a/b), another crack route (the analog to Robbins Crack) that shares the same bolt anchor. After each climber took a turn on Lie Detector, they sat together on top of the boulder.

Shortly after, Riley removed his quad anchor from the bolts. Unanchored and with the Grigri clipped directly to his harness, Riley began lowering his friend down the Robbins Crack side of the boulder. The rope began feeding rapidly through the Grigri. Riley released the brake handle to block the rope and started to slide off the boulder. Riley fanned out his body in an attempt to increase friction but was quickly launched off the boulder. He fell approximately 25 feet and landed on his right side. His partner, still tied to the end of the rope, had fallen approximately ten feet and was uninjured.

On impact, Riley suffered a seizure and remained unconscious. Others nearby heard his partner yelling for help. They called 911, and nearby CAL FIRE first responders arrived. They placed Riley on a stretcher and onto the flat bed of their truck, then transported him to a nearby airport. There, they met a Mercy Air medical helicopter, who flew him to the Palomar Health trauma center.

Riley sustained multiple injuries including a concussion, an open fracture of both bones in the right forearm, a lung contusion, and three pelvic fractures. He was not wearing a helmet. He required multiple surgeries but has fully recovered and continues to climb.

Analysis

The Robbins Boulder requires lowering or rappelling to descend. The large and deceptively angled summit can give climbers a false sense of security. Dawson recalled having removed his quad anchor from the bolts while he and his friend sat and relaxed after climbing Lie Detector. The quad anchor gear remained attached to his harness, while his friend remained tied into the rope.

Complacency plays a role in many accidents, and this incident might be no exception. In this case, Riley’s familiarity with the climb (he’d been on top of the Robbins Boulder many times) and the large, comfortable summit belied the hazard. In any perilous position, it is critical to establish and maintain a safe anchor, perform safety checks with your partner, and assess/test the system before detaching from the anchor. It is also wise to redirect the rope through the anchor while lowering another climber from a braking device that is directly attached to the harness. This technique creates extra friction and allows more control of the lowering speed and the force on the belayer.

A safer alternative might have been a rappel from the bolts. As Riley recalls, “Looking back, the only way I had descended the route [previously] was by rappelling. On that day, my brain wanted to lower my partner because I noticed he was still tied in and the rope was running through my Grigri. But muscle memory was getting me ready to rappel, so I removed the quad then began lowering without registering that I was unanchored.” 

(Source: Dawson Riley.)

Learn More About Safe Lowering Techniques

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“The Prescription” is the monthly newsletter of Accidents in North American Climbing. Join the American Alpine Club email list to get it right to your inbox.

The ice and mixed season is in full swing. While offering a dazzling range of sights, sounds, and textures, winter climbing arguably presents the highest risk to life and limb of any crag-oriented climbing genre. Ice is an ever-changing medium. The clothing and tools required deprive climbers of the accustomed “feel” for the climbing medium—so critical to fair-weather rock climbing.

This month we have two accidents from 2023. Both involved collapsing ice formations. One had an injury-free ending. The other ended in tragedy.

Fall on Ice | Collapsed Pillar

Hyalite Canyon, Montana

On January 27, 2023, Lauren Olivia Smith and Bailey Lasko, both of Bozeman, Montana, were climbing Code Red (WI 5) in nearby Hyalite Canyon. This single-pitch ice pillar has a longer approach than other popular venues in the canyon. The approach, combined with the avalanche hazard, made for a more serious outing. 

Smith was leading. As she reported to Climbing magazine, “(From the approach gully)…the pillar looked funky and off-kilter, in a shape I’d never seen before…. I remember thinking it doesn’t look quite right, but the part that was leaning seemed quite big, and we had a big freeze-thaw [cycle], so I figured it was well-attached.”

From a closer vantage, Smith confirmed that Code Red appeared well-attached to the rock and “gave its stability no further thought.” At 15 feet up, Smith heard a cracking noise from above. The bottom half of the pillar then collapsed, toppling “like a falling tree.” Smith said, “I remember seeing a chunk of ice fall past me with my tool still in it.” 

The point of detachment was 35 feet above Smith. With no intermediate protection, she—and the unanchored Lasko—"rocketed down the 30-degree approach slope.” Smith had been climbing on the lower-angled (left) side of the formation, and the inclined column fell away from her, so she avoided being crushed. The pair slid alongside the pillar before self-arresting after 100 feet, and they emerged unharmed.

ANALYSIS

Smith did well to assess temperature patterns in the days prior to the outing. She also chose a line that was well-bonded to the top of the cliff. While Smith was surprised at the collapse, it’s worth noting that the unusual crooked profile indicated the pillar had previously cracked and toppled partway before refreezing at a Pisa-like tilt. Inclined columns are subject to axial compression, shear forces, and in this case, buckling. Smith says she now completes a full 360-degree inspection of any free-standing ice pillar before climbing.

(Sources: Climbing magazine, The Editors.)

Fall on Ice | Collapsed Pillar

Right Fork of Indian Canyon, Duchesne, Utah

On April 2, 2023, Meg O’Neill (40), a member of a party of three climbers, was killed when struck by a collapsing ice column on Raven Falls (WI4), near Duchesne in northeast Utah. According to the Duchesne County Sheriff’s Office, O’Neill, who was standing nearby, saved the belayer’s life by pushing her out of the fall zone. The leader was seriously injured.

Sean McLane (34) was on lead near the top of the second pitch when the accident occurred. He was belayed by Anne Nikolov (21), while O’Neill was spectating.

McLane wrote to ANAC, “It had been warm for a couple days, and this was to be my last climb of the season. We were a group of three. Meg was experienced and a regular climbing partner of mine. Anne was new and had climbed a couple times with Meg.”

McLane led the first pitch and brought the other two up. The base of pitch 2 was a broad snow ledge about 100 feet above the top of the first pitch.

“The second pitch was an ice column that formed at the lip of a cave. The column was 40 feet high and 15 feet in diameter. I saw no signs of instability. I didn’t see or hear any significant running water. There was little to no cone at the bottom, although a 15-foot radius of ice was present at the base. I stomped on it to test for anything being undercut, but it felt solid, likely because it was a couple feet thick and my weight wasn't enough to stress it.”

“I led out the back of the ice and corkscrewed around to the side. Anne (Nikolov) was belaying and Meg (O’Neill) was walking around, taking pictures. As I [was nearly] top[ping] out, there was a significant density change in the ice. It went from wet, one-swing sticks, to dense… dinner-plating [hits]."

McLane climbed above the point where the ice was attached to the rock. As he swung an ice tool into an already dinner-plated placement, the pillar fractured, breaking two or three feet below the point of the pick’s impact.

According to McLane, the collapse took “my other tool and both my feet with it. Meg was in the cave behind the pillar, and Anne was to the side. Most of the column went downhill, but falling ice buried Meg.”

Climbing magazine wrote that O’Neill “noticed the ice fracture, and… may have heard it cracking just before the formation broke.” She then pushed Nikolov aside, and as also reported in Climbing magazine, “Her quick thinking undoubtedly saved Anne’s life.” 

McLane recalls, “I had placed screws in the pillar and was pulled off by the rope. The main column fell down the slope away from me, and I came straight down. "I hit the ground... land[ing] on my back [atop] a large chunk of ice. [This] broke my spine at L2... That was my only injury besides scrapes and bruises. I put myself in recovery position as Anne tried to get to Meg.”

The closest cell signal was driving distance away. McLane showed Nikolov how to fix a rappel line and then gave her his phone along with directions to access the car keys. Nikolov safely descended, drove to town and contacted SAR and local climbers. About six hours after the accident, some Salt Lake climbing friends arrived. McLane was long-lined by helicopter to the road. He was then loaded into another helicopter and flown to a hospital in Salt Lake City.

*Editor’s Note: This is an example of a hidden ice climbing hazard called a False Pillar. To learn more, click the link below.

 ANALYSIS

Alpinism and ice climbing are perhaps the most dangerous of climbing games. As mentioned above, frozen water is a fickle, ever-changing medium. And, as demonstrated in these two accidents, the hazards are often invisible. In no small way, luck was a determinant factor in the different outcome of these two accidents.

On Raven Falls, McLane—a very experienced climber who had safely climbed the route twice previously—visually assessed the ice and stomp-tested the base to ensure the column was attached. He wrote to ANAC that, “In retrospect, to fail as it did, the pillar must have been melted out from underneath.” The solid-looking column was basically a free-hanging, bus-sized chunk of ice.

McLane has physically recovered; it took about six months to get back to normal climbing.

McLane notes:

• Running water underneath an ice formation can render a solid and fully attached flow free-hanging and unstable. Figuring out if ice is undercut can be hard to impossible to do, without seeing the running water or the gap between the bottom of the pillar and the base. Several days of warmer temperatures can create this dangerous situation. 

• Large variations in ice quality and density (on the route) may signal stability issues. 

• (When belaying or spectating) Position yourself farther away than you might think in order to stay out of the way of falling ice. A cave is not necessarily protected if the ice collapses.

• Carry an extra layer (pack it with you on your harness or in your pack). Since it was a warm day, I left my puffy at the base, a pitch below. I got very cold lying on ice and not moving for many hours.

• If you might need something on a multi-pitch route, don’t leave it at the base. A satellite communicator and warm layers with me on pitch two would have made a bad situation more manageable.

(Source: Sean McLane, Climbing magazine, and The Editors.)

To Climb or Not to Climb?

More people than ever are ice climbing. At the same time, climate change is dramatically affecting geologic stability in the mountains. Changes include rock fall, glacial recession, and waterfall ice collapse. The intersection of ice climbing popularity and effects of climate change can cause accidents.

This flowchart was developed by Derek DeBruin. It was first published in the 2023 ANAC. This tool can assist in managing hazards by helping determine the stability of the ice, the effectiveness of ice screw protection, and the quality of ice tool placement. Downloadable PDF and image are available through the link below.

The Prescription is the monthly newsletter of Accidents in North American Climbing. The Prescription brings you monthly unpublished accident reports, tech tips, links to new online educational resources, and much more—all aimed at helping you become a safer climber.

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A note from the editor of Accidents in North American Climbing: I’m writing this from the AAC Hueco Rock Ranch in Texas. Here, the season is in full swing for what some say is the best bouldering on the planet. While often regarded as relatively risk-free, bouldering can be plenty dangerous. This month we feature a reminder from Joshua Tree National Park.

Bouldering Fall | Insufficient Pads

California, Joshua Tree National Park, Hidden Valley Area

On November 9, 2023, Gibson McGee (19) was bouldering on White Rastafarian, a V2 (often graded V3) highball that has been the scene of many accidents. He fell from near the top and struck the ground, shattering his L1 vertebra, the highest bone in the lower back.

Though Mountain Project describes White Rastafarian as “one of JTree’s finest (problems),” the climb is 25 feet tall—more a short route instead of a boulder problem. After the midpoint crux, the climber is faced with a tricky mantel topout.

McGee wrote to ANAC, “I was heading to Joshua Tree for the weekend, and I was planning on meeting a group who were coming in the following morning. After setting up camp, I went to go climb the nearby White Rastafarian. I had previously attempted it but fell at the crux (15 feet off ground). I was fine with no injuries.” McGee laid out three crash pads, set up a video camera to record himself, and started up the route.

“I got to the top of the route (about 25 feet off ground) and was too pumped to do the ‘easy’ mantel onto the top of the rock. I looked down and decided I could drop safely. I dropped, but when I hit the ground, I ended up shattering my L1 vertebra. I then army crawled (using arms and upper body to cross the ground) to the nearby Hidden Valley Campground, where I got help and was transported by ambulance to High Desert Medical Center.”

McGee is currently recovering. He wrote, “While I am eager to be able to climb again, healing physically and mentally from this fall will take me quite some time. I was very fortunate looking back on the possible injuries I could’ve sustained.”

Analysis

Bouldering is inherently dangerous, and highball problems particularly so. On Reddit, un poco lobo posted, “Was chatting with a park ranger who said they see more accidents on WR (White Rastafarian) than pretty much all other routes/problems combined.”

McGee had been consistently climbing outdoors for one year prior. He recalls, “I saw White Rastafarian the first week I started climbing. It has always been a dream for me to do it.” His pad placements were in the right place and he landed cleanly—no part of his body struck exposed ground. While multiple pads are great idea, an evenly distributed second layer of pads might have saved McGee from a trip to the hospital. Covering gaps between pads with a thin “slider” pad also would have provided additional safety. McGee mentioned, “I should’ve brought a buddy and stacked bouldering pads.”

Keep ‘Em On The Pad!

In bouldering, spotting is the norm. On highballs, though, spotters can be extraneous as the impact forces of a falling climber can be equally harmful to the spotter. See a fall from the same problem that came close to injuring the spotter here.

While spotting highballs is more art than science, the general rule is to ensure the falling climber stays on the pad after impact. Guaranteeing that the climber impacts the pad itself is part of good pad placement. A spotter should also protect the head and neck from impacting bare ground or surrounding obstacles. Another good rule to follow is to never fall above the 20-foot mark. Be open to using a top-rope to practice the problem. John Gill himself was a big exponent of top-roping.

Finally, Joshua Tree has a well-earned reputation for tricky climbing and a long learning curve. As always, different climbing areas have special characteristics that grades do not convey. Be conservative and risk-averse as you learn the peculiarities of any area. Wrote McGee, “I have bouldered in Joshua Tree four or five times. The grading is much, much harder than what you might think. I let the number (V2-3) get in my head rather than trusting the true difficulty of J Tree grades.”

(Sources: Gibson McGee, Mountain Project, and Climbing magazine.)

Clarification and Reflection on Michael Spitz Free Solo Accident

In the 2023 ANAC, we reported on the death of free soloist Michael Spitz. Recently, Brian Gillette, a close friend of Spitz, reached out to correct some inaccuracies in our report. In his letter to ANAC, Gillette filled some gaps in our understanding of the accident, while offering some thoughtful words on risk.

A short excerpt, “In the year before his death, Mike's free soloing had accelerated from an occasional outing to a nearly weekly activity. The more he free soloed, the more I watched his perception of the risks become disconnected from the reality of climbing. Mike had also been surfing a heavy swell in the days leading up to his death. When I spoke with him the night before, I thought he sounded tired and told him to take it easy. He told me he planned to climb for the day and head home. From what I can tell, soloing Illusion Dweller was a last-minute decision. He might have been more tired than he realized. It might explain why a small slip caused him to fall. Mike's last-minute decision also meant that he wasn't prepared in any way for a potential accident, even a minor one.”

Read the original report and Brian Gillette’s full letter here.

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This month we have an unfortunate accident that occurred several months ago on a popular one-pitch sport route at Sand Rock, Alabama. This accident underscores the sometimes perilous learning curve faced by those transitioning from indoor to outdoor climbing.

Fatal Fall From Anchor | Inexperience, Inadequate Supervision

Alabama, Sand Rock, Sun Wall

On October 14, Yutung “Faye” Zhang (18) fell 90 feet from the anchors of Misty (5.10b/c) while cleaning this route at Sand Rock in northeastern Alabama. It was her second time climbing outdoors. At around 12 p.m., Zhang, a new climber and part of a larger group, took a final top-rope lap on the route. She cleaned the quickdraws and reached the two-bolt anchor. The anchor was equipped with two mussy hooks plus a single locking carabiner that had been placed by one of the other climbers to guard against the rope from unclipping from the mussys. 

No one was at the anchors with Zhang to see exactly what happened. Jun C., who was belaying Zhang at the time of the accident, wrote on Mountain Project, “We put the locker in on the incredibly unlikely premise that the mussys could come unclipped. Not that any of us really thought that would happen, but we wanted to keep our party safe. [While Zhang was on the ground], we communicated and demonstrated what she was to do when she got to the top.... She was aware and confident of just needing to remove a locker and leave the mussys clipped.”

It is assumed that after removing the locking carabiner at the belay, Zhang somehow unclipped the rope from the mussy hooks. Jun C., the belayer, wrote, “Suddenly the rope became unweighted and she (Zhang) wasn’t clipped through the mussys anymore. I fell and smacked my back and head against another rock, and she fell right beside me…. A few of us trained in emergency first response came to aid immediately, as well as a physician that just happened to be in the area. EMS response was quite fast as well, but there was really nothing to be done.” 

Jun C. added, “Between all of us we have decades of climbing experience. In our eyes, this [lowering from the mussys] was routine and one of the safest things we could ask of a relatively new climber.” The belayer added, “At the same time, I know all of us are kicking ourselves for asking her to do anything at all.… We’ve all been thinking about what we could or should have done differently or how this could have been a safer experience.” (Sources: mountainproject.com, climbing.com, and the Editors.)

ANALYSIS

A few weeks after the accident, IFMGA guide Karsten Delap climbed this route and provided ANAC with some images and video. He observed that the best handholds at the end of Misty were located above the bolts. (See the video below.) This may have positioned Zhang above the mussys. Then, as Zhang weighted the rope, it might have loaded the mussys incorrectly and become unclipped.

A more in-depth article on best practices for using mussy hooks, written by Delap, will appear in the 2024 ANAC. For now, he writes that, “It is plausible that the rope was threaded from right to left on the mussy hooks, with the locking carabiner positioned between the two hooks. As the climber approached the anchor from the right side, an attempt to remove the locking carabiner involved pulling up above the mussy hooks to introduce slight slack into the system. While this facilitated the removal of the carabiner, it also inadvertently positioned the rope over the gates of the mussy hooks. The belayer, responding to the climber's movement, probably took up slack, felt the climber's weight, and subsequently the gates of the mussy hooks back-clipped under the full force of the climber's weight. This resulted in the rope becoming dislodged from the anchor.” 

BE A PRO, KEEP IT LOW

Delap noted that the addition of a locking carabiner to a mussy hook belay was inappropriate for the system. In this case, the locker probably brought the rope above the plane of the hooks, a mistake when considering the “open” nature of mussy hooks.

After the accident, Delap posted an Instagram video detailing some best practices for mussy use. Click here or on the photo to see the video.

“The best thing you can do is always stay below the mussy hooks, both with your anchor setup and your body,” Delap writes. “So be a pro, keep it low.”

Greg Barnes is executive director of the American Safe Climbing Association (ASCA). Though Barnes is a proponent of lower-offs such as mussy hooks, he says these useful tools have inherent limits.

He wrote to ANAC: “Lower-offs include hooks, ram's horns, fixed carabiners, etc. We have had a policy of avoiding hooks for popular top-rope-accessible routes because of the chance of hooks becoming unclipped as someone transitions to rappel.”

Although mussys have a proven safety record, Barnes believes, they still require eduation. He writes, “In Owens River Gorge, lower-offs [have been] the standard since the early ’90s. Despite very heavy climber traffic for 30 years, there have been very few anchor changeover accidents compared to similar areas with closed anchors. In the Sand Rock case, we don’t know whether the rope became accidentally unclipped or if the climber unclipped them on purpose. It is wise to have direct supervision—namely an experienced climber at the same anchor—when a new climber cleans an anchor.” (Sources: Karsten Delap, Greg Barnes, and the Editors.)

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Winter is coming and our attentions are shifting to sunny destinations like Southern Arizona. This month we have an unfortunate mishap that occurred last winter on one of the region’s premier backcountry crags.

Fall on Rock | Broken Hold

Arizona, Mendoza Canyon, Table Dome

On February 24, 2023, Steve Sagin (58) and Jerry Cagle (70) were climbing Wily Javelina (6 pitches, 5.9, PG-13) on Table Dome in the remote Mendoza Canyon, southwest of Tucson. On pitch five, Sagin broke a hold and took a long leader fall.

Cagle recounted the following in a report to ANAC:

“We began planning for this climb with a check of the predicted weather for the day: pleasantly warm around midday with an occasional light breeze. Our spouses were informed of our plans.

“Wily Javelina is a coveted route and considered a bit of a testpiece. Though it’s frequently climbed using just the bolts, the distances between are considerable, but can be supplemented with gear—albeit possibly dubious—so we also carried a light rack. We each carried a cell phone, and I carried a Garmin inReach Mini. We had jackets, space blankets, food, water, and headlamps.

“Reaching the start of the approach hike entails driving for 9.5 miles on an unmaintained dirt road after leaving the highway. The approach wends through two miles of rugged trails. The areas adjacent to the paths present an impenetrable barrier of cat-claw acacias and thorny mesquite trees.

“It was around 10 a.m. when we started climbing. Steve led pitch one, then we swung leads. Though I had always shied away from this route due to its reputation of serious runouts and sections of poor-quality rock, neither of us was excessively nervous about the risk. But throughout the course of the climb, we repeated the mantra that ‘falling was not an option.’ It is my considered opinion that this route is the textbook definition of an ‘R’ rated route and not PG-13 (as graded on Mountain Project).

“We continued climbing carefully without incident. As Steve led pitch five, he passed the middle mark on the ropes (60m x 7.9mm twin/half). He was well past the second bolt on the chickenhead-studded upper section, at the start of the easier climbing, when a large hold fractured, sending considerable debris past my helmet. He fell, striking a large ledge 30 or 40 feet below him with the full force of his weight. The rope came taut as he started to slide off the ledge. It was immediately obvious that he was seriously injured.

“We determined that lowering him to my position at the anchor was our best option. We had enough rope to lower him to the stance with about ten feet to spare.

“Steve was bleeding in several places but not excessively. His broken ankle was likely the most serious injury, and we determined it was not a compound [open] fracture. We knew we couldn’t extricate ourselves from the canyon due to the difficult terrain, so I pulled out the inReach, only to discover that the batteries were dead. We next dialed 911 on my cell phone. The battery was low, having recorded our approach using the Gaia GPS application. To our surprise, a voice came on the other end asking, ‘What's your emergency?’ We explained our situation and indicated that we intended to rappel the route but would require assistance to evacuate.

“We were starting the last rappel when we heard a helicopter approaching. It came into sight before we reached the ground. A Pima County Sheriff’s Department officer was lowered, and he hooked Steve up to the rescue cable. They flew him to an ambulance which took him to a hospital in Tucson. I was left to return on my own accord and was able to get back to the truck without incident.

“X-rays taken at the hospital showed that Steve's tibia was shattered into eight pieces. The fibula was, thankfully, not involved. This could have just as easily resulted in a fatality had he landed differently.”

ANALYSIS

The duo was very experienced, having over 60 years of climbing between them. Sagin had climbed extensively in Mendoza Canyon, and this was his sixth time on Wily Javelina. Despite this, several factors contributed to the accident.

“But for luck, several other failures could have easily compounded the difficulty of our situation:

1. My failure to make certain that the battery on the inReach was charged.

2. My cell phone battery wasn't fully charged when we left that morning. I had intended to charge it on the ride but didn’t have a compatible cable.

3. On the approach, I didn’t pay sufficient attention to our surroundings and let Steve lead the way while I chatted and followed blindly along. On the return I depended heavily on the GPS track I had recorded on my phone. Had the phone failed for any reason, I am pretty sure I would've gotten lost and had to bivouac.

“As a result of this incident, I now strive, when climbing or hiking, to cultivate a mindset that assumes that there WILL be an accident and to be fully prepared, both in skills and resources.” (Source: Jerry Cagle.)

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